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game theoretic predictions depend on robustness properties of the solution concepts adopted. Chapter 1
discusses recent results in this research area and their relations with the results obtained in the subsequent
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received little attention in the literature (namely, the distinction between knowledge and certainty), raising
novel questions of robustness. Chapter 4 develops a methodology to address classical questions of
implementation, when agents' beliefs are unknown to the designer and their private information changes over
time. The key idea is the identification of a solution concept that allows a tractable analysis of the full
implementation problem: Full "robust" implementation requires that, for all models of agents' beliefs, all the
perfect Bayesian equilibria of a mechanism induce outcomes consistent with the social choice function
(SCF). It is shown that, for a weaker notion of equilibrium and for a general class of games, the set of all such
equilibria can be computed by means of a "backwards procedure" that combines the logic of rationalizability
and backward induction reasoning. It is further shown that a SCF is (partially) implementable for all models
of beliefs if and only if it is ex-post incentive compatible. In environments with single crossing preferences,
strict ex-post incentive compatibility and a "contraction property" are sufficient to guarantee full robust
implementation in direct mechanisms. This property limits the interdependence in agents' valuations.
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ABSTRACT
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND ROBUSTNESS IN STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENTS
Antonio Penta
George J. Mailath
Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on agentsinnite hierar-
chies of beliefs. These assumptions are understood to be only approximately satised
in the actual situation. Thus, the signicance of game theoretic predictions depend
on robustness properties of the solution concepts adopted. Chapter 1 discusses re-
cent results in this research area and their relations with the results obtained in the
subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 explores the impact of misspecication of higher or-
der beliefs in static environments, when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions
on payo¤s are relaxed. (Existing literature focuses on the extreme case in which all
such assumptions are relaxed.) Chapter 3 provides a characterization of the strongest
predictions, for dynamic games, that are robust to possible misspecications of
agentshigher order beliefs, and shows that such characterization depends on model-
ing assumptions that have hitherto received little attention in the literature (namely,
the distinction between knowledge and certainty), raising novel questions of robust-
ness. Chapter 4 develops a methodology to address classical questions of implementa-
tion, when agentsbeliefs are unknown to the designer and their private information
changes over time. The key idea is the identication of a solution concept that allows
a tractable analysis of the full implementation problem: Full robust implementa-
tion requires that, for all models of agentsbeliefs, all the perfect Bayesian equilibria
of a mechanism induce outcomes consistent with the social choice function (SCF). It
v
is shown that, for a weaker notion of equilibrium and for a general class of games, the
set of all such equilibria can be computed by means of a backwards procedurethat
combines the logic of rationalizability and backward induction reasoning. It is further
shown that a SCF is (partially) implementable for all models of beliefs if and only if
it is ex-post incentive compatible. In environments with single crossing preferences,
strict ex-post incentive compatibility and a contraction propertyare su¢ cient to
guarantee full robust implementation in direct mechanisms. This property limits the
interdependence in agentsvaluations.
vi
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Chapter 1
Incomplete Information and
Robustness in Strategic
Environments
Abstract: Standard models for games with incomplete information im-
pose common knowledge on agentspayo¤s and beliefs. Recent research
has explored questions of robustness of game theoretic predictions with
respect to possible misspecications of the model. In static games, the
solution concept of rationalizability, corresponding to the epistemic as-
sumptions of Rationality and Common Belief in Rationality (RCBR), pro-
vides a unique answer to several questions of robustness. When the same
questions are addressed in dynamic games, such unity is lost: di¤erent
dynamic extensions of RCBR provide answers to di¤erent robustness
questions.
Keywords: equilibrium hierarchies of beliefs  incomplete information
 rationalizability  robustness
JEL Codes: C72; C73; D82.
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1.1 Introduction
Game theory can be dened as the study of mathematical models of interactions of
rational, strategic and intelligent agents, in situations in which agentspayo¤s depend
on the actions of others.
Rationality here means that agents are assumed to choose behavior that maximizes
exogenously given, stable preferences. (More specically, agents are assumed expected
utility maximizers.) The interdependence of agentsdecision problems is not exclusive
to game theory: Models of competitive economies do exhibit this feature. What is
specic to game theory is the fact that agents are aware of such interdependence:
That is, agents are strategic. Intelligent agents not only take strategic considerations
into account, but also the fact that their opponents are strategic.
Classical game theory is based upon two fundamental methodological tenets: rst,
the assumption that the rules of the game and the payo¤ structure are commonly
known by the players (that is, everybody knows them, everybody knows that every-
body knows them, and so on); second, the equilibrium hypothesis, for which agents
play best-responses to correct conjectures about the opponents behavior (i.e. a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium).
For a long time, authoritative views ascribed to Nash equilibrium the value of a
necessary consequence of the assumption of common knowledge of the game and of
the agentsrationality, to the point that the equilibrium hypothesis almost acquired
the status of a methodological assumption.1 This view was forcefully challenged by
1For example, in Schelling (1960, p.115):
Whether one agrees explicitely to a bargain or agrees tacitly or accepts it by default,
he must, if he has his wits with him, expect that he could do no better and recognize
that the other party must reciprocate the feeling. Thus the fact of an outcome, which
is simply a coordinated choice, should be analytically characterized by the notion of
2
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984), who introduced the concept of rationalizability:
far from being a consequence of rationality, equilibrium arises from cer-
tain restrictions on agentsexpectations which may or may not be plau-
sible [...](Bernheim 1984, p. 1007).
In contrast, rationalizability is based on the idea that agents are rational, they
believe that everybody is rational, and so on (that is, rationality and common belief
in rationality, RCBR hereafter), without imposing coordination of expectations.2
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) showed that RCBR and equilibrium are indeed
connected, but in a more subtle way. Brandenburger and Dekels result occupies a
central position in relation with more recent research, that explored the premises of
traditional solution concepts when the other fundamental tenet of game theory is
addressed: Namely, that the rules of the game, including the payo¤ structure and
agentsbeliefs, are common knowledge. This literature produced a number of notions
of rationalizability (all based on the idea of RCBR) for incomplete information games,
i.e. strategic situations in which some features of the environment are not commonly
known to players.
Overall, RCBR (in its di¤erent declinations) emerged as the unique answer to
di¤erent questions of robustness for static games. In my dissertation I address some
of these robustness questions in the context of dynamic games. What emerges is that
this unity is lost: di¤erent analogues of RCBR for dynamic games answer di¤erent
converging expectations.
More recently, in Myerson (1991, p. 108):
[...] being a Nash Equilibirum is [...] a necessary condition for a theory to be a good
prediction of the behavior of intelligent rational players.
2Tan and Werlang (1988) provided the formal epistemic characterization.
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questions of robustness. The source of the discrepancythat arises in dynamic games
lies in the agentsbeliefs updating process, and in the possibility that they observe
unexpected moves, possibly inconsistent with their previous beliefs about everyones
rationality. This possibility, inherent to dynamic games, also raises novel robustness
questions that can only be addressed adopting an extensive-form approach.
This chapter surveys the main concepts and results in this literature, serving as
a background for the results obtained in the subsequent chapters. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the basic concepts, and presents
the main result from Brandenburger and Dekel (1987); Section 1.3 introduces games
with incomplete information; Section 1.4 presents the main results on robustness for
static games; Section 1.5 concludes discussing the main results of the dissertation
concerning the analysis of robustness problems in dynamic games.
1.2 Complete Information: Rationalizability and
Equilibria
Bernheim and Pearce claried that equilibrium is not the logical consequence of the
assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality (RCBR), and proposed
the concept of rationalizability. However, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) showed
that rationalizability and the equilibrium approach are more closely related than at
rst it might appear, proving that a certain kind of equilibrium could be given a
decision theoretic foundation based on RCBR alone.
Brandenburger and Dekels result applies to games with complete information,
but is important for understanding the subsequent research on robustness in games
of incomplete information. This section introduces the basic notation and illustrates
the main concepts and results from Brandenburger and Dekel (1987, BD hereafter).
4
1.2.1 (Static) Games with Complete Information.
For simplicity, we will consider here only games with two players, indexed by i = 1; 2.
A (static) game with complete information is a tuple (Ai; ui)i=1;2 where Ai is a (nite)
set of actions (or strategies) for agent i, and ui : A1  A2 ! R is agent is payo¤
function. The tuple (Ai; ui)i=1;2 is assumed to be common knowledge among the
players: that is, everybody knows (Ai; ui)i2N , everybody knows that everybody knows
(Ai; ui)i=1;2, and son on.
Rationalizability. A subset C1C2 of A1A2 is a best reply set if for every i and
each ai 2 Ci, there exist conjectures i 2 (C i) to which ai is a best reply. The
set of rationalizable action proles R1R2  A1A2 is the (nite) union of all best
reply sets C1 C2 . An equivalent denition of the set R1R2 can be given in terms
of iterated deletion of strongly dominated actions.3
Example 1.1. Consider for instance the following game, with A1 = fU;M;Dg,
A2 = fL;C;Rg, and payo¤s as represented in the following matrix (payo¤s in bold
correspond best responses):
L C R
U 2;3 5; 1 2; 0
M 3; 1 2;3 2; 0
D 1;4 1; 3 6; 0
Notice that strategy R is dominated by strategies L and C, hence a rational player
2 would never play R. Hence, if player 1 believes that 2 is rational, he would never
3In the case of more than two players, this denition translates into correlated rationalizability, in
which agentsconjectures about the opponentsbehavior allow for correlation, i.e. i 2 (j 6=iAj).
Bernheim and Pearce instead dened independent rationalizability, in which opponentsactions were
independent in the eyes of a player, hence conjectures are of the form i 2 j 6=i(Aj). For the case
of two players there is no distinction.
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play D, which is only justied by the belief that 2 plays R. The set of rationalizable
strategy proles is therefore fU;Mg  fL;Cg.
A Posteriori Equilibrium. The equilibrium concept that Brandenburger and
Dekel relate to rationalizability is a renement of Aumanns (1974) subjective corre-
lated equilibrium, called a posteriori equilibrium.
To dene an a posteriori equilibrium, we must introduce a (nite) space 
, and
for each player i a partition Ii of 
. A strategy now is a Ii-measurable function
i : 
! Ai. For each player i, also specify a prior Pi on 
 and a proper and regular
version of conditional probability on Ii: for each Ii 2 Ii, Pi (jIi) is required to be
a probability measure on 
 and Pi (IijIi) = 1. Clearly, if Pi (Ii) > 0, Bayes rule
guarantees that Pi (jIi) satises both requirements, but Pi (jIi) is required to satisfy
them also if Pi (Ii) = 0. For each i and ! 2 
, let Ii (!) denote the cell of is partition
that contains !.
Denition 1.1. A strategy prole (1; 2) is an a posteriori equilibrium if for each i
and for each ! 2 
,
X
!02

Pi (f!0g jIi (!))  ui (i (!) ;  i (!0))

X
!02

Pi (f!0g jIi (!))  ui (a0i;  i (!0)) for all a0i 2 Ai:
Notice that, similar to Aumanns (1974) subjective correlated equilibrium, in an a
posteriori equilibrium agents have subjective beliefs over the space 
, that is agents
are allowed to have inconsistent priors over 
. A posteriori equilibrium though re-
nes subjective correlated equilibrium because it requires every agent to best respond
at every Ii 2 Ii, including those cells that receive zero probability under the prior.
Subjective correlated equilibrium instead maintains an ex ante perspective, and con-
6
ditional probabilities on zero probability events dont need to be specied.
1.2.2 Common Belief in Rationality and Equilibrium
The next result states an equivalence between rationalizable and equilibrium strate-
gies.4
Proposition 1.1 (cf. Proposition 2.1 in BD). Strategy ai is rationalizable if and only
if there exists an a posteriori equilibrium in which ai is played.5
The following example illustrates the proposition.
Example 1.2. Take the game in example 1.1, and consider the following equilib-
rium, in which all the rationalizable strategies are played: let 
 = fa; b; c; dg, and
agents partitions I1 = ffa; bg ; fc; dgg and I2 = ffa; cg ; fb; dgg. Let agents pri-
ors be such that P1 (fag) = 1 and P2 (fcg) = 1. Let conditional probabilities be
such that P1 (fag j fa; bg) = 1 and P1 (fdg j fc; dg) = 1, while for player 2 they are
P2 (fcg j fa; cg) = 1 and P2 (fbg j fb; dg) = 1. Consider the following strategy prole:
1 (a) = 

1 (b) = U and 

1 (c) = 

1 (d) =M ;
2 (a) = 

2 (c) = C and 

2 (b) = 

2 (d) = L.
To see that (1; 

2) is an a posteriori equilibrium, consider state a rst: at that state,
player 1 puts probability one on the true state, and given 2 he also puts probability one
on 2 playing C: 1 (a) = U is thus a best response. Player 2 instead puts probability
1 on c at state a, hence he expects player 1 to play M , hence 2 (a) = C is a best
4BD expressed the equivalence in terms of payo¤s. For our purposes, it is more useful to present
it in terms of strategies.
5With more than two players, this result holds for correlated rationalizability. Using a modied
version of the equilibrium concept, BD also provide an analogous for independent rationalizability
(footnote 3.)
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response. At state c, the opposite is true: 2 puts probability one on the true state, and
expects 1 to play M , and he best responds playing C; player 1 instead (mistakenly)
puts probability one on a, expects 2 to be playing C, and best responds playing U .
In state b, player 1 assigns probability one to a, hence he expects 2 to play C, hence
1 (b) = U is a best response; at b instead 2 puts probability one on b, i.e. he expects
1 to play U , hence 2 (b) = L is a best response. Finally, at d, player 1 believes the
true state is d, hence expects 2 to play L, so that 1 (d) = M is a best response; at
d instead player 2 believes that the state is b, i.e. he expects 1 to play U , so that
2 (d) = L is a best response.
The equilibrium hypothesis is based on two assumptions: 1) rationality; 2) coordi-
nation of expectations: agents hold correct conjectures about the opponentsstrate-
gies. On the contrary, rationalizability does not impose coordination and derives
restrictions on agentsconjectures from the hypothesis of common belief in rational-
ity. These restrictions may or may not lead to coordination of expectations. Hence, in
general, rationalizability is weaker than equilibrium concepts. The equivalence result
of Proposition 1.1 though shows that the two approaches are intimately connected:
Proposition 1.1 can be interpreted as saying that if no restrictions on the agents
beliefs about the correlating device are imposed (i.e. if agents play not Nash, but
a posteriori equilibrium), and if the analyst has no information about the equilib-
rium correlating device (i.e. he does not know h
; I1; I2i), then the assumption that
agents best respond to correct conjectures about the opponentsstrategies (i.e. the
equilibrium hypothesis) has no bite beyond rationalizability alone.
8
1.3 (Static) Games with Incomplete Information
Games of incomplete information are situations in which some features of agents
payo¤s are not common knowledge.6 This situation can be modelled parametrizing
the payo¤ functions on a space of uncertainty , letting ui : A! R denote agent
is payo¤ as a function of the action prole a 2 A and the payo¤ state  2 . In
general, agents may have private information about the payo¤-relevant states . To
represent this, write  as
 = 0 1 2.
For each i 2 f1; 2g, i is the set of player is payo¤ types, i.e. possible pieces
of information that i may have about the payo¤ state; 0 instead represents the
set of states of nature, the residual uncertainty that is left after pooling all players
information. The interpretation is that when the payo¤ state is  = (0; 1; 2), player
i knows that  2 0  fig   i. Special cases of interest are those of distributed
knowledge, in which ui is constant in 0 (or 0 is a singleton); private values, in which
each ui depends on i only; and the case in which the uis depend on 0 only, so that
players have no information about payo¤s (or, without loss of generality,  = 0).
We refer to the tuple G =
D
; (Ai; ui)i=1;2
E
as game with payo¤ uncertainty. (If
 = fg, the game has complete information, and its denoted by G ().) Notice
that this is not the standard way of representing a game with incomplete information,
i.e. G is not a Bayesian game. Bayesian games are introduced next.
6Harsanyi (1967-68) argued that, in static games, lack of common knowledge of any feature of
the game (i.e. payo¤s, rules, etc.) can be reduced to this case.
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1.3.1 Harsanyis approach: Bayesian Games and Equilibrium
Extending the classical (equilibrium) approach to situations with incomplete infor-
mation entails specifying agentsinnite hierarchies of beliefs: consider player 1, who
knows 1 and has beliefs about what he doesnt know, (0; 2). In any equilibrium,
1s behavior will in general depend on his information and on such rst order beliefs.
But this is true for agent 2 as well, so to form beliefs about 2s behavior player 1
also needs to have beliefs about 2s beliefs about (0; 1) (that is, beliefs about 2s
rst order beliefs, or second order beliefs). Clearly, this reasoning can be iterated
ad innitum. This hierarchies-of-beliefs approach is mathematically feasible (see e.g.
Mertens and Zamir, 1985), but it does not provide a tractable framework for a direct
analysis of incomplete information games.
Harsanyi (1967-68) showed that a convenient parametrization of agentsbeliefs
avoids the di¢ culties of the hierarchies-approach, and so incomplete information
games can be analyzed with the standard tools of game theory. Key to Harsanyis
approach is the notion of type space: For each player i and each payo¤-type i 2 i,
we add a parameter ei from some space Ei that encodes the purely epistemic com-
ponents of player is attributes. In general, di¤erent values of ei can be attached to
a given payo¤-type i. This way we obtain a set Ti  i  Ei of possible attributes,
or Harsanyi-types, of player i. A Harsanyi-type ti = (i; ei) encodes the payo¤-type
and the epistemic type of a player. The epistemic components are given content by
functions that specify agentsbeliefs about what they dont know: The state of nature
0 and the opponents Harsanyi-type t i = ( i; e i). Such functions are denoted by
i : Ti ! (0  T i), i = 1; 2. The tuple T =
D
(Ti; i)i=1;2
E
is a type space, and is
assumed common knowledge. More formally, and to emphasize the underlying space
of uncertainty, we dene:
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Denition 1.2. Given an underlying space of uncertainty  = 0  1  2, and
parameter spaces E1; E2, a -based type space is a tuple T =
D
(Ti; i)i=1;2
E
such that
Ti  i  Ei satises projiTi = i and i : Ti ! (0  T i).
First, notice that each type in a type space induces an innite hierarchy of beliefs:
the rst-order beliefs 1i (ti) of type ti is simply the marginal of i (ti) on 0 i; the
(k+1)-order beliefs implicit in ti is derived from i (ti) and knowledge of the function
k i ()mapping the opponents type into his k-order beliefs. Notice also that the array
of probabilities (i (ti))ti2Ti can always be derived from some prior, i.e. there is at
least one probability measure Pi 2 (0  T1  T2) such that i (ti) = Pi (jti) for all
ti. Thus, within this framework, playerssituation in the incomplete information game
is formally similar to the interim stage of a game with complete but imperfect and
asymmetric information about a chance move, whereby ti represents agent is private
information. But the priorPi here does not represent is beliefs in a hypothetical
ex-ante stage, it is only a (unnecessary) technical device to express the belief function
i ().
When we attach a type space T to the game G, we obtain a Bayesian game:
B =
D
; (Ai; Ti; i; u

i )i=1;2
E
, where (Ti; i)i=1;2 are as in T , and ui extends ui to the
payo¤-irrelevant epistemic components (i.e. ui : 0  T  A ! R is such that
ui (0; t1; t2; a) = ui (0; 1; 2; a) whenever tj = (j;ej), j = 1; 2). In the rest of the
paper, notation will be slightly abused and ui will be used for both domains.
Denition 1.3. A Bayesian equilibrium is a prole of strategies i : Ti ! (Ai),
i = 1; 2 such that for each player i and each Harsanyi-type ti, strategy i (ti) maximizes
is expected payo¤ given the payo¤-type i, the subjective belief i (ti) 2 (0  T i),
and the function  i : T i ! (A i).
Throughout the paper, the convention is maintained that beliefsare about 
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and the opponents beliefs about . That is, beliefs are about exogenous vari-
ables only. The term conjecturesinstead refers to beliefs that also encompass the
opponentsstrategies.
The universal type space. Harsanyi (1967-68) argued that assuming the exis-
tence of a commonly known Bayesian model of the environment (namely, a type
space) entails no loss of generality: any set of hierarchies of beliefs can nd an im-
plicit representation as a type in a type space. Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed
that this is indeed the case, proving the existence of a universal type space that
essentially contains all possible hierarchies of beliefs on a fundamental space of un-
certainty . The -based universal type space, T  , can be thought of as the set
of all possible hierarchies of beliefs over : Let T i; denote the set all hierarchies
of beliefs ti = (i; 1i ; 
2
i ; :::) that player i may have that satisfy some consistency
conditions.7 Mertens and Zamir showed that if T i; are endowed with the product
topology, then there exists a homeomorphism  i : T

i; ! 
 
0  T  i;

. Thus,
hierarchies of beliefs can be represented by a single joint probability measure over the
space 0 and the opponentshierarchies. That is, sets of hierarchies T 1;; T

2; can be
thought of as sets of types in a -based type space. The type space thus obtained,
T  =
D 
T i;; 

i

i=1;2
E
, is the -based universal type space.
Hence, Harsanyis indirect approach is without loss of generality in the sense
that, modeling a situation with incomplete information G as the Bayesian game
B = hG; T i imposes no more restrictions than those that are already implicit in G.
In applied work though it is common to work with smaller, non-universal type spaces,
7A hierarchy satises coherency if higher order beliefs agree with lower order beliefs on their
common support. Hierarchies in T i; are those consistent with common certainty of coherency : i.e.
they are coherent, put probability one on the opponents beliefs that are coherent and concentrated
on coherent beliefs, and so on. (See Mertens and Zamir, 1985, or Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993).
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which do entail some loss in generality. Mertens and Zamir showed that any such
(non-universal) type space without redundant types (i.e. such that no two distinct
types induce the same hierarchy of beliefs) can be seen as a belief-closed subspace of
the universal type space.
Ex-ante vs interim perspective. Harsanyis implicit representation of hierar-
chies is convenient because it ultimately transforms the problem of incomplete infor-
mation into one of asymmetric information about an initial chance move.8 But the
formal analogy should not overshadow the fundamental distinction between the two
situations: If agents are facing genuine incomplete information, the ex-ante stage
is merely ctitious; the relevant objects are the hierarchies of beliefs, and therefore
the natural perspective is the interim one. Also, hierarchies of beliefs (or types) are
purely subjective states describing a players view of the strategic situation he is fac-
ing. As such, they enter the analysis as a datum and should be regarded in isolation
(i.e. player by player and type by type). Nothing prevents playersviews of the world
to be inconsistent with each other; they are part of the environment (exogenous vari-
ables), and as such game theoretic reasoning cannot impose restrictions on them; it
is given such beliefs that we can apply game theoretic reasoning to make predictions
about playersbehavior (the endogenous variables).
Also, it is important to emphasize that in situations with genuine incomplete
information Harsanyi-types are mere parametrizations of agentsbeliefs, and cannot
8Harsanyi pushed the analogy even further by assuming that all the subjective beliefs 
(i (ti))ti2Ti

i=1;2
can be derived from a common prior P 2 (0  T ), so that i (ti) = P (jti). In
this case, Bayesian equilibrium simply corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of a companion game with
imperfect information about a ctitious chance move selecting the vector of attributes according
to probability measure P . For games with genuine incomplete information, such common prior
assumption can hardly be justied. For more on this see, for example, Gul (1998) and Dekel and Gul
(1997). Bonanno and Nehring (1999) make senseof the common prior assumption in incomplete
information games, characterizing it as a very strong agreementproperty.
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in general be interpreted as information: When his type is ti = (i; ei), agent is
information about the environment is i, not ti; the epistemic component is just a
parameter for is subjective beliefs about what i does not know, i.e. the state of
nature, the opponentsinformation and their beliefs. It is only in some special cases
that Harsanyi-types can be interpreted as information(see Section 1.3.2).
Both the applied and the theoretical literature have often overlooked the dis-
tinction between the ex-ante and the interim perspectives, as well as the related
distinction between types viewed as information or as parameters. The dis-
tinction though has great importance when questions of robustness are addressed:
In situations of asymmetric information, where the ex-ante stage is real, a mean-
ingful robustness question would be to consider perturbations of agentspriors Pi 2
(0  T1  T2), and study how solution concepts behave in such nearby models
(e.g., Kaji and Morris, 1997); with genuineincomplete information instead, models
should be considered nearby if the agentshierarchies of beliefs are close, not
their priors.
Redundant Types, Bayesian Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria
Redundant types in a Bayesian game are types that correspond to the same informa-
tion and to the same hierarchy of beliefs over .
Example 1.3. Consider a situation in which 0 = f0; 1g, while 1 and 2 are
singletons (hence, an environment with no information). Consider a type space in
which T 01 = ft01; t001g, T 02 = ft02; t002g, and agents share a common prior over 0T 01T 02,
described by the following matrices:
0 = 0 t
0
2 t
00
2
t01 1=6 1=12
t001 1=12 1=6
 = 1 t02 t
00
2
t01 1=12 1=6
t001 1=6 1=12
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Notice that in this example, both types for every player correspond to the same hierar-
chy of beliefs: every type puts 1=2 probability on each  2 f0; 1g, and this is common
certainty (i.e. all types put probability one on the opponent putting probability one
on... on  = 0; 1 being equally likely).
Consider now a situation with complete information, i.e. such that  = fg. It
is still possible to dene type spaces in such an environment. Clearly, all such type
spaces would have redundant types, all corresponding to common certainty (common
knowledge, in fact) of , but they would induce di¤erent Bayesian games, with
possibly di¤erent sets of Bayesian equilibria. What is the relationship between the
Bayesian equilibria of these games, and the equilibria of the underlying complete
information game G (), without redundant types? Essentially the answer is that
the correlated equilibria ofG () coincide with the Bayesian equilibria of the Bayesian
games thus obtained. The point is illustrated by the following example:
Example 1.4. Consider the correlated equilibrium discussed in example 1.2: it is easy
to see that it only takes a little more than a relabeling of the correlating device, to
obtain a type space for which the correlated equilibrium is a Bayesian equilibrium of the
induced Bayesian game. Let T1 =

tab1 ; t
cd
1
	
and T2 =

tac2 ; t
bd
2
	
, and let beliefs be such
that 1 (t1) [tac2 ] = 1 if t1 = t
ab
1 , 0 otherwise; for player 2 instead, let 2 (t2)

tcd1

= 1
if t2 = tac2 , 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that the following strategy prole is a
Bayesian equilibrium of the induced Bayesian game: 1
 
tab1

= U , 1
 
tcd1

= M ,
2 (t
ac
2 ) = C, 2
 
tbd2

= L. (The superscripts of these types refer to the corresponding
cells in the partition of the correlating device in example 1.2.)
In fact, the result of Proposition 1.1 can be restated as follows:
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Proposition 1.2. The set of rationalizable actions of a complete information game
G () characterizes the set of actions played as part of some Bayesian equilibrium of
the Bayesian game obtained attaching some type space to G ().
(Proposition 1.2 is a special case of Proposition 1.9 below.)
1.3.2 Non-Equilibrium Approach
If we envision a game as an isolated interaction, there is no reason to believe that
agents will be able to coordinate on a given equilibrium, i.e. that they will have
correct conjectures about the opponents strategy. This is the essence of Bernheim
(1984) and Pearces (1984) critique. If, on the other hand, we envision a game G
as the description of a stable, repeated interaction, then Nash equilibrium could be
interpreted as the steady state of a learning process in which players repeatedly play
G.9 This argument is problematic for situations with incomplete information, making
the non-equilibrium approach even more compelling.10
This section introduces some versions of rationalizability for incomplete informa-
tion games, and discusses the relationship between them. The next section discusses
some results and robustness properties of these solution concepts.
Rationalizability in Bayesian games
A non-equilibrium approach does not require the machinery developed by Harsanyi,
but the notions of type space and Bayesian game are so entrenched in the literature
9In general, convergence is not guaranteed and, even if the play converges, the limit outcome is
a selfconrming (or conjectural) equilibrium, which need not be equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.
See Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and references therein.
10Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2004) argue that the Bayesian equilibrium concept is hard to
justify in terms of learning even for games with asymmetric information where the ex ante stage is
real, but players have subjective heterogeneous priors on the state of Nature.
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that in recent years several versions of rationalizability for Bayesian games have been
put forward. Given our focus on the interim perspective, we focus on two versions
of rationalizability, both dened for the interim normal form of the game: these are
interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris, 2007) and interim
independent rationalizability (Ely and Peski, 2006)
Interim Correlated Rationalizability (ICR). ICR is (correlated) rationaliz-
ability applied to the interim normal form of the Bayesian game B = hG; T i. Denote
is conjecturesin the Bayesian game by  i 2 (0  A i  T i). For each type ti,
his consistent conjectures are
	i (ti) =

 i 2 (0  A i  T i) : margT i i = i (ti)
	
.
Let BRi ( i) denote the set of best responses to conjecture  i. If ai 2 BRi ( i), we
say that  i justies action ai.
Denition 1.4. For each ti 2 Ti and i 2 N , set ICR0i (ti) = Ai. For k = 0; 1; :::,
let ICRki be such that (ai; ti) 2 ICRki if and only if ai 2 ICRki (ti) and ICRk i =
j 6=iICRkj . Then recursively, for k = 1; 2; :::
ICRki (ti) = fai 2 Ai : 9 ai 2 	i (ti) s.t.: ai 2 BRi ( ai) and
supp
 
margA iT i 
ai
  ICRk 1 i 	 :
Then, let ICRi (ti) =
T
k0
ICRki (ti).
Interim Independent Rationalizability (IIR). Set 	i (ti) allows for correlation
between the opponents action, his type, and the state of nature 0. IIR imposes the
extra requirement that at each round, for an action to survive, it must be justied by
a consistent conjecture that treats a i as independent of 0, conditional on t i. For
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each ti, dene the set of consistent and conditionally independent conjectures for type
ti as
	CIi (ti) = f i 2 (0  A i  T i) : 9 i : T i ! (A i) s.t.
 i [0; a i; t i] = i (ti) [t i]   i (t i) [a i]g :11
Denition 1.5. For each ti 2 Ti and i 2 N , set IIR0i (ti) = Ai. For k = 0; 1; :::, let
IIRki be such that (ai; ti) 2 IIRki if and only if ai 2 IIRki (ti) and IIRk i = j 6=iIIRkj .
Then recursively, for k = 1; 2; :::
IIRki (ti) =

ai 2 Ai : 9 ai 2 	CIi (ti) s.t.: ai 2 BRi ( ai) and
supp
 
margA iT i 
ai
  IIRk 1 i 	 :
Then, let IIRi (ti) =
T
k0
IIRki (ti).
Interim rationalizability and redundant types.
Example 1.5. Consider a game with payo¤ uncertainty with payo¤s represented as
in gure 1.1.12 Suppose that players have no information about the states  = f0; 1g,
that they both put 1
2
probability on each state and that this is common knowledge.
In gure 1.1 two type spaces are used to model this situation: In the bottom type
space T , each player has only one type, ti , which puts probability
1
2
on each pair 
0; t i

and
 
1; t i

. In the top type space T 0, each player has two types, t0i and t
00
i .
The two matrices represent the common prior on  T 0. Notice that each type in T 0i
corresponds to the same -hierarchy as t, i.e. represents the beliefs that the two states
are equally likely and that this is common knowledge. Clearly, either action is rational
for all types of player 2, as she is indi¤erent between both actions. Now, consider
11In case of more than two players, ICR also allows correlation among all of the opponents
behavior and information, while IIR imposes conditional independence also among the opponents
strategies.
12This example is borrowed from Dekel, Fudenberg amd Morris (2007).
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Figure 1.1: Example 1.5
the Bayesian game induced by the singleton type space: there is no conditionally
independent conjecture over actions, states, and types that justies U for type t1.
Thus D is the only IIR action for type t1. On the other hand, if type t
0
1 conjectures
that type t02 will play L and type t
00
2 will play R, then he attaches probability 1=3 to
each of the state-action pairs (1; L) and (0; R). This is enough to make U a best
response. Thus both U and D are interim independent rationalizable for types t01 and
t001. Hence, although t

1 and t
0
1 correspond to the same hierarchy of beliefs, IIR delivers
di¤erent predictions for the two type spaces. Consider now ICR instead: its easy to
see that in both type spaces, both U and D are rationalizable for all types of player 1:
in either type space, suppose that 1 believes that with probability 1=2 the true state is
0 and player 2 plays L, and with probability 1=2 the true state is  = 1 and that 2
plays R. Then, U is a best response.
The types in T 0 are redundant (cf. example 1.3); nonetheless they di¤er in their
conjectures about their opponents and this is potentially important depending on the
choice of solution concept. Redundant types can serve as a correlating device, and so
these types are not truly redundantunless the addition of correlating devices has
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no e¤ect.
Under the assumption of conditional independence of IIR, the correlation implicit
in type space T 0 a¤ects the solution concept predictions in the example above. In
contrast, ICR allows players to have correlated conjectures about the opponents
actions, types, and the state, so the ability of redundant types to support such
correlation is, truly, redundant. Hence, unlike IIR, the predictions of ICR only
depend on the hierarchies of beliefs, not on the type space used to represent them.
This is the content of the next result, from Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007,
DFM07):
Proposition 1.3 (Proposition 1 in DFM07). If types ti, t0i (in possibly di¤erent type
spaces) induce the same -hierarchy, then ICRi (ti) = ICRi (t0i).
Incomplete information games: A direct approach
The specication of a type space is unnecessary for a non-equilibrium approach:
Agentssubjective situations can be explicitly modeled, and their conjectures about
the opponentsinformation and beliefs can be incorporated in the solution concept,
without need to specify a type space. The most direct approach, is to model agents
information explicitly. Agents may have both payo¤-relevant and payo¤-irrelevant
information. Payo¤-relevant information should be understood as knowledge of com-
ponents that directly a¤ect agentspayo¤s, such as a rms knowledge of her own
productivity. This information is represented by the payo¤-types i introduced above.
Agents though may also have payo¤ irrelevant information: this information does not
a¤ect payo¤s directly, but may be strategically relevant nonetheless, either because
it may be thought to be correlated with the payo¤-state  or with the opponents
actions. Economic examples abound: geological information, or satellite photographs
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of a tract of land on sale are thought to be correlated with the value of the recoverable
resources; expertsreports on an object are thought to be correlated with its value;
personality traits and propensities may be thought to be correlated with ability, etc.
A complete model should include all the potentially relevant aspects of which
players are commonly aware. Let i 2 i denote a realization of all the payo¤-
irrelevant but (potentially) strategically relevant aspects known by player i. The pair
xi = (i; i) 2 Xi (with Xi = i  i) describes is private information. Hence, a
direct representation of the environment consists of a tuple
E =
D
0; (i;i; Ai; ui)i=1;2
E
:
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003, 2007) introduced the solution concept of -
rationalizability: an umbrella notion dened on the environment E and parame-
trized by information-dependent restrictions on playersbeliefs about the primitives.
Formally, for each player i = 1; 2 and each xi 2 Xi, let xi  (0 X i  A i)
denote a set of possible beliefs about the exogenous state (0; x i) and the opponents
action, representing restrictions on is conjectures when his information is xi. For
every xi and every i 2 xi, denote by BRi (i;xi) the set of is best responses to
conjectures i, when his information is xi. Then, dene an iterative deletion proce-
dure that takes such restrictions on beliefs into account:
Denition 1.6. The set R of -rationalizable proles of information-action pairs
is recursively dened as follows: for every player i let R;0i = XiAi = iiAi
and then, for all k  0,
R;k+1i =
8<:(i; i; ai) 2 Xi  Ai

9i 2 (i;i) such that
(1) supp i  0 R;k i
(2) ai 2 BRi (i;xi)
9=; :
Finally, let Ri = \k0R;ki and R = R1 R2 .
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Battigalli and Siniscalchi show that R is characterized by the epistemic assump-
tions of rationality and common belief in rationality and the -restrictions. Hence,
RCBR obtains setting xi = (0 X i  A i) for every xi.
A unied view
Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2009, BDGP hereafter) provide a unied view
of these and other versions of rationalizability. An important notion in BDGP is
that of information-based type space (or type space with information types): type
space T =
D
(Ti; i)i=1;2
E
has information types if, for each i, the set of types Ti is
(isomorphic to) Xi. In this case, Harsanyi-types can be interpreted as information,
because every epistemic component corresponds to some payo¤ irrelevant signal i
that belongs to the environment.13 Hence, in this case, the type space restrictions
on agentsbeliefs nd an immediate representation in the environment, as a set 
of (information-dependent) restrictions on beliefs about the primitives: for each i
and xi, the set xi is the set of measures 
i 2 (0  X i  A i) such that (M)
marg0X i
i = i(xi) (that is, marg0X i
i is the belief of information-type xi in
T ). Based on this observation, -rationalizability and ICR coincide in the following
sense:
Proposition 1.4 (Proposition 1 in BDGP). If T has information types and  is the
set of restrictions corresponding to T , then -rationalizability coincides with ICR.
For the case of information types, it is possible to relate -rationalizability to IIR
as well: Say that a set  of restrictions CI-corresponds to T if, for each i and xi,
xi is the set of measures 
i 2 (0  X i  A i) such that (M) marg0X ii =
13In information-based type spaces, redundanttypes that induce the same -hierarchy are easily
interpreted as corresponding to the same payo¤-type but to di¤erent payo¤-irrelevant information,
i (notice though that they would not be redundant in terms of  -hierarchies.)
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i(xi) and (CI) i[x i] > 0 implies i[0; a ijx i] = i[0jx i]i[a ijx i], that is, i
believes that 0 and a i are independent conditional on x i. The following result
shows that the procedure of taking the interim strategic form of a Bayesian game
with information types and then computing the rationalizable strategies amounts to
imposing the conditional independence restriction (CI) on top of the restrictions (M)
implied by the type space:
Proposition 1.5 (Proposition 3 in BDGP). If T has information types and  is
the set of restrictions that CI-correspond to T , then -rationalizability coincides with
IIR.
Hence, for the case of information types, ICR corresponds to RCBR and common
certainty of the restrictions imposed by the type space (M), while IIR adds to these
conditions the assumption of conditional independence (CI) and common belief in
conditional independence.
For type spaces that are not information-based, Harsanyi-types do not nd a
natural interpretation in terms of the primitives of the environment, because in that
case the epistemic components are mere parametrizations of agentsbeliefs that do
not correspond to any information present in the environment. In this case, provid-
ing epistemic foundations to solution concepts dened for Bayesian games is more
problematic.14 Moreover, without information types, it is not clear whether the com-
mon practice of taking Bayesian games (or type spaces) as primitive objects is
meaningful at all: Harsanyi-types are just parameters, imposed by the modeler for
convenience, they have nothing to do with the fundamentals of the economic prob-
lem.15
14BDGP provide an epistemic characterization of ICR also for the case without information types.
15In particular, it is not clear what it means to have redundant types in a non-information based
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1.4 Interim Robustness in Static Games
The implicit assumption that a game (with or without complete information; modelled
following Harsanyis or the direct approach) is common knowledge among the
agents inherently imposes restrictions on agentsbeliefs of all orders. The existence
of a universal type space guarantees that, in principle, this assumption entails no loss
of generality. In applied work though assumptions are imposed that do entail some
loss of generality. To the extent that these assumptions are understood to hold only
approximately in the actual situation, the signicance of game theoretic predictions
relies crucially on robustness properties of the solution concepts adopted.
Section 1.4.1 discusses the premises of adopting renements of rationalizability
when no common knowledge (CK) assumptions on payo¤s are imposed. The main
result in the section implies that, when all common knowledge assumptions on payo¤s
are relaxed, the strongest robust predictions are those based on ICR alone.
In Section 1.4.2 instead we consider a somewhat complementary question: rather
than relaxing common knowledge assumptions on payo¤s, we maintain common
knowledge of the game structure G, but we impose no further assumptions on agents
beliefs about the environment (that is, we dont specify a type space). In such belief-
free environments, we address the premises of the equilibrium hypothesis when no
assumptions on agentsbeliefs are imposed. It will be shown that the only results of
the Bayesian (equilibrium) analysis that are independent of the exact specication of
the type space are those based on RCBR alone (that is, on -rationalizability with
xi = (0 X i  A i) for all xi:)
Hence, RCBR essentially provides the answer to both robustness problems.
type space. For a related point, see Liu (2009)
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1.4.1 Relaxing all CK assumptions on payo¤s
Any game theoretic analysis is based on some commonly known structure. So, what
does it mean to relax all common knowledge assumptions on payo¤s? It essentially
means to assume an underlying space of uncertainty that is su¢ ciently rich to
allow enough freedom to agentspreferences over the outcomes: it is making precise
the meaning of su¢ ciently richthat claries what assumptions are being relaxed.
For instance, consider the game in example 1.6, p. 27: in the complete information
model, with  = f2=5g, the game is a coordination game, and it is commonly
known that no action is dominant; if we set  = f 2=5; 2=5g then it is not common
knowledge that Notis not dominant, but common knowledge that Attackis not
dominant is maintained. If instead we set  = f 2=5; ; 6=5g, we relax common
knowledge that either action is not dominant. Hence, relaxing all CK assumptions
essentially means to consider all possible hierarchies of beliefs players may have about
a su¢ ciently rich space of uncertainty :16 assuming common knowledge of the -
based universal type space, T , entails no loss of generality. T  will thus be referred
to as the universal model. A solution concept S can thus be seen as a correspondence
that assigns to each players hierarchy of beliefs (the exogenous variables) a set of
strategies (the endogenous variables), i.e., S =(Si)i=1;2 such that Si : T i;  Ai,
i = 1; 2:
The universal model is a benchmark, but it is never used in practice: In modeling
a strategic situation, applied theorists typically select only a subset of the possible
16The representationG =
D
; (Ai; ui)i=1;2
E
, where ui : A! R, is without loss of generality:
For example, taking the underlying space of uncertainty  

[0; 1]
2
A
imposes no restrictions
on agentspreferences (beyond the assumption that they both are expected-utility maximizers of
course.)
25
hierarchies to focus on. To the extent that the truehierarchies are understood to
be only close to the ones considered in a specic model, the concern for robustness of
the theorys predictions translates into a continuity property of the solution concept
correspondence. Here we consider a solution concept robust if it never rules out
strategies that are not ruled out for arbitrarily close hierarchies of beliefs: This is
equivalent to requiring upper hemicontinuity of the solution concept correspondence
on T i;. Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006, DFM06) showed that ICR is robust
in this sense:
Proposition 1.6 (DFM06). The correspondence ICRi : T i;  Ai is upper hemi-
continuous.
Upper hemicontinuity in the universal model addresses a specic robustness ques-
tion: Robustness, with respect to small mistakes in the modeling choice of which
subset of playershierarchies to consider. Though, as discussed in Section 1.3.1, when
applied theorists choose a subset of -hierarchies to focus on, they typically repre-
sent them as Harsanyi-types in (non universal) type spaces, rather than elements of
T , imposing common knowledge assumptions that do entail some loss of generality.
The particular type space chosen to represent a given set of hierarchies of beliefs may
potentially a¤ect the predictions of a solution concept (cf. example 1.5). Invariance of
the predictions with respect to the type space is thus a distinct robustness property.
This property is called type space-invariance. Proposition 1.3 can thus be interpreted
as a robustness result for ICR: namely, that ICR is type space-invariant.
ICR is thus robust in two senses: it is type space-invariant, and it is upper
hemicontinuous. Clearly, a solution concept that never rules out anything is upper
hemicontinuous (hence robust), but not interesting. One way to solve this trade-o¤
is to look for a strongest robust solution concept. In fact, if  is su¢ ciently
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rich(i.e., if enoughcommon knowledge assumptions are being relaxed), Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007, WY hereafter) proved that ICR is the strongest robust solution
concept. The following example illustrates the point:
Example 1.6. Consider a game G () with payo¤s parametrized by  2 R as in the
following matrix:
Attack Not
Attack ;     1; 0
Not 0;    1 0; 0
Let  = 2=5 and let TCK =

tCK
	
denote the model in which  is common knowl-
edge. This delivers a coordination game, with (Attack; Attack) and (Not;Not) as the
two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. All actions are rationalizable in this game, while
only the equilibrium (Not;Not) is risk-dominant.
Now let the space of uncertainty be  = f; 2=5; 6=5g, so that any strategy is
dominant in some state, and consider type space T with set of types T1 = f 1; 1; 3; :::g
and T2 = f0; 2; 4; :::g, and beliefs as follow: type  1 puts probability one on state
0 6=  and type 0; type 0 puts probability p 2 (0; 1) on (0; 1) and (1  p) on (; 1);
types k = 1; 2; ::: all put probability p 2 (0; 1) on (; k   1) and probability (1  p)
on (; k + 1). The sequence of types proles f(k; k + 1)gk=22N converges to common
certainty of  as k ! 1: Type k = 2 is certain of , and also puts probability
one on the opponents type being 1 or 3, who are also certain of . Hence type 2 is
consistent with mutual certainty of , but not with common certainty: Type 2 puts
positive probability on type 1, which puts positive probability on type 0, who assigns
probability p to the state being 0 6= . Similarly, any type k is consistent with k
iterations of mutual certainty of , so that the rst k orders of beliefs of type k are
the same as type tCK. But as long as p 2 (0; 1), any nite k is not consistent with
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common certainty of : Common certainty is only approached letting k !1.17
Now, suppose that 0 =  2=5 and p = 2=3: Type  1 plays Not, as he is certain
that it is dominant; type 0 is certain of , but puts probability 2=3 on type  1, who
plays Not, hence playing Not is his unique rationalizable strategy. The argument can
be iterated, so that for each k > 1, despite there are k levels of mutual certainty of
, playing Not is the unique ICR action. It is easy to check that the same reasoning
can be repeated to obtain Attack as uniquely ICR, simply by letting 0 = 6=5.18
Hence, the strongest robust predictions are those based on rationalizability alone:
For instance, any solution concept that ruled out (Attack; Attack) in the complete
information model (e.g., risk-dominance) would not deliver robust predictions, be-
cause there exists a sequence of hierarchies of beliefs, arbitrarily close to tCK , in which
(Attack; Attack) is uniquely selected. Similarly, any solution concept that ruled out
(Not;Not) would not be robust.
For their general result, WY adopt the following notion of richness:
WYs Richness Condition: For every agent and every ai 2 Ai, there exists a
payo¤ state ai 2  that makes ai strictly dominant in G (ai).
WYs main result is the following:
Proposition 1.7. If  is rich, then for every type ti 2 T i; and for every ai 2
ICRi (ti), there exists a sequence fti g2N  T i; such that ti ! ti and ICRi (ti ) =
17This convergence is in the product topology of hierarchies of beliefs.
18From an ex ante perspective, the type space in example 1.6 cannot be considered close to
the complete information model TCK : Remember though that here we are focusing on genuine
incomplete information, hence the natural perspective is the interim one. For robustness analysis
from an ex ante point of view, see e.g. Kaji and Morris (1997).
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faig for each  2 N. Furthermore, the set of types for which ICR is unique is open
and dense in T i;.
The generic uniqueness result in the second part of the proposition generalizes an
important insight from the literature on global games, i.e. that multiplicity can be
seen as the direct consequence of the common knowledge assumptions.19 Relaxing
such assumptions, RCBR is (generically) su¢ cient to explain agents coordination
and deliver uniqueness. But notice here that the unique rationalizable outcome in
the perturbation depends on the choice of the sequence. Hence, WYs result does
not support a selection argument: Generically, ICR delivers a unique prediction, but
once we have multiplicity for a given type, it is not possible to rene it in a robust
way.
WYs program. To summarize what we said so far, WYs program involves the
following steps: 1) Start with a standard model (such as tCK), which makes implicit
common knowledge assumptions on the payo¤ structure and playershierarchies of
beliefs. 2) To relax all the CK assumptions, this model is embedded in a larger one,
with an underlying space of uncertainty : relaxing all CK assumptions, essentially
means to consider all possible hierarchies of beliefs players may have about a suf-
ciently rich space of uncertainty. In example 1.6, type tCK was embedded in a
larger model as a type (call it t) corresponding to common certainty of . 3) Once
the common knowledge assumptions of the original model are embedded as common
certainty assumptions in the universal model, the robustness of a solution concept
can be formulated as a continuity property in this space. Hence, the properties of
19On global games, see Morris and Shin (2003) and references therein. Carlsson and Van Damme
(1993) is the seminal paper of the literature.
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sequences converging to the common certainty type t could be used to address the
robustness of the predictions of the common knowledgemodel tCK .
The possibility of envisioning tCK as t is central to the argument, but rests on
the interchangeability of knowledge and certainty. Modeling knowledge as certainty
is innocuous for the purpose of WYs analysis, but as we will see in Section 1.5.1 the
distinction becomes crucial when the analysis is extended to dynamic settings.20 As
a consequence, the properties of a solution concept on the universal modeldo not
provide an exhaustive answer to the original robustness question.
Relaxing some CK assumptions.
WY proved that when all CK assumptions are relaxed (i.e. the richness condition is
imposed), the strongest robust predictions are those based on ICR alone. In many
situations though, imposing richness may be an unnecessarily demanding robustness
test: The richness condition on  implies that it is not common knowledge that any
strategy is not dominant. However, as modelers, we may wish to assume that some
features of the environment actually are common knowledge. For example: common
knowledge that some strategies are not dominant. In that case, the underlying space
of uncertainty does not satisfy richness. Chapter 2 explores the structure of ICR
on the universal type space based on arbitrary spaces of uncertainty, i.e. without
assuming richness.
Let A0i  Ai be the set of actions of player i for which there exists a dominance
state ai 2 . For each k = 1; 2; :::, let Aki be equal to Ak 1i union the set of
actions that are strict best responses to conjectures concentrated on Ak 1 i . Finally,
let A1i =
S
k0Aki .
20WY do not consider payo¤ types. Hence, in our terminology, players have no information in
WYs setting.
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Proposition 1.8 (Proposition 2.1). Whenever a type ti has multiple rationalizable
actions, for any ai of these actions that (i) belong to A1i and (ii) are justied by
conjectures concentrated on A1 i, there is a sequence of types converging to ti for
which ai is uniquely rationalizable.
Notice that WYs results obtain setting A0i = Ai for each i, i.e. assuming (strict)
dominance regions for each players action (WYs richness condition). Notice also
the following: suppose that (a) there exists a payo¤ state  2  for which payo¤
functions are supermodular, with each players higher and lower actions ahi and a
l
i
respectively, and such that no action is dominated; and (b) for each i, A0i =

ali; a
h
i
	
.
Then, it is easy to see that under these conditions A1 = A, and WYs full results
are obtained. Conditions (a) and (b) correspond to the case considered by the global
games literature, in which the underlying game has strategic complementarities and
dominance regions are assumed for the extreme actions only. The di¤erence is that
in that literature supermodularity is assumed at all states (so that it is CK). In con-
trast, here it may be assumed for only one state, which only entails relaxing CK that
the game is not supermodular. This observation claries that, on the one hand, the
equilibrium selection results obtained in the global games literature, which contrast
with WYs non-robustness result, are exclusively determined by the particular class
of perturbations that are considered, not by the fact that some (as opposed to all)
CK-assumptions are relaxed. On the other hand, the generic uniqueness result can be
obtained without assuming CK of supermodularity or relaxing all CK-assumptions:
for instance, relaxing CK that the game is not supermodular and that the corre-
sponding extreme actions are not dominant would su¢ ce to obtain the full results of
WY.
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1.4.2 Belief-Free Models and Equilibrium
The specication of the type space is often unrelated to the fundamentals of the
economic problem (cf. Section 1.3.1). Yet, it may crucially a¤ect the set of equi-
librium outcomes. This raises several related theoretical questions. Can we analyze
incomplete information games without specifying a type space? Which results of the
Bayesian analysis are independent of the exact specication of the type space? Is
it possible to provide a relatively simple characterization of the set of all Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes?
The notion of -rationalizability introduced above (denition 1.6) provides an
answer to these questions: Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003, BS) showed that the set
of (-) rationalizable strategies in a game with payo¤ uncertainty G characterizes
the set of strategies played as part of Bayesian equilibria in Bayesian games obtained
attaching some type space to G:21
Proposition 1.9 (Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 in BS). Fix a game with payo¤ uncertainty
G, and let xi = (0 X i  A i) for all xi. Then: ai 2 R (i; i) if and only
if there exist a type space T and a type ti = (i; ei) in T that plays ai in a Bayesian
equilibrium of the Bayesian game B = hG; T i.22
This proposition is the incomplete information counterpart of Proposition 1.1.
The analogy between the two is made transparent by Proposition 1.2, relating the
rationalizable strategies and the set of Bayesian equilibria obtained adding redundant
21See also Bergemann and Morris (2009) for a related result.
22Battigalli and Siniscalchi proved a more general result, for arbitrary restrictions: they show that
-rationalizability exactly characterizes the set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes consistent with
arbitrary restrictions .
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types to a complete information game.23
Proposition 1.9 implies that, if no assumptions on the agentsbeliefs are imposed,
the equilibrium hypothesis has essentially no bite: the set of equilibrium strategies
coincides with the set of rationalizable strategies. Hence, RCBR characterizes the
implication of equilibrium analysis in belief-free environments.
1.4.3 Discussion
We see that RCBR provides a unique answer to several notions of robustness. Going
to dynamic environments, there are several naturalanalogues of RCBR. As we will
see, such unity is lost in dynamic games: di¤erent extensions of RCBR provide the
answer to di¤erent questions.
1.5 Dynamic Games
In a dynamic game, agentsinformation about the environment is endogenous, and
may change as the game unfolds. Moreover, this may happen in ways that are un-
expected to the agents. This opens important questions concerning the modeling
activity, and the assumptions on agentsprocess of revising beliefs, both about ex-
ogenous variables (such as the payo¤ states) and about the opponents behavior.
Furthermore, as the game unfolds, agentsbeliefs about the exogenous variables will
in general depend on their beliefs on the endogenous: for instance, agents may draw
inferences about the opponentsprivate information from their behavior, and notions
of equilibrium for dynamic games will have to take this possibility into account.
While mostly inconsequential in static games, the distinction between knowl-
edge and certainty (probability-one belief) is crucial in dynamic games. If an agent
23In fact, proposition 1.2 is just a special case of proposition 1.9.
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Figure 1.2: Examples 1.7 and 1.8
knowssomething, he would be certain of it after observing any event (expected or
not). Not so if knowledgeis replaced by probability-one belief, as Bayesrule puts
no restrictions on the conditional beliefs after unexpected events.
Related to this, also assumptions about rationality (and interactive beliefs about
it) must be formulated with greater care. First of all, the natural notion of rationality
in dynamic settings is sequential rationality: an agent is rational not only if he plans
to play optimally at the beginning of the game, but also if he does so conditional on
each possible piece of information he may observe later in the game, expected or not.
As the very notion of rationality in dynamic games involves restrictions on agents
behavior at each point in the game, so also beliefs about the opponentsrationality
must be made explicit at each point of the game. Consider the following example:
Example 1.7. Consider the game in gure 1.2, and suppose that it is common knowl-
edge that  = 0 (hence, the game has complete information. Denote this model by
TCK =

tCK
	
). Then, strategy a3 is dominated by a1. Thus, if at the beginning
of the game player 2 thinks that 1 is rational, he assigns zero probability to a3 being
played. For example, 2 could assign probability one to a1, so that the next information
set is unexpected. We can consider two di¤erent hypothesis on the agentsreasoning
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in the game:
 [H:1] 2 believes that 1 is rational even after an unexpected move; or
 [H:2] 2 believes that 1 is rational as long as he is not surprised, but he is willing
to consider that 1 is not rational if he observes an unexpected move.
If [H:1] is true, in the subgame player 2 would still assign zero probability to a3,
and play b1 if rational. If 1 believes [H:1] and that 2 is rational, he would expect b1 to
be played. Then, if 1 is also rational, he would play a2. This is the logic of Pearces
(1984) Extensive Form Rationalizability (EFR), which delivers (a2; b1) as the unique
outcome in this game.
Now, lets maintain that 2 is rational, but assume [H:2] instead: once surprised,
player 2 is willing to consider that 1 is not rational. Hence, in the subgame, he may
assign probability one to a3 being played, which would justify b2. If at the beginning
2 assigned positive probability to a2, then the subgame would not be unexpected, and
player 2 would still assign zero probability to a3, making b1 the unique best response.
Thus, if [H:2] is true, either b1 or b2 may be played by a rational player 2. If 1 believes
that 2 is rational and that [H:2] is true, he cannot rule out either b1 or b2, and so
both a1 and a2 may be played by a rational player 1. This is the logic of Ben-Poraths
(1997) Common Certainty of Rationalizability (CCR), which selects fa1; a2gfb1; b2g
in this game.
Formally, a dynamic game is dened by an extensive form hN;H;Zi (N =
f1; :::; ng is the set of players; H and Z the sets of partial and terminal histories,
denoted by h and z respectively) and players payo¤s, dened over the terminal
histories. Incomplete information is modelled as in Section 1.3, parametrizing the
payo¤ functions on a space of uncertainty , letting ui : Z   ! R. The tuple
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0; (i; ui)i2N

, where ui : Z ! R for each i 2 N , represents playersinforma-
tion about everyones preferences, and is referred to as information structure.
An extensive form and an information structure induce a dynamic game with
payo¤ uncertainty,   =


N;H;Z;0; (i; ui)i2N

. This is not a dynamic Bayesian
game, because a model of agentsbeliefs is not specied.
Strategic Forms. Agentsstrategies in the game   are functions si : H ! Ai such
that si (h) 2 Ai (h) for each h 2 H (Ai (h) denotes the actions that i may choose
at h, and Ai =
S
h2H
Ai (h)). The set of player is strategies is denoted by Si, and as
usual we dene the sets S = i2NSi and S i = j 6=iSj. Any strategy prole induces
a terminal allocation z (s) 2 Z. Hence, we can dene strategic-form payo¤ functions
Ui : S! R as Ui (s; ) = ui (z (s) ; ) for each s and . If strategies si and s0i only
di¤er at histories that are inconsistent with si, then they are said to be outcome
equivalent. Reduced form strategies, denoted by Si are the equivalence classes of
the outcome equivalence relation. Reduced strategies si 2 Si are also called plans of
actions: each si only species actions at histories that are reachable by si itself.
As the game unfolds, agents learn about the environment from the private signals,
but they also learn about the opponentsbehavior through the public histories: for
each history h and player i, let Si (h) denote the set of player is strategies that are
consistent with history h being observed.
Bayesian Games Dynamic Bayesian games are dened as for the static case, at-
taching a -based type space T that implicitly represents a set of hierarchies of
beliefs. All comments about Harsanyi-types, information, ex-ante vs. interim ap-
proach, etc., made in Section 1.3.1, obviously apply to these settings as well. (Pure)
strategies in the Bayesian game are mappings i : Ti ! Si. To distinguish i 2 i
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from si 2 Si, the latter will be referred to as interim strategies.
The next two sections explore robustness questions in dynamic games analogous
to those discussed in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 for static games.
1.5.1 Relaxing all CK-assumptions on payo¤s (II)
The results of Section 1.4.1 do not cover dynamic games for one technical reason:
WYs richness condition cannot be satised by the normal form of a dynamic
game, as strategies that only di¤er at nodes that the opponents can prevent from
being reached cannot strictly dominate each other. An obvious way to overcome the
problem is to modify the notion of dominance: Strategy si is conditionally dominant at
state  2  if, for every history h on its path, and every s0i 2 Si (h), if si (h) 6= s0i (h),
then
ui (z (si; s i) ; ) > ui (z (s0i; s i) ; ) for all s i 2 S i (h) :
Richnessfor dynamic games: for every s 2 S, there exists s =  s0; si ; s i 2
: such that si is conditionally dominant at s for every i.
Based on this richness condition, in chapter 3 I conduct an analysis analogous to
the one discussed in Section 1.4.1. To do this, a new solution concept for Bayesian
games in extensive form is introduced, Interim Sequential Rationalizability (ISR).24
ISR extends the logic of Ben-Poraths (1997) CCR (see example 1.7) to dynamic
Bayesian games: similar to CCR, ISR expresses the assumption that agents are
(sequentially) rational and share common certainty of (sequential) rationality at the
24Independent work of Chen (2009) addressed the same question, but maintaining WYs normal
form approach: that is, Chen applies ICR to the reduced interim normal form of a dynamic game,
only substituting WYs richness condition with the version for dynamic games. In chapter 3 it is
shown that such a normal form approach is only viable for the case of no-information environments,
while the extensive form approach applies to general information structures. This point is discussed
below, p. 45.
37
beginning of the game, but no restrictions are imposed on their conjectures after
unexpected events; similar to ICR, ISR is dened as a type-by-type iterative
deletion procedure for interim (reduced form) strategies si, that imposes the consis-
tency condition that a types conjectures at the beginning of the game agree with his
beliefs (as specied in the type space), and conjectures allow correlation between the
opponentsbehavior and the states of nature.
Hence, ISR represents the assumptions of (sequential) rationality, initial com-
mon certainty of (sequential) rationality and of the type space restrictions: initial,
because no restrictions are imposed after unexpected events.25
Proposition 3.4 below provides a result analogous to the rst part of Proposition
1.7 above:
Proposition 1.10 (Proposition 3.4). If  satised the richness condition for dy-
namic games, then for every type ti 2 T i; and for every si 2 ISRi (ti), there exists
a sequence fti g2N  T i; such that ti ! ti and ISRi (ti ) = fsig for each  2 N.
This result implies, for instance, that despite the fact that the EFR logic is com-
pelling in example 1.7, its predictions are not robust. To illustrate the point we will
construct a sequence of hierarchies of beliefs, converging to the hierarchies in example
1.7, in which (a1b2) is the unique ISR-outcome (hence, also the unique EFR out-
come). Since (a1; b2) is ruled out by EFR in the limit, but uniquely selected along
the converging sequence, EFR is not robust.
25Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007) notion of weak -rationalizability, characterized by the epis-
temic assumptions of initial common certainty in rationality and in the -restrictions, is also related
to ISR. That solution concept though is dened for games with payo¤ uncertainty, not Bayesian
games. In the case of information-types (Section 1.3.2), a result analogous to Proposition 1.4 can
be proved that relates ISR and weak -rationalizability, when the restrictions  are derived from
the type space.
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Example 1.8. In the game of gure 1.2, let the space of uncertainty be  = f0; 3g.
Suppose that player 1 knows the true state, while 2 doesnt (and this is common knowl-
edge). Let t = (t1; t

2) represent the situation in which there is common certainty that
 = 0: type t1 knows that  = 0, and puts probability one on 2 being type t

2; type
t2 puts probability one on  = 0, and player 1 being type t

1. A reasoning similar to
that in example 1.7 implies that fa1; a2g and fb1; b2g are the sets of ISR strategies
for t1 and t

2, written ISR (t) = fa1; a2g  fb1; b2g.
Now, a sequence of types ftmg will be constructed, converging to t, such that
(a1; b2) is the unique ISR-outcome for each tm: Since it is the unique ISR-outcome
along the sequence, any (strict) renement of ISR that rules out (a1; b2) for type
t would not be upper hemicontinuous, hence not robust. The type spaces used
for the construction of the sequence ftmg can be viewed as a perturbed version of
Rubinsteins (1989) e-mail game, in which there is a small probability that the original
e-mail is sent in the wrong state of nature.
Fix " 2  0; 1
6

and let p 2

0; "
(1 2")

. Consider the set of type proles T "1 
T "2  T , where T "1 = f 13; 10; 13; 30; 33; 50; 53:::g and T "2 = f0; 2; 4; :::g. Types k
(k =  1; 1; 3; :::,  = 0; 3) are player 1s types who know that the true state is ;
2s types only know their own payo¤s, which are constant across states, but dont
know the opponents type. Suppose that beliefs are described as follows. Type  13
puts probability one on facing type 0; type 0 assigns probability 1
1+p
to type  13, and
complementary probability to types 10 and 13, with weights (1  ") and ", respectively.
Similarly, for all k = 2; 4; ::: player 2s type k puts probability 1
1+p
on 1s types (k   1)0
and (k   1)3, with weights (1  ") and " respectively, and complementary probability
p
1+p
on the (k + 1)-types, with weight (1  ") on (k + 1)0 and " on (k + 1)3. For all
other types of player 1, with k = 1; 3; :::, and  = 0; 3, type k puts probability 1
1+p
on
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Figure 1.3: The type space in Example 1.8
2s type k   1, and complementary probability on 2s type k + 1. (The type space is
represented in gure 1.2.) Notice that the increasing sequence of even ks and odd k0s
converges to t as we let " approach 0.26 It will be shown that player 2s types 0; 2; 4; :::
only play b1, while 1s types 10; 30; ::: only play a1: All types k3 (k =  1; 1; 3; :::) would
play a3, for they know it is dominant. Type 0 puts probability 11+p on type  1, who
plays a3; given these initial beliefs, type 0s conditional conjectures after In must put
probability at least 1
1+p
on a3 being played, which makes b2 optimal for him. Type 10
also puts probability 1
1+p
on type 0, who plays b2, thus a1 is the unique best response.
Type 2s initial beliefs are such that type 10 plays a1 and types 13 and 33 play a3.
Hence, the probability of a3 being played, conditional on In being observed, must be
no smaller than
Pr
 
 = 3jnot 10 = "
1 

1
1+p

(1  ")
=
(1 + p) "
p+ "
Given that p < "
(1 2") , this probability is greater than
1
2
. Hence, playing b2 is the unique
26This convergence of the hierarchies of beliefs is in the product topology.
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Figure 1.4: Examples 1.9 and 1.10
best response, irrespective of type 2s conjectures about 30s behavior. Given this, type
30 also plays a1. The reasoning can be iterated, so that for all types 10; 30; 50; :::, a1
is the unique ISR strategy, while for all types 0; 2; 4; ::: of player 2, strategy b2 is.
Hence, when all common knowledge assumptions are relaxed, any renement of
ISR is not upper hemicontinuous, i.e. delivers non-robust predictions. Together with
Proposition 1.10, the next proposition implies that, under the richness condition, ISR
is the strongest robust solution concept for dynamic Bayesian games: it is robust, and
any renement of it is not.
Proposition 1.11 (Proposition 3.1). For any , ISR is upper hemicontinuous on
the universal type space T  .
In a dynamic game, the details of the modeling assumptions on agents infor-
mation about  are crucial. The next example shows how the distinction between
knowledge and certainty may a¤ect the predictions of a solution concept, raising novel
questions of robustness.
Example 1.9. Consider the game in gure 1.4, and assume that  = f 3; 3g. Lets
consider two alternative setups.
 [A]: Player 2 observes the realization of , and this is common knowl-
edge. (This situation can be modelled letting 0 and 

1 be singletons, and
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2 = f 3; 3g.) Suppose that agents are commonly certain that  = 3, denoted
by tA =
 
tA1 ; t
A
2
 2 T : if type tA2 , player 2 knows that  = 3, and puts proba-
bility one on player 1 being type tA1 ; if type t
A
1 , agent 1 puts probability one on
 = 3 and agent 2 being type tA2 . (Notice that t
A is not common knowledge
of  = 3because tA1 does not know that  = 3.) Since 1 knows that 2 knows
the true state of , if 1 is rational and believes that 2 is rational, he must play
Out: if 2 is rational and knows , 1 obtains  3 in the subgame irrespective of
the realization of .
 [B]: Players observe nothing about , and this is common knowledge.
(This situation can be modelled letting 1 and 

2 be singletons, and 

0 =
f 3; 3g.) Now, lets maintain that agents share common certainty of  = 3,
denoted by tB =
 
tB1 ; t
B
2
 2 T : each type tBi (i = 1; 2) puts probability one
on  = 3 and the opponent being type tBj (j 6= i). Hence, agents in this setup
share the same hierarchies as types tA. If player 1 believes that  = 3, and
believes that player 2 plays D, then 1s optimal response is to play Out. If 2
believes this, then his information set is unexpected: If called to move, player
2 would be surprised and, if he revises his beliefs in favor of  =  3, he may
play U . If 1 anticipates this, then playing In is optimal even if 1 believes that
 = 3. That is because 1 knows that 2, although certain of  = 3, does not
know that  = 3. So, types tB share the same hierarchies as types tA, but under
this specication of agentsinformation, ISR  tB = fIn;OutgfU;Dg (while
ISR  tA = f(Out;D)g).
Hence, in a dynamic game, the details of agents information about  may
crucially a¤ect our predictions. So, for instance, types t in example 1.8 share the
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same hierarchies of beliefs as types tCK in example 1.7, but agents have di¤erent
information about  in the two examples. Yet, in that case ISR (t) = ISR  tCK.
Then, why is it the case that ISR  tCK = ISR (t) while ISR  tA 6= ISR  tB?
What if we change agentsinformation in example 1.8? How do di¤erences in agents
information a¤ect the properties of robustness with respect to perturbations of
agentshierarchies of beliefs?
Robustness(-es): Type Spaces, Models and Invariance. Modeling a strategic
situation with incomplete information requires a specication of agentsentire hierar-
chies of beliefs. A complete modelincludes a description of all possible hierarchies
of beliefs agents may have over a rich space of uncertainty, ; then, a solution
concept assigns to each hierarchy of beliefs the set of strategies that the agent might
play (possibly a singleton). In practice, it is common to select a small subset of all
the possible hierarchies of beliefs to focus on. Then, the robustnessof our predic-
tions depends on properties of continuity of the solution concept correspondence on
the space of all possible hierarchies of beliefs. Upper hemicontinuity in the universal
model T  addresses precisely this robustness problem, and we have seen that Propo-
sitions 1.10 and 1.11 imply that ISR is a strongest robustsolution concept in this
sense.
When applied theorists choose a subset of -hierarchies to focus on, they typi-
cally represent them by means of (non universal) -based type spaces (denition 1.2)
rather than elements of T . Representing a hierarchy as a type in a (non-universal)
type space T rather than an element of T  does not change the common knowledge
assumptions on the information structure


; (ui)i2N

, but it does impose common
knowledge assumptions on playershierarchies of beliefs, and their correlation with
43
the states of nature 0. A solution concept is type space-invariant if the behavior
prescribed for a given hierarchy does not depend on whether it is represented as an
element of T  or of a di¤erent T. Thus, type space-invariance is also a robust-
ness property: Robustness, with respect to the introduction of the extra common
knowledge assumptions on playersbeliefs (and their correlations with 0) imposed
by non-universal type spaces.
Proposition 1.12 (Proposition 3.2). ISR is type space-invariant under all infor-
mation structures.
The intuition behind the type space-invariance of ISR is the same as in example
1.5 for ICR: since ISR allows all possible correlations in agentsconjectures about
the state of nature and the opponentsstrategies, the possibility of redundant types
to serve as correlating devices does not expand the set of feasible conjectures. Hence,
ISR only depends on the hierarchies of beliefs, not on the type space.
In writing down a game, as analysts we typically make common knowledge as-
sumptions not only on playersbeliefs, but also on payo¤s. For instance, suppose
that all types in T have beliefs concentrated on some strict subset   , i.e.
there is common certainty of  in T. In applied work, states that receive zero prob-
ability ( 2 n) are usually excluded from the model. That is: common certainty
of  is made into common knowledge of .
Denition 1.7. A model of the environment is a -based type space, where  is
such that k  k for each k = 0; :::; n.
Each type in a model induces a -hierarchy, and hence a -hierarchy. A so-
lution concept is model invariant if the behavior is completely determined by the
-hierarchies irrespective of the model they are represented in. Model invariance is
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a stronger robustness property than type space-invariance, as it also requires robust-
ness to the introduction of extra common knowledge assumptions on the information
structure.
Example 1.10. Consider example 1.9 again, and suppose that the true situation
is the one described by case B, in which agents share common certainty that  =
3, but they have no information about . As argued, for these types the solution
concept delivers ISR  tB = fIn;Outg  fU;Dg. If that situation is modelled as
there being common knowledge of  = 3, then the prediction of ISR is the backward
induction outcome ISR  ~tCK = (Out;D). Hence, despite ~tCK and tB share the same
hierarchies of beliefs, ISR delivers di¤erent predictions depending on the model in
which those hierarchies are represented.
Hence, in environments with no-information (NI-environments), ISR is notmodel-
invariant. The next proposition instead shows that ISR is model-invariant in en-
vironments with private-values, or PV-environments (That is why ISR  tCK =
ISR (t) in example 1.8.):
Proposition 1.13 (Proposition 3.3). In environments with private values, ISR is
model-invariant.
On NI- and PV-settings. In NI-settings, all common knowledge-assumptions are
relaxed. In particular, the assumption that players know their own preferences: in
these environments, agents dont know their own preferences over the terminal nodes,
they merely have beliefs about that. Under an equivalent richness condition, indepen-
dent work by Chen (2009) studied the structure of ICR for dynamic NI-environments,
extending Weinstein and Yildizs (2007) results. Together with the upper hemicon-
tinuity of ISR, Chens results imply that the two solution concepts coincide on the
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universal model in these settings. Outside of the realm of NI-environments, ISR
generally renes ICR (imposing sequential rationality restrictions). The fact that,
under the richness condition, ISR coincides with ICR in NI-environments, implies
that sequential rationality has no bite in these settings. The intuition is simple: In
NI-environments players dont know their own payo¤s, they merely have beliefs about
them. Once an unexpected information set is reached, Bayesrule does not restrict
playersbeliefs, which can be set arbitrarily. Under the richness conditions, there are
essentially no restrictions on playersbeliefs about their own preferences, so that any
behavior can be justied. Hence, the only restrictions that retain their bite are those
imposed by (normal form) rationality alone. This also provides the main intuition for
ISRs failure of model invariance in NI-settings (1.10).
To the extent that the interest in studying extensive form games comes from the
notion of sequential rationality, PV-settings, in which the assumption that players
know their own payo¤s (and this is common knowledge) is maintained, seem most
meaningful for dynamic environments. As shown by proposition 1.13, ISR is model
invariant in these settings.27
On the Impact of higher order beliefs on multiplicity. A growing litera-
ture is exploring to what extent the main insights from the theory of global games
can be extended to dynamic environments. These contributions are mainly from
an applied perspective, and do not pursue a systematic analysis of these problems.
Consequently, the conclusions are diverse: for instance, Chamley (1999) and Frankel
27Another closely related paper is Dekel and Fudenberg (1990): In that paper, solution concept
S1W is shown to be robust to the possibility that players entertain small doubts about their
opponentspayo¤ functions. The robustness result for ISR is in the same spirit. Dekel and Fuden-
berg (1990) maintain the assumption that players know their own payo¤s: This corresponds to the
PV-case in this paper. In Appendix A.3 it is shown that, in PV-settings, ISR coincides with S1W
applied to the interim normal form.
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and Pauzner (2000) obtain the familiar uniqueness result in di¤erent setups, under
di¤erent sets of assumptions. On the other hand, few recent papers seem to ques-
tion the general validity of these results: For instance, Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan
(2007) and Angeletos and Werning (2006) apply the global gamessignals structure
to dynamic environments, and obtain non-uniqueness results that contrast with the
familiar ones in static settings. The origin of such multiplicity lies in a tension be-
tween the global games signals structure and the dynamic structure: by relaxing
common knowledge-assumptions, the former favors uniqueness; in dynamic games,
some information endogenously becomes common knowledge (e.g. public histories),
thus mitigating the impact of the signals structure.
The following result shows that also in dynamic games multiplicity can be im-
puted to common knowledge assumptions: once CK-assumptions are relaxed, ISR
generically delivers uniqueness.
Proposition 1.14 (Proposition 3.5). If  is rich, the set of types for which ISR
is unique is open and dense in T 
1.5.2 Equilibria in Belief-free environments
In this section we explore the scope of the equilibrium hypothesis in dynamic games,
when no assumptions on beliefs are imposed. The main goal is therefore a result
analogous to Proposition 1.9, p. 32: we want to characterize the predictions of the
equilibrium approach in dynamic games that do not depend on the formulation of a
specic type space.
In dynamic Bayesian games, equilibrium concepts typically involve two assump-
tions about agentsrationality: rst, that agents are sequentially rational ; second,
that they hold consistent beliefs. That is, at each point in the game agents con-
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ditional beliefs about the state of nature and the opponentstypes are obtained via
Bayesian updating from the agents prior beliefs and the equilibrium strategy proles.
Several notions of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium(PBE) have been put forward in
the literature (see e.g. Section 8.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991b). Here we focus
on the weakest possible version of PBE, that maintains the assumption of sequential
rationality at all histories, and Bayesian updating whenever possible: this delivers the
solution concept of interim perfect equilibrium (IPE), from Chapter 4.28
Interim Perfect Equilibrium.
An IPE is dened as an assessment (i.e. a strategy prole and a belief system) that
satises sequential rationality and consistency of beliefs. Formally, given a dynamic
Bayesian game ( ; T ), a system of beliefs consists of collections (pti (h))h2H for every
type ti of every agent i, such that pti (h) 2 (0  T i) for every h 2 H. A strategy
prole and a belief system (; p) form an assessment. For each agent i, a strategy
prole  and conditional beliefs pti induce, at each private history hi, a probability
measure P ;pti (h) over the histories h0 following h.
Denition 1.8. Fix a strategy prole  2 . Assessment (; p) is consistent if for
each i 2 N and ti 2 Ti, (BC1) pti () = i (ti) and if (BC2) for each h0 such that
h  h0 (i.e. h precedes h0 ), pti (h0) is obtained from pti (h) and P ;pti (h) via Bayesian
updating (whenever possible).
Condition (BC1) requires that each types beliefs at the beginning of the game
agree with those specied in the type space; condition (BC2) requires that the belief
system pti is consistent with Bayesian updating whenever possible. Also, notice that
28The environment in Chapter 4 is one of distributed knowledge, i.e. 0 is a singleton. Chapter 4
also allows for the possibility that agents learn their payo¤-type over time.
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P ;pti (h) is obtained taking both i and  i into account, hence also own-deviations
are zero probability events, and leave an agents beliefs at the subsequent history
unrestricted.29 This point is discussed below.
The notion of sequential rationality is completely standard: Given beliefs p, (; p)
is sequentially rational if for every agent i, every type ti 2 Ti, and for every history
h 2 H, behavior i (ti) (h) is a best response to  i at h, given beliefs pti (h) :
Denition 1.9. An assessment (; p) is an Interim Perfect Equilibrium (IPE) if it
is consistent and sequentially rational.
Notice that the notion of consistency in denition 1.8 imposes no restrictions on
the beliefs held at histories that receive zero probability at the preceding node. Hence,
even if agentsinitial beliefs admit a common prior, IPE is weaker than Fudenberg
and Tiroles (1991a) perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hence also of Kreps and Wilsons
(1982) sequential equilibrium). Also, notice that from the point of view of the belief
system, any players deviation is a zero probability event, and treated the same way. In
particular, if history h0 is precluded by i (h) alone (for h  h0), h0 =2suppP ;pi (h), and
agent is beliefs at h0 are unrestricted the same way they would be after an unexpected
move of the opponents: it is as if player i is surprised by his own deviation, and after
such a surprisehis beliefs about 0  T i may be upset.30 This feature of IPE is
not standard, but it is key to some of the results in Chapter 4. This point will be
further discussed below.
29Penta (2009a) considers a more standard notion of equilibrium in which unilateral own-
deviations to not trigger this change in beliefs: i.e., the belief system is obtained considering
the probability distribution induced by  i and pi, written P i;pti (h).
30IPE is consistent with a trembling-handview of unexpected moves, in which no restrictions
on the possible correlations between trembles and other elements of uncertainty are imposed.
Unlike other notions of weak perfect Bayesian equilbrium (e.g. denition 9.C.3, p. 285 in Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995), in IPE agentsbeliefs are consistent with Bayesian updating
also o¤-the-equilibrium path.
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Figure 1.5: Example 1.11
Finally, notice the following:
Remark 1.1. In complete information games, IPE coincides with subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE).
Backwards Rationalizability.
As SPE renes Nash equilibrium in dynamic games, so IPE renes Bayesian equilib-
rium (it also generalizes SPE to incomplete information games the same way Bayesian
equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium). Similarly, for a result analogous to Propo-
sition 1.9, a good candidate would be some dynamic version of -rationalizability
(denition 1.6), i.e. some dynamic version of the idea of common belief in rationality
(RCBR). The solution concept that answered the robustness questions addressed in
Section 1.5.1 (ISR) represents the weakest dynamic extensionof RCBR: that is,
sequential rationality takes the place of (ex ante) rationality, but common certainty
of it is only assumed at the beginning of the game; whenever agents are surprised,
they may believe that their opponents are irrational. Initial common certainty of
rationality is not the only possible dynamic extensionof the idea of RCBR:
Example 1.11. Consider the complete information game in gure 1.5: Strategy rD
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is dominated by l. Thus, if at the beginning of the game player 2 thinks that 1 is
rational, he assigns zero probability to rD being played. For example, 2 could assign
probability one to l, so that the next information set is unexpected.
If we adopt a solution concept based on (only) initial common certainty of rational-
ity, like ISR for instance (Section 1.5.1), then in the proper subgame nothing is ruled
out for player 2: If 2 puts probability one on l, the subgame is unexpected, and 2 is
allowed to believe that 1 could play anything in the subgame (including D). Hence, 2s
best response could be either L, C or R. Given this, both rU and rM are justiable
for a rational player 1, as well as strategies lU , lM and lD. Hence, under initial
common certainty in rationality, reduced strategy proles frU; rM; lg fL;C;Rg are
selected. (ISR is a solution concept dened for reduced-form strategies, l denotes the
equivalence class of strategies lU , lM and lD, which are all outcome equivalent.)
Now, besides initial common certainty of rationality, consider the following as-
sumptions:
[H-1] Agents believe that the opponent is rational even after unexpected
moves, AND after such moves:
[H-1.1] They believe that the opponent is rational and, if possible, that
he was rational in the past; OR
[H-1.2] They accept that the opponent may have played irrationally in
the past, but will be rational in the future.
Suppose that [H-1] is true, and this is common certainty: then, after observing r,
player I would still put zero probability on D, hence he would never play R if rational.
If 1 anticipates this, then rU is dominated by l, because the highest payo¤ from rU if
player 2 does not play R is 2.
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If [H-1.1] is true, upon observing r player 2 would assign zero probability to U :
the only way playing r would be rational for 1, is that 1 expects 2 to play C, which
means that 1 is playing strategy rM . Given this, 2 plays C. If 1 anticipates this, his
unique best response is in fact to play rM . This reasoning corresponds to Pearces
(1984) Extensive Form Rationalizability (cf. example 1.7 above), and selects prole
(rM;C) as the only outcome in this game.
Suppose that [H-1.2] is true instead: now, if 2 observes the unexpected move r,
he may believe that 1 has made a mistake. Then, from the observation of r player 2
does not infer that 1 expects 2 to play C, hence he also does not infer that 1 would play
M . Hence, if agents are willing to accept that the opponents have played irrationally
in the past, but they share common certainty of future rationality at every history,
then the strategy proles selected in this game are frU; rM; lU; lMg  fL;Cg.
Chapter 4 introduces a solution concept for dynamic games with payo¤ uncer-
tainty (such as  , i.e. not Bayesian games) based on the idea of rationality and
common certainty of future rationality at every history, called Backwards Rationaliz-
ability (BR).31
BR consists of an iterated deletion procedure similar to -rationalizability. One
important di¤erence is that conjectures here are represented by Conditional Proba-
bility Systems i = (i (h))h2H 2 Hi ( i  S), i.e. collections of conditional prob-
ability distributions, one for each history, such that i (h) 2 ( i  S) for every h,
and that satisfy two conditions: (C.1) agents are certain of what they know : is con-
jectures are concentrated on  i  S (h) at history h; (C.2) conditional probabilities
are consistent with Bayesian updating (whenever possible.)
31Perea (2010) independently introduced a solution concept for complete information games, Com-
mon Belief in Future Rationality, that coincides with BR in this class of games.
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Notice that in this specication agents entertain conjectures about the payo¤
state, the opponentsas well as their own strategies. Nonetheless, it is maintained
that an agent is always certain of his own strategy (hence the notion of sequential
rationality does not change.) This points will be discussed below.
BR is dened as follows: At each round, strategy s^i survives if it is justied by
conjectures i that satisfy two conditions: condition (A) states that at the beginning
of the game, the agent must be certain of his own strategy s^i and have conjectures
concentrated on opponentsstrategies that survived the previous rounds of deletion;
condition (B) restricts the agents conjectures at unexpected histories, and its made
of two parts: condition (B.1) states that agent i is always certain of his own con-
tinuation strategy, s^ijh; condition (B.2) requires conjectures to be concentrated on
opponentscontinuation strategies s ijh that are consistent with the previous rounds
of deletion.32 However, at unexpected histories, agentsconjectures about  i are
unrestricted. Thus, condition (B) embeds two conceptually distinct kinds of assump-
tions: one concerning agentsconjectures about  i; the other concerning their con-
jectures about the continuation behavior. For ease of reference, they are summarized
as follows:
 Unrestricted-Inference Assumption (UIA): At unexpected histories, agents
conjectures about  i are unrestricted. In particular, agents are free to infer
anything about the opponentsprivate information from the public history h.
For example, conditional conjectures may be such that marg i
i (h) is concen-
trated on a payo¤-type  i for which some of the previous moves in h are irrational.
32That is: if ( i; s i) is in the support of the conjectures i (h) at round k, then there exist
s^ i 2 BRk 1 i ( i) s.t. s^ ijh = s ijh.
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Nonetheless, condition (B.2) implies that it is believed that  i will behave ratio-
nally in the future. From an epistemic viewpoint, it can be shown that BR can be
interpreted as common certainty of future rationality at every history.
 Common Certainty in Future Rationality (CCFR): at every history (ex-
pected or not), agents share common certainty in future rationality.
Results
The next result provides the analogue of Proposition 1.9, and shows that BR char-
acterizes the set of IPE-strategies across models of beliefs:
Proposition 1.15 (Proposition 4.1). Fix a game  . For each i: s^i 2 BRi if and
only if there exists a type space T and a type ti 2 Ti and (^; p^) such that: (i) (^; p^)
is an IPE of ( ; T ) and (ii) s^i 2supp ^i (ti) :
As emphasized above, in BR agents hold conjectures about both the opponents
and their own strategies. First, notice that conditions (A) and (B.2) in the denition
of BR maintain that agents are always certain of their own strategy; furthermore, the
denition of sequential best response depends only on the marginals of the conditional
conjectures over  i  S i. Hence, this particular feature of BR does not a¤ect the
standard notion of rationality. The fact that conjectures are elements ofH ( i  S)
rather than H ( i  S i) corresponds to the assumption, discussed above, that
IPE treats all deviations the same; its implication is that both histories arising from
unexpected moves of the opponents and from ones own deviations represent zero-
probability events, allowing the same set of conditional conjectures about  i  S,
with essentially the same freedom that IPE allows after anyones deviation. Hence
Proposition 1.15.
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Backwards Procedure and Backward Induction Reasoning. Condition (B.1),
hence CCFR, can be interpreted as a condition of belief persistence on the contin-
uation strategies: Both at expected and unexpected histories, agentspossible con-
jectures about the opponents continuation strategies are unchanged. In games of
complete information, an instance of the same principle is provided by subgame per-
fection, where agents believe in the equilibrium continuation strategies both on- and
o¤-the-equilibrium path. The belief persistence hypothesis goes hand in hand with
the logic of backward induction, allowing to envision each subgame in isolation:
SPE is dened as a Nash equilibrium that induces a Nash equilibrium in each sub-
game. Hence, SPE-implications in a subgame can be drawn looking at the subgame in
isolation. This modularstructure abides Harsanyis and Selten (1988) requirement
of subgame consistency, according to which the behavior prescribed on a subgame
is nothing else than the solution of the subgame itself(ibid., p.90).
Assumptions UIA and CCFR extend these ideas to incomplete information en-
vironments: under UIA, the set of beliefs agents are allowed to entertain about the
opponentspayo¤types is the same at every history:  i. Hence, in this respect, their
information about the opponentspayo¤-types in the subform starting from (public)
history h is the same as if the game started from h. Also, CCFR implies that agents
epistemic assumptions about everyones behavior in the continuation is the same that
would hold if the game started at h: namely, CCFR.
Thus, UIA and CCFR combined imply that, from the point of view of BR, a
continuation from history h is equivalent to a game with the same space of uncertainty
and strategy spaces equal to the continuation strategies, which justies the possibility
of analyzing continuation games in isolation. This discussion provides the main
insights for the following result:
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Figure 1.6: Example 1.12
Proposition 1.16 (Proposition 4.2). BR can be computed as follows: for every
almost-terminal node h, apply -rationalizability in the continuation game; then,
proceed backwards applying -rationalizability to the normal form of the subgame,
with strategies restricted to be -rationalizable in the corresponding continuations.
Proceed backwards, until the initial node is reached (Denote this backwards procedure
by R)
To illustrate the solution concept, consider the following example:
Example 1.12. Consider the game in gure 1.6, and let 1 = f10; 10g, while 0
and 2 are singletons (hence, player 1 knows the true state, while player 2 has no
information). Notice that playing l (resp. r) is dominated for payo¤-type 1 =  10
(resp. 1 = 10). Hence, if we apply the logic of hypothesis [H  1:1], that is Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2007) Strong (Extensive Form) Rationalizability, whatever 2s prior
beliefs about 1, he would assign probability one to 1 = 10 if he observes l, and
probability one to 1 =  10 if he observes r. Given this, and the fact that rational
player 1 would never play L3 or R3 in the continuations, the only rationalizable
strategy for 2 is to play a2b2. Given this, only strategy lL2R2 survives for type 1 = 10,
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and only strategy rL2R2 survives for type 1 =  10. (Notice that hypothesis [H  1:1]
incorporates a forward induction logic)
Now, lets apply BR instead: at the rst round, strategies involving L3 and R3
would be deleted for all types of player 1, while strategies involving l (resp. r) would
be deleted for type 1 =  10 (resp. 1 = 10). So, for instance, after the rst round
strategy rL1R2 survives for type 1 =  10. Now, suppose that 2s initial conjec-
tures are concentrated on payo¤ state-strategy pair (1; s1) = ( 10; rL1R2): then,
l is unexpected, so after observing it we are free to specify 2s beliefs, who could
for example assign probability one on pair (1; s1) = (10; lL1R2), hence play a2,
or on pair (1; s1) = (1; lL1R2), hence play a1. Similarly, both b1 and b2 in the
right-most continuation game can be justied if 2s prior assigns probability one to
1 = 10. Hence, strategies that survive BR are fa1b2; a1b3; a2b2; a2b3g for player 2,
flL1R1; lL1R2; lL2R1; lL2R2g for type 1 = 10 and frL1R1; rL1R2; rL2R1; rL2R2g for
type 1 =  10.
Notice that this solution is precisely that delivered by the backwards procedure:
if we apply -rationalizability to the continuation game following r, R3 is deleted
at the rst round for both types of player 1, and b1 at the second round for player
2. In this continuation game, the procedure selects continuations fb2; b3g for player
2 and continuations fR1; R2g for both types of player 1. Similarly, after l, only
fa1; a2g and fL1; L2g for both types survive -rationalizability. So, now we apply
-rationalizability with the normal form in which it is maintained that continua-
tion strategies are rationalizable in the corresponding continuations, i.e. the relevant
strategy sets now are fa1b2; a1b3; a2b2; a2b3g for player 2, and
flL1R1; lL1R2; lL2R1; lL2R2g [ frL1R1; rL1R2; rL2R1; rL2R2g
for (both types of) player 1: at this stage, type 1 = 10 deletes all strategies involving
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r at the rst round, and so does type 1 =  10 with those involving l, but player 2
doesnt delete anything: if he expects 1 = 10 (hence 1 to play l), then both a2b2 and
a2b3 are best responses in the normal form; similarly, if he expects 1 = 10 (i.e. 1 to
play r), then both a2b3 and a1b3 are optimal.
Further Comments: A result analogous to Proposition 1.15 can be obtained
for the more standard renement of IPE mentioned in footnote 29, in which uni-
lateral own deviations leave an agents beliefs unchanged, applying to a modied
version of BR: such modication entails assuming that agents only form conjectures
about  iS i (that is: i 2 H ( i  S i), and consequently adapting conditions
(A) and (B) in the denition of BR (See Penta, 2009a): The assumption that IPE
treats anyones deviation the same (and, correspondingly, that in BR agents hold
conjectures about their own strategy as well) is not crucial to characterize the set
of equilibrium strategies for all models of beliefs. It is crucial instead for the result
of Proposition 1.16, which shows that such set can be computed applying a proce-
dure that extends the logic of backward induction to environments with incomplete
information: Treating own deviations the same as the opponentsis key to the pos-
sibility of considering continuation games in isolation, necessary for the result. In
the alternative specication of IPE (in Penta 2009a), the backwards procedureto
compute the set of equilibria must be modied, so to keep track of the restrictions
the extensive form imposes on the agentsbeliefs at unexpected nodes. Losing the
possibility of envisioning continuation games in isolation, the modied procedure
is more complicated.
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Figure 1.7: Example 1.13
Backwards procedure, Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium and IPE.
In games with complete and perfect information, the backwards procedure coin-
cides with the backward induction solution, hence with subgame perfection.33 The
next example (borrowed from Perea, 2010) shows that if the game has complete but
imperfect information, strategies played in Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) may
be a strict subset of R:
Example 1.13. Consider the complete information game in gure 1.7. The backward
procedure delivers the following sets of strategies for the two agents: R1 = fbc; bd; acg
and R2 = ff; gg. The game though has only one SPE, in which player 1 chooses
b: in the proper subgame, the only Nash equilibrium entails the mixed (continuation)
strategies 1
2
c + 1
2
d and 3
4
f + 1
4
g, yielding a continuation payo¤ of 11
4
for player 1.
Hence, player 1 chooses b at the rst node.
In games with complete information, IPE coincides with SPE (remark 1.1,p. 50),
butR in general is weaker than subgame perfection. At rst glance, this may appear
33For the special case of games with complete information, Perea (2010) independently introduced
an equivalent procedure and showed that R coincides with the backward induction solution if the
game has perfect information.
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in contradiction with propositions 1.15 and 1.16, which imply that R characterizes
the set of strategies played in IPE across models of beliefs. The reason is that even if
the environment has no payo¤ uncertainty ( is a singleton), the complete informa-
tion model in which Ti is a singleton for every i is not the only possible: models with
redundant types may exist, for which IPE strategies di¤er from the SPE-strategies
played in the complete information model. The source of the discrepancy is analo-
gous to the one between Nash equilibrium and subjective correlated equilibrium (see
examples 1.2 and 1.4). We illustrate the point constructing a type space and an IPE
in which strategy (ac) is played with positive probability by some type of player 1.34
Let payo¤s be the same as in example 1.13, and consider the type space T such that
T1 =

tbc1 ; t
bd
1 ; t
ac
1
	
and T2 =
n
tf2 ; t
g
2
o
, with the following beliefs:
1 (t1)
h
tf2
i
=

1 if t1 = tbc1 ; t
ac
1
0 otherwise
and
2 (t
g
2)

tad1

= 1, 2

tf2
 
tbc1

= 1
The equilibrium strategy prole  is such that 8i;8ti, i (tsii ) = si. The system of
beliefs agrees with the models beliefs at the initial history, hence the beliefs of types
tg2 and t
ac
1 are uniquely determined by Bayesian updating. For types t
si
i 6= tg2; tac1 ,
it is su¢ cient to set pi (t
si
i ; ai) = i (t
si
i ) (i.e. maintain whatever the beliefs at the
beginning of the game were) Then, it is easy to verify that (; p) is an IPE.
On the other hand, if jj = 1 and the game has perfect information (no stage
with simultaneous moves), then R coincides with the set of SPE-strategies. Hence,
in environments with no payo¤ uncertainty and with perfect information, only SPE-
34It is easy to see that such di¤erence is not merely due to the possibility of zero-probability types.
Also the relaxation of the common prior assumption is not crucial.
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strategies are played in IPE for any model of beliefs.
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Chapter 2
On the Structure of
Rationalizability on Arbitrary
Spaces of Uncertainty
Abstract: This note characterizes the set A1i of actions of player i that
are uniquely rationalizable for some hierarchy of beliefs on an arbitrary
space of uncertainty. It is proved that for any rationalizable action ai for
the type ti, if ai belongs toA1i and is justied by conjectures concentrated
on A1 i, then there exists a sequence of types converging to ti for which ai
is uniquely rationalizable.
Keywords: Rationalizability, incomplete information, robustness, rene-
ment, higher order beliefs, dominance solvability, richness.
JEL Codes: C72.
2.1 Introduction
This note characterizes the set A1i of actions of player i that are uniquely rationaliz-
able for some hierarchy of beliefs on an arbitrary space of uncertainty . It is proved
that for any rationalizable action ai for the type ti, if ai belongs to A1i and is justied
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by conjectures concentrated on A1 i, then there exists a sequence of types converging
to ti for which ai is uniquely rationalizable.
Assuming that  contains regions of strict dominance for each players strategy
(the richness condition), Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) prove a version of the above
result:
 (Non-) Robustness (R.1): whenever a model has multiple rationalizable out-
comes, any of these is uniquely rationalizable in a model with beliefs arbitrarily
close to the original ones.
Result (R.1) essentially corresponds to the case A1i = Ai for each i.
An important implication of (R.1) is that, under the richness condition, the
strongest predictions that are robust to perturbations of higher order beliefs are those
based on rationalizability alone. In many situations though, imposing richness may
be an unnecessarily demanding robustness test: The richness condition on  implies
that it is not common knowledge that any strategy is not dominant. However, as
modelers, we may wish to assume that some features of the environment actually are
common knowledge. For example: common knowledge that some strategies are not
dominant. In that case, the underlying space of uncertainty does not satisfy richness.
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the structure of rationalizability without
assuming richness.
By guaranteeing that A1i = Ai for each i, the richness condition also delivers the
following striking result (Weinstein and Yildiz, 2007):
 Generic Uniqueness (R.2): in the space of hierarchies of beliefs, the set of
types with a unique rationalizable action is open and dense (i.e. models are
generically dominance-solvable);
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Result (R.2) generalizes an important insight from the global games literature,
that multiplicity is often the consequence of the modeling assumptions of common
knowledge.1 If such assumptions are relaxed (e.g. assuming richness), hierarchies
of beliefs typicallyhave a unique rationalizable outcome. The case of multiplicity
corresponds to a knife-edge situation, at the boundary of regions of uniqueness for
each of the rationalizable actions.
Multiplicity is pervasive in applied models. Yet, from a theoretical point of view,
there is a sense in which a complete model should be able to deliver a unique predic-
tion. By way of analogy, consider the dynamics of a coin toss: If all the information
about the intervening forces, the mass and shape of the coin, air pressure and so on
(the initial conditions) were available, according to Newtonian mechanics we could
predict the outcome of the coin toss. The practicalunpredictability of a coin toss
is rather a consequence of the imperfectionof our model for the initial conditions:
indeterminacy does not pertain to the underlying phenomenon; rather, it stems from
the modeling activity.2
Result (R.2) can be interpreted as saying that the typical indeterminacy of stan-
dard game theoretical models does not pertain to the object of study; rather, it is a
consequence of the simplifying assumptions that we make on higher order beliefs.
It will be shown that very weak conditions on  su¢ ce to obtain Weinstein and
1Notice though that result (R.1) is in sharp contrast with that literature: In the global games
approach, the relaxation of common knowledge assumptions supports the robust selection of a unique
equilibrium. In contrast, (R.1) implies that if one considers a richer class of perturbations, any
selection from rationalizability is not robust. See Morris and Shin (2003) for a thorough survey of
the literature.
2The last paragraph presumes that the underlying phenomenon, i.e. the object of the model, is
not intrinsically indeterminate. It is not a statement that no such indeterminate objects exist.
If one believes that the object of study is intrinsically indeterminate, then the statement should be
rejected. A debate in phylosophy of science is open on the issue.
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Yildizs results in their full strength, without imposing the richness condition. For
instance, it su¢ ces to assume that there exists a state in  for which payo¤ functions
are supermodular, plus dominance regions for the corresponding extreme actions only.
In other words, if it is not common knowledge that the game is not supermodular,
and that the corresponding extreme actions are not dominant, then the strongest
predictions that are robust to perturbations of higher order beliefs are those based
on rationalizability alone.
2.2 Game Theoretic Framework
I consider static games with payo¤ uncertainty, i.e. tuples G =


N;; (Ai; ui)i2N

whereN is the set of players; for each i 2 N , Ai is the set of actions and ui : A! R
is is payo¤ function, where A := i2NAi and  is a parameter space representing
agentsincomplete information about the payo¤s of the game. Assume that the sets
N , A and  are all nite. As standard, hierarchies of beliefs can be represented by
means of type spaces: a type space is a tuple T = (Ti; i)i2N s.t. for each i 2 N ,
Ti is the (compact) set of types of player i, and the continuous function i : Ti !
( T i) assigns to each type of player i his beliefs about  and the opponents
types. Let T i be the set of all coherent hierarchies; we denote by T  = (T i ;  i )i2N
the -based universal type space (Mertens and Zamir, 1985). Elements of T i will be
referred to as types or hierarchies. A type ti 2 T i is nite if  i (ti) 2 
 
 T  i

has nite support; the set of nite types in the universal type space is denoted by
T^i  T i . The function Ti : Ti ! T i represents the belief morphism assigning to each
type in a type space the corresponding hierarchy in the universal type space.
Attaching a type space-representation of the playershierarchies of beliefs to the
game with payo¤uncertaintyG, one obtains a Bayesian model, i.e. the Bayesian game
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GT =


N;; (Ai; Ti; u^i)i2N

, with payo¤ functions dened as u^i : A    T ! R.
Since playerstypes are payo¤ irrelevant, with a slight abuse of notation we write ui
and drop the dependence on T .3
Given a Bayesian model GT , player is conjectures are denoted by
 i 2 ( A i  T i) :4
For each type ti, his consistent conjectures are
	i (ti) =

 i 2 ( A i  T i) : margT i i = i (ti)
	
.
For any Bi  Ai, let BRBii ( i) denote the set of best responses in Bi to conjecture
 i, and write BRi ( i)  BRAii ( i). Formally:
BRBii
 
 i

= arg max
ai2Bi
X
(;a i;t i)
ui (; ai; a i)   i (; a i; t i) .
If ai 2 BRBii ( i), we say that  i justies action ai in Bi. Appealing again to the
payo¤-irrelevance of the epistemic types, with another abuse of notation we will write
BRi (
i) for conjectures i 2 ( A i).
We dene next the solution concept, Interim Correlated Rationalizability (ICR),
introduced by Dekel et al. (2007):
3In Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and in the present settings types are payo¤-irrelevant, or purely
epistemic (capturing beliefs). Chapter 3 below instead considers the general case which allows for
payo¤-types: the space of uncertainty is  = 0  1  :::  n and each player i observes the
i-th component of the realized . A players type ti = (i; ei) is made of two parts: a payo¤-
relevant component (what i knows, i) and a purely epistemic component (ei), representing his
beliefs about what he doesnt know: his residual uncertainty about  and the opponentsbeliefs (i.e.
0  i  E i). In Chapter 3 it is shown how the distinction between payo¤-relevant and purely
epistemic types is irrelevant for the purpose of Weinstein and Yildizs analysis of static settings.
(For the same reason, payo¤-types are not considered here.) The distinction instead is relevant in
dynamic settings, as it a¤ects the possibility that players have to revise their beliefs after observing
unexpected moves. If  is su¢ ciently rich, and no payo¤-types are allowed, sequential rationality
has no bite in dynamic settings. Not so if payo¤-types are considered.
4Throughout the paper, the convention is maintained that beliefsare about  and the oppo-
nentsbeliefs about . That is, beliefsare about exogenous variables only. The term conjectures
instead refers to beliefs that also encompass the opponentsstrategies.
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Denition 2.1. Fix a Bayesian model GT . For each ti 2 Ti and i 2 N , set
ICR0i (ti) = Ai. For k = 0; 1; :::, let ICR
k
i be such that (ai; ti) 2 ICRki if and
only if ai 2 ICRki (ti) and ICRk i = j 6=iICRkj . Then recursively, for k = 1; 2; :::
ICRk;Ti (ti) = fai 2 Ai : 9 ai 2 	i (ti) s.t.: ai 2 BRi ( ai) and
supp
 
margA iT i 
ai
  ICRk 1;T i o
Then, let ICR1;Ti (ti) =
T
k0
ICRk;Ti (ti).
ICR is a version of rationalizability (Pearce, 1984 and Bernheim, 1984) applied
to the interim normal form, with the di¤erence that the opponentsstrategies may
be correlated in the eyes of a player.5 Dekel et al. (2007) proved that whenever two
types ti 2 Ti and t0i 2 T 0i are such that Ti (ti) = T 0i (t0i), ICR1;T
0
i (t
0
i) = ICR
1;T
i (ti):
That is, ICR is completely determined by a types hierarchies of beliefs, irrespective
of the type space representation. Hence, we can drop the reference to the specic
type space T , and without loss of generality work with the universal type space.
2.2.1 Structure of Rationalizability without Richness
Let A0i  Ai be the set of actions of player i for which there exists a dominance state
ai 2 . For each k = 0; 1; :::, set Ak i = j 6=iAkj and Ak = i2NAki . Recursively, for
each k = 1; 2; :::, dene
Aki =

ai 2 Ai : 9i 2 
 
Ak 1 i

s.t. faig = BRi
 
i
	
and let A1i =
S
k0Aki .
In words, for each k = 1; 2; :::, the set Aki is set of player is actions that are unique
best response to conjectures concentrated on Ak 1i . Actions in A0i are those for which
5Ely and Peski (2006) studied Interim (Independent) Rationalizability, that is simply Pearces
solution concept applied to the interim normal form. Battigalli et al. (2008) studied the connections
between these and other versions of rationalizability for incomplete information games.
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there exists dominance states. For k then, each action in Aki can be traced backto
such dominance regions through a nite sequence of strict best responses.
Remark 2.1. It is easy to verify that, for each k = 1; 2; :::, Ak 1i  Aki . Also, since
each Ai is nite, there exists K 2 N such that for each i 2 N , AKi = AK+1i = A1i .
The next lemma shows that for each k and for each action ai 2 Aki , there exists a
nite type for which ai is the only action that survives after (k + 1) rounds of iterated
deletion of dominated actions.
Lemma 2.1. For each k = 0; 1; :::, for each ai 2 Aki there exists a nite type t0i 2 T^i
such that ICRk+1i (t
0
i) = faig.
Proof. The proof is by induction:
Initial Step: this is immediate, as for ai 2 A0i , there exists ai 2  that makes ai
strictly dominant, and letting t
0
i denote the type corresponding to common belief of
ai, ICR1i (t
0
i) = faig.
Inductive Step: Let ai 2 Aki , then there exists i 2 
 
Ak 1 i

such that faig =
BRi (
i). From the inductive hypothesis, there exists a function k 1 i : Ak 1 i ! T^ i
such that for each a i 2 Ak 1 i , fa ig = ICRk i
 
k 1 i (a i)

. We want to show that
there exists t0i 2 T^i such that ICRk+1i (t0i) = faig. Let i 2 

Ak 1 i  T^ i

be
dened as
i
 
; a i; k 1 i (a i)

= i (; ai)
and let t0i be dened as 

i (t
0
i) =margT^ i
i. Then, by construction:

i
	
=
n
 i 2 	i (t0i) : supp

margA iT^ i 
i

 ICRk i
o
and faig = BRi
 
i

.
Hence: ICRk+1i (t
0
i) = faig :
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Denition 2.2. From lemma 1, let ki : Aki ! T^i be dened as a mapping such that
for each ai 2 Aki , faig = ICRki
 
ki (ai)

and i : A1i ! T^i as a mapping such that
for each ai 2 A1i , faig = ICR1i (i (ai)). Given i : A1i ! T^i, dene the set of types
Ti  T^i as follows:
Ti :=
n
ti 2 T^i : ti = i (ai) for some ai 2 A1i
o
.
Remark 2.2. Since A1i is nite, the set Ti is nite.
As already mentioned, Weinstein and Yildiz assume richness, that is A0i = Ai for
each i. Hence, it is immediate to construct types with a unique rationalizable action.
Given such dominance types, they prove their main result through an infection
argumentto obtain the generic uniqueness result. Their proof is articulated in two
main steps: rst, a types beliefs are perturbed so that any rationalizable action for
that type, is also strictly rationalizable for a nearby type (lemma 6 in Weinstein
and Yildiz, 2007); then, they show that by a further perturbation, each strictly
rationalizable action can be made uniquely rationalizable for an arbitrarily close
type, perturbing higher order beliefs only (lemma 7, ibid.).
With arbitrary spaces of uncertainty (without richness), the argument requires
two main modications: rst, the set of types Ti which will be used to start the
infection argumenthad to be constructed (denition 2.2); then, a result analogous
to Weinstein and Yildizs lemma 6 is proved (lemma 3 below), but with a di¤erent
solution concept than strict rationalizability, which will be presented shortly (def
2.3). The di¤erence with respect to strict rationalizability, parallels the di¤erence
between Weinstein and Yildizs dominance typesand types Ti constructed above,
so to be able to trace backa types hierarchies to the dominance regions for actions
in A0. Given these preliminary steps, the further perturbations of higher order beliefs
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needed to obtain the result is completely analogous to Weinstein and Yildizs: lemma
4 below entails minor modications of Weinstein and Yildizs equivalent (lemma 7).
The proof of the main result is based on the following solution concept:
Denition 2.3. For each i 2 N and ti 2 T i , set W0i (ti) = A0i . For k = 0; 1; :::, let
Wki be such that (ai; ti) 2 Wki if and only if ai 2 Wki (ti) and Wk i = j 6=iWkj . For
k = 1; 2; :::dene recursively
Wki (ti) =

ai 2 Aki : 9 i 2 
 
Wk 1 i

s.t. margT i 
i = i (ti)
and faig = BRi ( i)g
Let K 2 N be such that for each k  K, Wk+1i (ti)  Wki (ti) for all ti and i (such
K exists because of remark 1 above). Finally, dene W1i (ti) :=
T
kK
Wki (ti).
Notice that for k < K, Wki (ti) may be non-monotonic in k, as for k < K the
sets Aki are increasing. Hence, up to K, Wki (ti) may increase. When k  K though,
Aki = A1i is constant, and the condition 9 i 2 
 
Wk 1 i

becomes (weakly)
more and more stringent, making the sequence
Wki (ti)	k>K monotonically (weakly)
decreasing. Being always non-empty, W1i (ti) :=
T
k>K
Wki (ti) is also non-empty and
well-dened (as long as A0i 6= ;):
The following lemma states a standard xed point property, and it is an immediate
implication of lemma 5 in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007).6
Lemma 2.2. For any family of sets fVi (ti)gti2Ti;i2N such that Vi (ti)  A1i for all
i 2 N and ti 2 Ti. If for each ai 2 Vi (ti), there exists  i 2 ( A i  T i) such
that faig = BRi ( i), margT i i = i (ti) and  i (; a i; t i) > 0) a i 2 V i (t i),
then Vi (ti)  W1i (ti) for each ti.
6This is becauseW1 coincides with Weinstein and YildizsW1 applied to the game with actions
A1.
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We turn next to the analysis of higher order beliefs: the next lemma shows how
for each ti and each action ai 2 ICR1i (ti) \ A1i that is justied by conjectures
concentrated on A1 i, we can construct a sequence of types converging to ti for which
ai survives to the iterated deletion procedure introduced in denition 2.3.
Lemma 2.3. Let ai 2 ICR1i (ti)\A1i be such that there exists a justifying conjecture
 ai 2 	i (ti) such that supp
 
margA i 
ai
  A1 i. Then there exists ti (") ! ti as
"! 0 such that for each " > 0, ai 2 W1i (ti (")) and ti (") 2 T^i (hence ai 2 Wki (ti ("))
for all k  K)
Proof. Since ai 2 ICR1i (ti) \ A1i , 9 ai 2 
 
 ICR1 i

such that ai 2
BRi ( 
i) and margT i 
i = i (ti) and there exists i 2 
 
A1 i

such that
faig = BRi (i). Let  i be as in denition 2, and v(ti;ai)i 2 
 
 T i

such that
for each (; a i) 2   A1 i, v(ti;ai)i (;  i (a i)) = i (; a i). For each " 2 [0; 1],
consider the set of types T "i  T i such that each T "i = Ti[T i . That is, T "i consists of
two kinds of types: types taii 2 Ti (see denition 2), which have a unique rationalizable
action, and for each ti, ai and " types i (ti; ai; ") 2 T i with hierarchies of beliefs are
implicitly dened as follows:
 i (i (ti; si; ")) = "  v(ti;ai)i + (1  ")

 ai  ^ 1 i;"

,
where ^ i;" :   A1 i  T i !   T " i is the mapping given by ^ i;" (; a i; t i) =
(;  i (t i; a i; ")), and

 ai  ^ 1 i;"

denotes pushforward of  ai given by ^ 1 i;".
Dene  :  T " i ! A1 i  T " i such that:
8 i (t i; a i; ") 2 T  i :
 (;  i (t i; a i; ")) = (; a i;  i (t i; a i; "))
and for every ta i i 2 T i  T " i;

 
; t
a i
 i

=
 
; a i; t
a i
 i ;

.
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Consider the conjectures  i 2   A1 i  T " i dened as  i =  "i(ti;ai;")   1.
By construction, they are consistent with type  "i(ti;ai;"). Being a mixture of the beliefs
 ai (which made ai best reply) and of i (which makes ai strict best reply), we have
that faig = BRi ( i). Hence, setting Vi (i (ti; ai; ")) = faig and Vi (taii ) = faig as in
lemma 2, we have that faig 2 W1i (ti) for all ti 2 T "i . Finally, i (ti; ai; ") ! ti as
"! 0.
The next lemma shows that for any type ti and for any ai 2 Wki (ti), k = 0; 1; :::;
there exists a type that di¤ers from ti only for beliefs of order higher than k, for which
ai is the unique action which survives (k + 1) rounds of the ICR-procedure.
For any type ti 2 T i , let tmi denote the m-th order beliefs of type ti. (By denition
of T i , any ti 2 T i can be written as ti = (tmi )1m=1.)
Lemma 2.4. For each k = 0; 1; :::, and for each ai 2 Wki (ti), there exists ~ti : ~tmi = tmi
for all m  k and such that faig = ICRk+1i
 
~ti

Proof. The proof is by induction. For k = 0, ai 2 W0i (ti) = A0i , so there exists
a dominance state for action ai, ai. Let ~ti denote common belief of ai, so that
faig = ICR1i
 
~ti

(condition ~t0i = t
0
i holds vacuously). For the inductive step, write
each t i as t i = (l; h) where
l =
 
t1 i; :::; t
k
 i

and
h =
 
tk+1 i ; t
k+2
 i ; :::

:
Let L =

l : 9h s.t. (l; h) 2 T  i
	
:
Let ai 2 Wki (ti), and  ai 2 
 
Wk 1 i

the corresponding conjecture s.t.
margT i 
ai = i (ti)
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and faig = BRi ( ai) : Under the inductive hypothesis, for each
(a i; t i) 2 supp
 
margA iT i 
ai

,
9~t i (a i) =

l; ~h (a i)

s.t. ICRk i
 
~t i (a i)

= fa ig :
Dene the mapping
' : supp
 
margA iL 
ai
!  T  i
by ' (; a i; l) =
 
; ~t i (a i)

. Dene ~ti by
 i
 
~ti

=
 
margA iL 
ai
  ' 1
By construction,
margA iL

i
 
~ti

=  ai  proj 1A iL  ' 1  proj 1L
=  ai  proj 1L
=  ai  proj 1A iT  i  proj
 1
L
= margA iLi (ti)
where the rst equality exploits the denition of lower order beliefs and the construc-
tion of type ~ti, the second follows from the denition of ', for which
proj 1LA i  ' 1  proj 1L = proj 1L
The third is simply notational, and the last one by denition. Hence, by construction,
we have ICRk+1i
 
~ti

= faig, which completes the inductive step. 
We are now in the position to present the main result:
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Proposition 2.1. For each ti 2 T^i and for each ai 2 ICR1i (ti) \ A1i such that
supp
 
margA i 
ai
  A1 i, there exists a sequence fti g  T^i s.t. ti ! ti and for each
 2 N, faig = ICR1i (ti ) :
Proof: Take any ti 2 T^ and any ai 2 ICR1i (ti)\A1i such that supp
 
margA i 
ai

 A1 i: from lemma 3, there exists a sequence of nite types ti (") ! ti (as " ! 0)
such that ai 2 W1i (ti (")) for each " > 0, hence, there exists a sequence fti (n)gn2N
converging to ti such that ai 2 Wki (ti (n)) for all k  K. Then we can apply lemma
4 to the types t (n): for each n, for each k  K and for each ai 2 Wk (ti (n)),
there exists ~ti (k; n) such that ~tki (k; n) = t
k
i (n) and faig = ICRk+1i
 
~ti (k; n)

. Hence,
for each n, the sequence

~ti (k; n)
	
k2N converges to ti (n) as k ! 1. Because the
universal type-space T  is metrizable, there exists a sequence ti (n; kn)! ti such that
ICR1i (ti (n; kn)) = faig. Set ti = ti (n; kn): ti ! ti as  !1 and ICR1i (ti ) = faig
for each .
2.3 Discussion
If it is common knowledge that no action is dominant (A0i = ;), proposition 1 is
vacuous. Weinstein and Yildizs richness condition amounts to assuming that  is
such that A0i = Ai for each i: In this case, proposition 1 coincides with proposition 1
in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007).
Of more interest is the observation that all results in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007)
(including the generic uniqueness result) hold true, without richness, whenever A1 =
A.
Moreover, suppose that there exists a payo¤state  2  for which payo¤functions
are supermodular, with player is higher and lower actions ahi and a
l
i respectively; and
for each i, A0i =

ali; a
h
i
	
. Then under these conditions A1 = A, and Weinstein and
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Yildizs full results are again obtained. This corresponds to the case considered by the
global games literature, in which the underlying game has strategic complementarities
and dominance regions are assumed for the extreme actions only. The di¤erence is
that in that literature supermodularity is assumed at all states (so that it is commonly
known).7 In contrast, here it may be assumed for only one state, which only entails
relaxing common knowledge that payo¤s are not supermodular. This observation
claries that, on the one hand, the equilibrium selection results obtained in the global
games literature, which contrast with the non-robustness result (R.2), are exclusively
determined by the particular class of perturbations that are considered. On the
other hand, the generic uniqueness result can be obtained without assuming common
knowledge of supermodularity or imposing richness: as argued, relaxing common
knowledge that payo¤s are not supermodular and that the corresponding extreme
actions are not dominant would su¢ ce to obtain the full results of Weinstein and
Yildiz.
With minor changes, the proof above can be used to obtain a slightly stronger
result (although not directly in terms of the primitives) just setting A0i as the set of
actions of player i that are uniquely ICR for some type (clearly, this would always
include the set of actions that are dominant in some state): Then, A1i characterizes
the set of actions that are uniquely rationalizable (hence robust) for some type.8
7See Morris and Shin (2003) and references therein.
8Since the ICR-correspondence is upper hemicontinuous in T , the uniqueness regions are open
and locally constant: the corresponding predictions are thus robust.
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Chapter 3
Higher Order Beliefs in Dynamic
Environments
Abstract: The impact of higher order uncertainty in dynamic games is
not as well understood as for static ones. This paper answers the follow-
ing question: What are the strongest predictions that we can make, in a
dynamic game, that are robustto possible misspecications of agents
higher order beliefs? The answer is provided by a new solution concept,
Interim Sequential Rationalizability (ISR): It is shown that, if the space
of uncertainty is su¢ ciently rich, ISR is the strongest upper hemi-
continuous solution concept on the universal type space. Furthermore,
ISR is generically unique. ISR is in general very weak, but its weakness
depends on other modeling assumptions concerning agents information
about the environment. These results reveal an interaction with modeling
assumptions that have hitherto received little attention in the context of
higher order uncertainty (namely, the distinction between knowledge and
certainty), and raise further questions of robustness: It is shown that ISR
is type space-invariant, that is it depends solely on agentshierarchies, not
on the type space; In private-valuesenvironments, ISR is also invari-
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ant to the representation of certainty as knowledge, a novel robustness
property called model-invariance.
Keywords: dynamic games  hierarchies of beliefs  higher order beliefs
 robustness  uniqueness
JEL Codes: C72; C73; D82.
3.1 Introduction
A large literature, beginning with Rubinstein (1989), has explored the impact of per-
turbations of common knowledge assumptions in static games. The overall message
is negative: many predictions depend on the simplifying assumptions implicit in the
modeling choices made. If common knowledge assumptions are relaxed, only weak
predictions are robust to possible misspecications of agentshigher order beliefs. In
particular, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that, when no common knowledge
assumptions on the payo¤s of a static game are imposed, the strongest robustpre-
dictions are those based on (interim correlated) rationalizability alone. In contrast,
the role of higher order uncertainty in dynamic games is not well understood.
This paper characterizes the strongest predictions that are robust to possi-
ble misspecications of agentshigher order beliefs in dynamic games. This charac-
terization depends on implicit assumptions that have hitherto received little atten-
tion. These assumptions concern the distinction between knowledge and certainty
(probability-one belief). While mostly inconsequential in static games, in dynamic
games the distinction is crucial. If an agent knowssomething, he would be certain
of it after observing any event (expected or not). Not so if knowledgeis replaced
by probability-one belief, as Bayesrule puts no restrictions on the conditional beliefs
after unexpected events.
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Addressing robustness questions in dynamic games, it is then important to main-
tain agents information about the environment separate from their beliefs. A type
in this paper consists of two components: one describing the agents information, or
payo¤-type; and one purely epistemic, parametrizing his beliefs. Di¤erent assump-
tions on the agentsinformation a¤ect the robustness of a models predictions: For
example, it will be shown that in environments with no information, in which types
are purely epistemic, the strongest robust predictions are weaker than in envi-
ronments with private values, in which players know their own payo¤ function, and
higher order uncertainty only concerns the opponentspayo¤s (and their beliefs about
their opponents). Hence, to provide a thorough answer to the question of robust-
ness, it is necessary to deconstructthe modeling activity, so to isolate the di¤erent
intervening forces.
Modeling a strategic situation with incomplete information requires a specication
of agents entire hierarchies of beliefs. A complete model includes a description
of all possible hierarchies of beliefs agents may have over the underlying space of
uncertainty; then, a solution concept assigns to each hierarchy of beliefs the set of
strategies that the agent might play (possibly a singleton). In practice though it is
common to select a small subset of all the possible hierarchies of beliefs to focus on.
Then, the robustnessof our predictions depends on properties of continuity of the
solution concept correspondence on the space of all possible hierarchies of beliefs.
Since Harsanyi (1967-68), it is common practice to represent hierarchies of beliefs
implicitly, by means of (non-universal) type spaces. These type spaces impose common
knowledge assumptions on agentshierarchies of beliefs. The particular type space
chosen to represent a given set of hierarchies of beliefs may potentially a¤ect the
predictions of a solution concept. Invariance of the predictions with respect to the
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type space is thus a distinct robustness property from that discussed in the previous
paragraph. This property is called type space-invariance.
Finally, the modeling activity typically imposes common knowledge restrictions
not only on agentsbeliefs, but also on payo¤s. For instance, if all types under con-
sideration have beliefs concentrated on a subset  of all possible payo¤ states, i.e. if
there is common certainty of , it is common practice to ignore the states not in 
in the specication of the model, thus transforming common certainty into common
knowledge assumptions. I will say that a solution concept is model-invariant if its
predictions are invariant to the representation of certainty as knowledge (and vicev-
ersa). Model-invariance is a novel robustness property, in general more demanding
than type space-invariance, but equivalent to it in static environments.
To answer the questions above, a solution concept for dynamic games of incom-
plete information is introduced: Interim Sequential Rationalizability (ISR hereafter).
ISR captures the implications of agentssequential rationality and initial common
certainty of sequential rationality, and extends ideas from solution concepts intro-
duced by Ben-Porath (1997) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007). It is proven that,
if no common knowledge assumptions on payo¤s are imposed, ISR is the strongest
upper hemicontinuous solution concept on the universal type space (Mertens and Za-
mir, 1985): any (strict) renement of ISR delivers predictions that are not robust
to perturbations of higher order beliefs.
This delivers a thoroughly negative message, as ISR is in general a very weak
solution concept.1 Its weakness though is highly sensitive to the ne details of the
1It is important to emphasize that the result holds once all common knowledge assumptions
are being relaxed: although common knowledge assumptions are intrinsically strong, in some cases
analysts may have reasons to believe that some of them are actually satised. In that case, the
robustness exercise performed here may be unnecessarily demanding, and stronger predictions may
be robust if only some such assumptions are relaxed. Chapter 2 above investigates the problem in
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maintained assumptions about playersknowledge and their beliefs: For instance, if
common knowledge assumptions are relaxed in an environment with no information,
ISR coincides with (interim correlated) rationalizability, that is iterated strict dom-
inance in the interim normal form; If instead we consider private-values settings,
then ISR strictly renes rationalizability, and it is shown to be equivalent to Dekel
and Fudenbergs (1990) S1W -procedure applied to the interim normal form (that
is, one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, followed by iterated strict
dominance).
It is further shown that, irrespective of the information structure, ISR is type
space-invariant. The type space-invariance and upper hemicontinuity results parallel
analogous results in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) on (interim correlated) ratio-
nalizability. Model-invariance instead is a novel robustness property. ISR is shown
to satises this property in environments with private values, but not in environments
with no information.
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that if no common knowledge assumptions are
imposed, static games are generically dominance-solvable. This result generalizes an
important insight from the literature on (static) global games: The pervasive multi-
plicity of equilibria that we observe in standard models stems from the high degree of
coordination that common knowledge assumptions force on the agentsbeliefs.2 The
existing literature is not conclusive as to whether the same insight applies to dynamic
games: As the game unfolds, players may extract information about the environment
from the history of play, updating their initial beliefs; furthermore, some information
endogenously becomes common knowledge (e.g. public histories), possibly serving
the context of static games.
2Morris and Shin (2003) survey that literature.
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as a coordination device and favoring multiplicity. This tension is at work in sev-
eral studies on dynamic global games, in which the familiar uniqueness results dont
obtain, casting some shadow on the possibility of drawing tempting analogies from
static to dynamic environments.3 This paper provides a generic uniqueness result for
ISR, which shows that imputing multiplicity to common knowledge assumptions is
legitimate in dynamic games as well.4 Furthermore, very weak epistemic conditions
(generically) su¢ ce for agents to achieve coordination of expectations, with no need
to invoke sophisticated backward or forward induction reasoning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 contains several examples
to illustrate the main concepts and results. Section 3.3 introduces the game theoretic
framework; ISR is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides some robustness
results: upper hemicontinuity, type space-invariance and model-invariance. Section
3.6 explores the structure of ISR on the universal type space, and proves that under
a suitable richness condition it is generically unique and that any renement of ISR
is not robust. Section 3.7 concludes and discusses the relation with the literature.
Proofs are in the appendix.
3For example, Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2007) show how imposing the global games infor-
mation structure on dynamic environments may not deliver the familiar uniqueness results.
4Thus, despite the important di¤erences discussed above, the impact of higher order beliefs in
dynamic environments is analogous to the static case. This nding contrasts with previous results
for dynamic environments (e.g. Chassang, 2009 and Angeletos et al., 2007).
81
Figure 3.1: Examples 3.1 and 3.2
3.2 Relaxing CK-assumptions and Robustness in
Dynamic Games
3.2.1 Preliminaries and Examples
The next example illustrates the logic of Interim Sequential Rationalizability (ISR)
in the context of a game with complete information, and compares it with Pearces
(1984) Extensive Form Rationalizability (EFR). In the example, the predictions made
by EFR seem very compelling. Yet, when common knowledge assumptions are re-
laxed, these predictions are not robust to perturbations of higher order beliefs. ex-
ample 3.2 will illustrate the non-robustness of EFR.
Example 3.1. Consider the game in gure 3.1, and suppose that it is common
knowledge that  = 0 (hence, the game has complete information. Denote this model
by TCK =

tCK
	
). Then, strategy a3 is dominated by a1. Thus, if at the beginning
of the game player 2 thinks that 1 is rational, he assigns zero probability to a3 being
played. For example, 2 could assign probability one to a1, so that the next information
set is unexpected. We can consider two di¤erent hypothesis on the agentsreasoning
in the game:
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[H:1] 2 believes that 1 is rational even after an unexpected move; or
[H:2] 2 believes that 1 is rational as long as he is not surprised, but he
is willing to consider that 1 is not rational if he observes an unexpected
move.
If [H:1] is true, in the subgame player 2 would still assign zero probability to a3,
and play b1 if rational. If 1 believes [H:1] and that 2 is rational, he would expect b1 to
be played. Then, if 1 is also rational, he would play a2. This is the logic of Pearces
(1984) Extensive Form Rationalizability (EFR), which delivers (a2; b1) as the unique
outcome in this game.
Now, lets maintain that 2 is rational, but assume [H:2] instead: once surprised,
player 2 is willing to consider that 1 is not rational. Hence, in the subgame, he may
assign probability one to a3 being played, which would justify b2. If at the beginning
2 assigned positive probability to a2, then the subgame would not be unexpected, and
player 2 would still assign zero probability to a3, making b1 the unique best response.
Thus, if [H:2] is true, either b1 or b2 may be played by a rational player 2. If 1 believes
that 2 is rational and that [H:2] is true, he cannot rule out either b1 or b2, and so both
a1 and a2 may be played by a rational player 1. Interim Sequential Rationalizability
(ISR) corresponds to the latter form of reasoning, and selects fa1; a2g fb1; b2g for
tCK , written ISR  tCK = fa1; a2g  fb1; b2g. 
The logic of EFR in this example seems compelling. Yet, as the next example
shows, its predictions are not robust. To illustrate the point we will construct a
sequence of hierarchies of beliefs, converging the hierarchies in example 1, in which
(a1b2) is the unique ISR-outcome (hence, also the unique EFR outcome). Since
(a1; b2) is ruled out by EFR in the limit, but uniquely selected along the converging
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sequence, EFR is not robust.
Example 3.2. In the game of gure 3.1, let the space of uncertainty be  =
f0; 3g. Suppose that player 1 knows the true state, while 2 doesnt (and this is
common knowledge). Let t = (t1; t

2) represent the situation in which there is common
certainty that  = 0: typet1 knows that  = 0, and puts probability one on 2 being
type t2; type t

2 puts probability one on  = 0, and player 1 being type t

1. A reasoning
similar to that in example 1 implies that fa1; a2g and fb1; b2g are the sets of ISR
strategies for t1 and t

2, written ISR (t) = fa1; a2g  fb1; b2g.
Now, a sequence of types ftmg will be constructed, converging to t, such that
(a1; b2) is the unique ISR-outcome for each tm: Since it is the unique ISR-outcome
along the sequence, any (strict) renement of ISR that rules out (a1; b2) for type
t would not be upper hemicontinuous, hence not robust. The type spaces used
for the construction of the sequence ftmg can be viewed as a perturbed version
of Rubinsteins (1989) e-mail game, in which there is a small probability that the
original e-mail is sent in the wrong state of nature.
Fix " 2  0; 1
6

and let p 2

0; "
(1 2")

. Consider the set of type proles T "1 
T "2  T , where T "1 = f 13; 10; 13; 30; 33; 50; 53:::g and T "2 = f0; 2; 4; :::g. Types k
(k =  1; 1; 3; :::,  = 0; 3) are player 1s types who know that the true state is ;
2s types only know their own payo¤s, which are constant across states, but dont
know the opponents type. Suppose that beliefs are described as follows. Type  13
puts probability one on facing type 0; type 0 assigns probability 1
1+p
to type  13, and
complementary probability to types 10 and 13, with weights (1  ") and ", respectively.
Similarly, for all k = 2; 4; ::: player 2s type k puts probability 1
1+p
on 1s types (k   1)0
and (k   1)3, with weights (1  ") and " respectively, and complementary probability
p
1+p
on the (k + 1)-types, with weight (1  ") on (k + 1)0 and " on (k + 1)3. For all
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Figure 3.2: The type space in Example 3.2
other types of player 1, with k = 1; 3; :::, and  = 0; 3, type k puts probability 1
1+p
on
2s type k   1, and complementary probability on 2s type k + 1. (The type space is
represented in gure 3.2.) Notice that the increasing sequence of even ks and odd k0s
converges to t as we let " approach 0.5 It will be shown that player 2s types 0; 2; 4; :::
only play b1, while 1s types 10; 30; ::: only play a1: All types k3 (k =  1; 1; 3; :::) would
play a3, for they know it is dominant. Type 0 puts probability 11+p on type  1, who
plays a3; given these initial beliefs, type 0s conditional conjectures after In must put
probability at least 1
1+p
on a3 being played, which makes b2 optimal for him. Type 10
also puts probability 1
1+p
on type 0, who plays b2, thus a1 is the unique best response.
Type 2s initial beliefs are such that type 10 plays a1 and types 13 and 33 play a3.
Hence, the probability of a3 being played, conditional on In being observed, must be
no smaller than
Pr
 
 = 3jnot 10 = "
1 

1
1+p

(1  ")
=
(1 + p) "
p+ "
5This convergence of the hierarchies of beliefs is in the product topology.
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Given that p < "
(1 2") , this probability is greater than
1
2
. Hence, playing b2 is the
unique best response, irrespective of type 2s conjectures about 30s behavior. Given
this, type 30 also plays a1. The reasoning can be iterated, so that for all types
10; 30; 50; :::, a1 is the unique ISR strategy, while for all types 0; 2; 4; ::: of player 2,
strategy b2 is. 
The main result of the paper generalizes the insights of the example. In fact, it will
be shown that when all common knowledge assumptions are relaxed, the strongest
robustpredictions are those based on ISR alone: Any (strict) renement deliv-
ers non-robust predictions. But any game theoretic model implictly makes common
knowledge assumptions. We thus need to be precise about what we mean when we say
that all common knowledge assumptions are being relaxed. For instance, suppose
that the parameter space for the game in gure 3.1 is  = f0; 3g, so that strategy a3
is dominant in some state. If only common knowledge of  is assumed, then it is not
common knowledge that a3 is not dominant. Thus, relaxing all common knowledge
assumptions essentially means to consider the set of all possible hierarchies of beliefs
(or types) that players may have about a su¢ ciently rich space of uncertainty, .
Assuming common knowledge of h; T i, where T  denotes the -based univer-
sal type space, entails essentially no loss of generality. Then, robustnessmay be
formulated as a property of continuity of the solution concept on T .
In a dynamic game, the details of the modeling assumptions on agentsinformation
about  are crucial. The next example shows how the distinction between knowledge
and certainty may a¤ect the predictions of a solution concept, raising novel questions
of robustness.
Example 3.3. Consider the game in gure 3.3, and assume that  = f 3; 3g.
86
Figure 3.3: Examples 3.3 and 3.4
Lets consider two alternative setups.
[A]: Player 2 observes the realization of , and this is common knowl-
edge. Suppose that agents are commonly certain that  = 3, denoted by tA = 
tA1 ; t
A
2
 2 T : if type tA2 , player 2 knows that  = 3, and puts probability one on
player 1 being type tA1 ; if type t
A
1 , agent 1 puts probability one on  = 3 and agent
2 being type tA2 . (Notice that t
A is not common knowledge of  = 3because tA1
does not know that  = 3.) Since 1 knows that 2 knows the true state of , if 1 is
rational and believes that 2 is rational, he must play Out: if 2 is rational and knows
, 1 obtains  3 in the subgame irrespective of the realization of .
[B]: Players observe nothing about , and this is common knowledge.
Now, lets maintain that agents share common certainty of  = 3, denoted by tB = 
tB1 ; t
B
2
 2 T : each type tBi (i = 1; 2) puts probability one on  = 3 and the opponent
being type tBj (j 6= i). Hence, agents in this setup share the same hierarchies as types
tA. If player 1 believes that  = 3, and believes that player 2 playsD, then 1s optimal
response is to play Out. If 2 believes this, then his information set is unexpected:
If called to move, player 2 would be surprised and, if he revises his beliefs in favor
of  =  3, he may play U . If 1 anticipates this, then playing In is optimal even if
1 believes that  = 3. That is because 1 knows that 2, although certain of  = 3,
does not know that  = 3. So, types tB share the same hierarchies as types tA,
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but under this specication of agentsinformation, ISR  tB = fIn;Outg  fU;Dg
(while ISR  tA = f(Out;D)g). 
Hence, in a dynamic game, the details of agents information about  may
crucially a¤ect our predictions. So, for instance, types t in example 3.2 share the
same hierarchies of beliefs as types tCK in example 3.1, but agents have di¤erent
information about  in the two examples. Yet, in this case ISR (t) = ISR  tCK.
Then, why is it the case that ISR  tCK = ISR (t) while ISR  tA 6= ISR  tB?
What if we change agentsinformation in example 3.2? How do di¤erences in agents
information a¤ect the properties of robustness with respect to perturbations of
agents hierarchies of beliefs? The purpose of the paper is to provide systematic
answers to these questions.
The rest of the section provides a non-technical exposition of the formalization
and the main results.
3.2.2 Non-technical Presentation of the Approach and Re-
sults
Basic Setup
Modeling Incomplete Information. A dynamic game is dened by an extensive
form hN;H;Zi (N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players; H and Z the sets of partial
and terminal histories, respectively) and playerspayo¤s, dened over the terminal
histories. Incomplete information is modelled parametrizing the payo¤ functions on
a rich space of uncertainty , letting ui : Z  ! R. In general, let  be written
as
 = 0 1  :::n.
For each i = 1; :::; n, i is the set of player is payo¤ types, i.e. possible pieces
88
of information that player i may have about the payo¤ state; 0 instead represents
any residual uncertainty that is left after pooling all players information. The in-
terpretation is that when the payo¤ state is  = (0; 1; :::; n), player i knows that
 2 0  fig   i, where  i = j2Nnfigj . The tuple


0; (

i ; ui)i2N

, where
ui : Z   ! R for each i 2 N , represents playersinformation about everyones
preferences, and is referred to as information structure.6 (Case A in example 3 can
be formalized assuming that 0 and 

1 are singletons, or (w.l.o.g.) that 

2 = 
)
Special cases of interest are those of private values, in which each ui depends on
i only; and the case in which the uis depend on 

0 only, so that players have no
information about payo¤s (i.e., without loss of generality,  = 0). In a private
values-environment, each players payo¤s only depend on what he knows. Hence, in
private values-environments (PV), the fact that everybody knows his own payo¤s
is common knowledge: Uncertainty only concerns the opponentspayo¤s and higher
order beliefs. (In example 2, player 2s payo¤s are constant across states, and player 1
observes . Hence, 1 = 
, and the environment has private-values.) In contrast, in
no information-environments (NI) players have no knowledge of the payo¤ state. In
particular, each player does not know his own preferences over the terminal histories:
He merely holds beliefs about that. (Case B in example 3 is a NI-environment.)
The Interim Approach. An information structure and an extensive form dene
a dynamic game with payo¤ uncertainty, but do not complete the description of the
strategic situation: Playersbeliefs about what they dont know must be specied, i.e.
beliefs about 0 i (rst order beliefs), beliefs about 0 i and the opponents
6The standard denition of an information structure species playerspartitions and priors over
the set of states. Here playersbeliefs, i.e. their priors, are not specied. Appending playersbeliefs
to an information structure, in the terminology adopted here, delivers a model (see below).
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rst order beliefs (second order beliefs), and so on. The -based universal type space,
T , can be thought of as the set of all such hierarchies of beliefs (Mertens and Zamir,
1985). Each element ti = (i; ei) 2 T i; is a complete description of player i: His
information i (what he knows), and his epistemic type ei (his beliefs about what he
doesnt know, 0  i  E i).
It is important to stress one point: Playershierarchies of beliefs (or types) are
purely subjective states describing a players view of the strategic situation he is fac-
ing. As such, they enter the analysis as a datum and should be regarded in isolation
(i.e. player by player and type by type). Nothing prevents playersviews of the world
to be inconsistent with each other (i.e. to assign positive probability to opponents
types other than the actual ones); they are part of the environment (exogenous vari-
ables), and as such game theoretic reasoning cannot impose restrictions on them; it
is given such beliefs that we can apply game theoretic reasoning to make predictions
about playersbehavior (the endogenous variables). The name InterimSequential
Rationalizability is meant to emphasize this point.
Robustness(-es)
Continuity in the Universal Model. To explore what predictions retain their
validity when all common knowledge assumptions are relaxed, we specify a rich space
of uncertainty  and look at playerstypes in the universal space T : Assuming
common knowledge of h; T i entails no loss of generality; h; T i will thus be re-
ferred to as the universal model. A solution concept assigns to each players hierarchy
of beliefs (the exogenous variables) a set of strategies (the endogenous variables).
In modeling a strategic situation, applied theorists typically select a subset of
the possible hierarchies to focus on. To the extent that the true hierarchies are
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understood to be only close to the ones considered in a specic model, the concern
for robustness of the theorys predictions translates into a continuity property of the
solution concept correspondence. In this paper a solution concept is robust if it
never rules out strategies that are not ruled out for arbitrarily close hierarchies of
beliefs: This is equivalent to requiring upper hemicontinuity (u.h.c.) of the solution
concept correspondence on T .
Clearly, a solution concept that never rules out anything is robust, but not inter-
esting. One way to solve this trade-o¤ is to look for a strongest robust solution
concept. It will be shown (Proposition 3.4) that for any type t 2 T  and any
s 2 ISR (t), there exists a sequence tm ! t such that fsg = ISR (tm) for any m.
Furthermore, ISR is u.h.c. on T  (Proposition 3.1). Hence, ISR is a strongest
robust solution concept.7
Type Spaces, Models and Invariance. Upper hemicontinuity in the universal
model addresses a specic robustness question: Robustness, with respect to small
mistakesin the modeling choice of which subset of playershierarchies to consider.
When applied theorists choose a subset of -hierarchies to focus on, they typically
represent them by means of (non universal)-based type spaces, rather than elements
of T .
Denition 3.1. A -based type space is a tuple
T =


0; (

i ; Ei; Ti; ; i)i2N

such that Ti; = i  Ei and i : Ti; ! (0  T i;)
7Any single-valued and constant solution concept is a strongest u.h.c. solution concept, but not
interesting. ISR is the strongest among the class of solution concepts that satisfy initial common
certainty of sequential rationality.
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Each type ti in Ti; corresponds to a -hierarchy for player i (an element of
T i;). Representing a hierarchy as a type in a (non-universal) type space T rather
than an element of T  does not change the common knowledge assumptions on the
information structure (), but it does impose common knowledge assumptions on
playershierarchies of beliefs, and their correlation with the states of nature 0. A
solution concept is type space-invariant if the behavior prescribed for a given hierarchy
does not depend on whether it is represented as an element of T  or of a di¤erent T.
Thus, type space-invariance is also a robustness property: Robustness, with respect
to the introduction of the extra common knowledge assumptions on playersbeliefs
(and their correlations with 0) imposed by non-universal type spaces. Proposition
3.2 shows that ISR is type space-invariant under all information structures.8
In writing down a game, as analysts we typically make common knowledge as-
sumptions not only on playersbeliefs, but also on payo¤s. For instance, suppose
that all types in T have beliefs concentrated on some strict subset   , i.e.
there is common certainty of  in T. In applied work, states that receive zero prob-
ability ( 2 n) are usually excluded from the model. That is: common certainty
of  is made into common knowledge of .
Denition 3.2. A model of the environment is a -based type space, where  is
such that k  k for each k = 0; :::; n.
Each type in a model induces a -hierarchy, and hence a -hierarchy. A so-
lution concept is model invariant if the behavior is completely determined by the
-hierarchies irrespective of the model they are represented in. Model invariance is
a stronger robustness property than type space-invariance, as it also requires robust-
8Type space-dependence in static settings has been studied by Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel,
Fudenberg and Morris (2007).
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ness to the introduction of extra common knowledge assumptions on the information
structure.
Example 3.4 (Model Dependence) Consider example 3 again, and suppose
that the truesituation is the one described by case B, in which agents share common
certainty that  = 3, but they have no information about . As argued, for these
types the solution concept delivers ISR  tB = fIn;OutgfU;Dg. If that situation
is modelled as there being common knowledge of  = 3, then the prediction of ISR
is the backward induction outcome ISR  ~tCK = (Out;D). Hence, despite ~tCK and
tB share the same hierarchies of beliefs, ISR delivers di¤erent predictions depending
on the model in which those hierarchies are represented. Hence, in NI-environments,
ISR is not model-invariant. 
Proposition 3.3 in section 3.5.3 shows that ISR is model-invariant in environ-
ments with private-values. (That is why ISR  tCK = ISR (t) in example 2.)
3.3 Game Theoretic Framework
The analysis that follows applies to dynamic games, dened by an extensive form
and a model, i.e. a specication of playersinformation and beliefs about everyones
preferences and beliefs. The present work is concerned with robustness of solution
concepts to di¤erent specications of playersmodel, i.e. the extensive form will be
maintained xed throughout, and the model varied. These concepts are formally
introduced next:
Extensive Forms. An extensive form is dened by a tuple
  =


N;H;Z; (Ai)i2N
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where N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players; for each player i, Ai is the (nite) set of
his possible actions; a nite collection of histories (concatenations of action proles),
partitioned into the set of terminal histories Z and the set of partial histories H
(which includes the empty history ). As the game unfolds, the partial history h that
has just occurred becomes public information and perfectly recalled by all players.
At some stages there may be simultaneous moves. For each partial history h 2 H
and player i 2 N , let Ai (h) denote the (nite) set of actions available to player i
at history h, and let A (h) = i2NAi (h) and A i (h) = j2NnfigAj (h).9 Without
loss of generality, Ai (h) is assumed non-empty for each h: player i is inactive at h if
jAi (h) j = 1; he is active otherwise. If there is only one active player at each h, the
game has perfect information.
Pure strategies of player i assign to each partial history h 2 H an action in the
set Ai (h). Let Si denote the set of reduced strategies (plans of actions) of player i.
Two strategies correspond to the same reduced strategy si 2 Si if and only if they are
realization-equivalent to si, that is, they preclude the same collection of histories and
for every non precluded history h they select the same action, si(h).10 Each prole of
reduced strategies s induces a unique terminal history z(s) 2 Z. For each h 2 H, let
Si(h) be the set of si allowing history h (meaning that there is some s i such that h is
a prex of z(si; s i). Hence, Si () = Si). H (si) is the set of histories not precluded
by si: H (si) = fh 2 H : si 2 Si (h)g.
9Formally: Ai (h) = fai 2 Ai : 9a i 2 A is.t. (h; (ai; a i)) 2 H [ Zg
10In the classical equilibrium approach, strategies specify a players behavior also at histories
precluded by the strategy itself: in the equilibrium, this counterfactual behavior represents the
opponentsbeliefs about is behavior in case he has deviated from the strategy (see Rubinstein, 1991).
In this paper a non-equilibrium approach is considered, and playersbeliefs about the opponents
behavior are modelled explicitly. We can thus restrict attention to players plans of actions (or
reduced strategies).
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Information Structures. Players have preferences over the terminal histories, rep-
resented by payo¤ functions ui : Z ! R for each i. To model incomplete information,
payo¤ functions are parametrized on a fundamental space of uncertainty  such that
 = 0 1  :::n,
and ui : Z   ! R.11 Elements of  are referred to as payo¤ states. For each
i = 1; :::; n, i is the set of player is payo¤ types, i.e. possible information that
player i may have about the payo¤ state. 0 instead represents the states of nature
(any residual uncertainty that is left after pooling all playersinformation). Each k
(k = 0; 1; :::; n) is assumed non-empty, Polish and convex, and each ui : Z  ! R
continuous.12 (For each i,  i = j2Nnfigj , so that  = 0  i   i.) The
tuple


; (ui)i2N

represents the fundamental information structure, and describes
playersinformation about everyones payo¤s. For ease of reference, two special cases
are dened:
Denition 3.3. Information structure


; (ui)i2N

has Private Values (PV) if for
each i 2 N , ui : Z i ! R.
Denition 3.4. Information structure


; (ui)i2N

has No Information (NI) if for
each i 2 N , ui : Z 0 ! R.
In PV-structures (or environments) it is common knowledge that every agent
knows his own preferences over the terminal nodes; in NI-environments instead it is
common knowledge that players have no information about payo¤s.
11This representation is without loss of generality: For example, taking the underlying space of
uncertainty   ([0; 1]n)Z imposes no restrictions on agentspreferences.
12Convexity of i (i = 1; ::; n) is only required for the results in section 3.6. Convexity of 

0 can
be dropped without a¤ecting any result.
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The set  should be thought of as being a richspace of uncertainty, so that im-
posing common knowledge of  entails su¢ ciently little loss of generality (see Section
3.2):  represents the benchmark in which no common knowledge assumptions are
imposed, hence the term fundamental information structure. Stronger common
knowledge assumptions can be imposed considering smaller information structures:
Tuples


; (ui)i2N

such that  = nk=0k and k  k is Polish for each k are
referred to as (-based) information structures.
Type Spaces and Hierarchies of Beliefs. Given an information structure

; (ui)i2N

;
the description of the game is completed by a description of agentshierarchies of
beliefs. Playershierarchies are dened as follows: for each i 2 N let Z0i = 0  i
and for k  1 dene Zki = Zk 1i  
 
Zk 1 i

. An element of 
 
Zk 1i

is a -based
k-order belief, one of i 
 k1  Zk 1i  a -hierarchy: the rst component (in
i) represents player is information, and the second (in k1
 
Zk 1i

) represents
his higher order beliefs. For each i, let T i;  denote the set of is collectively coherent
-hierarchies (Mertens and Zamir, 1985). Players-hierarchies are represented by
means of type spaces:
Denition 3.5 (-based Type Space). A (-based) type space is a tuple T =

; (Ti; i; i)i2N

such that for each i 2 N , Ti is a compact set of types, i : Ti ! i
(onto and continuous) assigns to each type a payo¤ type and i : Ti ! (0  T i)
(continuous) assigns to each type a belief about the states of nature and the opponents
types.
Each type in a type space induces a -hierarchy: For each ti 2 Ti, let ^0i (ti) =
i (ti); construct mappings ^ki : Ti ! (Zk 1i ) recursively for all i 2 I and k  1, s.t.
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^1i (ti) is the pushforward of i(ti) given by the map from  T i to Z0i such that
(0; t i) 7!
 
0; ^
0
 i(t i)

;
and ^ki (ti) is the pushforward of i(ti) given by the map from 0  T i to Zk 1i such
that
(0; t i) 7!
 
0; ^
0
 i(t i); ^
1
 i(t i); : : : ; ^
k 1
 i (t i)

:13
The maps ^i : Ti ! T i dened as
ti 7! ^i (ti) =
 
^0i (ti) ; ^
1
i (ti); ^
2
i (ti); : : :

;
assign to each type in a -based type space, the corresponding -hierarchy of beliefs.
From Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) we know that
when the sets T i;  (i = 1; :::; n) are endowed with the product topology, there is a
homeomorphism
i : T

i;   ! 
 
 i  T  i; 

that preserves beliefs of all orders: for all ti = (i; 
1
i ; 
2
i ; : : :) 2 T i; ,
margZk 1i i (t

i ) = 
k
i 8k  1:
Hence, the tuple T  =
D
;
 
T i; ; 

i ; 

i

i2N
E
with  i = i is a type space. It will be
referred to as the -based Universal Type Space. The maps ^i : Ti ! T i constitute
the canonical belief morphism from T to T  .
A (-based) nite type is any element ti 2 T i;  such that jsupp  i (ti)j <1. The
set of nite types is denoted by T^i;   T i; .
13For measurable spaces X and Y , measure  2 (X) and measurable map Q : X ! Y , the
pushforward of  under Q is 0 2 (Y ) such that for every measurable E  Y , 0 [E] =  Q 1 (E) :
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Models. An information structure and a type space complete the description of a
model:
Denition 3.6. A model is a tupleM = 
; T; (u^i)i2N such that: (i) 
; (ui)i2N
is a (-based) information structure; (ii) T is a -based type space, and (iii) for
each i, u^i : Z0T ! R are such that for each (z; 0; t) 2 Z0T , u^i (z; 0; t) =
ui (z; 0;  (t)). A model is nite if j0  T j is nite. The pair


; T  ; (u^i)i2N

is
referred to as the Universal Model.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the universal model represents the benchmark in which
all common knowledge assumptions are being relaxed.14 Any smaller model imposes
common knowledge assumptions: adopting a -based non universal type space (a
model


; T ; (u^i)i2N

) imposes common knowledge assumptions on agentshier-
archies of beliefs; adopting a smaller information structure (a model


; T; (u^i)i2N

,
k  k for each k) entails extra common knowledge assumptions on payo¤s.
Attaching a model M = 
; T; (u^i)i2N to the extensive form   delivers a mul-
tistage game with observable actions:
 M =


N;H;Z;; (Ti; i; i; u^i)i2N

:
(For simplicity of notation, the reference to the payo¤ functions will be omitted in
the following, and models written as h; Ti.)
14As discussed in Section 3.3, the notion of richness that is adopted qualies what common
knowledge assumptions are being relaxed. If  =

[0; 1]
Z
n
, with u (; z) =  (z), the only common
knowledge restrictions is that agents are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers.
(This specication of  satises the richness condition introduced in Section 3.6.)
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3.4 Interim Sequential Rationalizability
Fix a model M = 
; T ; (u^i)i2N, and consider the induced game  M. As the
game unfolds, players form conjectures about their opponentsbehavior, their types
and the state of nature, represented by conditional probability systems (CPS), i.e.
arrays of conditional beliefs, one for each history, (denoted by i = (i (h))h2H 2
H (0  T i  S i)) such that: (i) i is consistent with Bayesrule whenever pos-
sible, and (ii) for each h 2 H, i (h) 2 (0  T i  S i (h)).15 To avoid confusion,
we refer to this kind of beliefs as conjectures, retaining the term beliefsonly for
those represented in the models introduced in Section 3.3.
Conjectures. Agents entertain conjectures about the space 0T iS i. As the
game unfolds, and agents observe public histories, their conjectures change. For each
history h 2 H, dene the event [h]  0  T i  S as:
[h] = 0  T i  S i (h) :
(Notice that, by denition, [h]  [h0] whenever h0 is a predecessor of h.)
Denition 3.7. A conjecture for agent i is a conditional probability system (CPS
hereafter), that is a collection i = (i (h))h2H of conditional distributions 
i (h) 2
(0  T i  S i) that satisfy the following conditions:
C.1 For all h 2 H, i (h) 2 ([h]);
C.2 For every measurable A  [h]  [h0], i (h) [A]  i (h0) [h] = i (h0) [A].
For each type ti 2 Ti, his consistent conjectures are
Ti (ti) =

i 2 H (0  T i  S i) : marg0T ii () = i (ti)
	
:
15See Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007).
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Condition C.1 states that agentsare always certain of what they know, i.e. the
observed public history; condition C.2 states that agentsconjectures are consistent
with Bayesian updating whenever possible. Type tis consistent conjectures agree
with his beliefs on the environment at the beginning of the game.
Sequential Rationality. The set of Sequential Best Responses for type ti to con-
jectures i 2 H (0  T i  S i), denoted by ri (ijti), is dened as:
si 2 ri
 
ijti

if and only if 8h 2 H (si)
si 2 arg max
s0i2Si(h)
Z
0T iS i
u^i (z (si; s i) ; 0; t i; ti) di (h) (3.1)
Denition 3.8. A strategy si 2 Si is sequentially rational for type ti, written si 2
ri (ti), if there exists i 2 Ti (ti) such that si 2 ri (ijti).
The notion of sequential rationality is stronger than (normal-form) rationality,
which only requires that a player optimizes with respect to his initial conjectures,
hence putting no restrictions on behavior at zero-probability histories. Notice also
that working with reduced strategies, the restrictions in equation (3.1) only concern
histories that are reachable by si.
Interim Sequential Rationalizability.
Denition 3.9 (ISR). Fix a -based model T . For each i 2 N , let ISRT ;0i = TiSi.
For each k = 0; 1; :::, and ti 2 Ti, let ISRT ;ki (ti) =
n
si 2 Si : (ti; si) 2 ISRT ;ki
o
,
ISRT ;k = i=1;:::;nISRT ;ki and ISRT ;k i = j 6=i;0ISRT ;kj . Dene recursively, for
k = 1; 2; :::, and ti 2 Ti
ISRT ;ki (ti) =
8<:s^i 2 ISRT ;k 1i (ti) :
9i 2 Ti (ti) s.t.
(1) s^i 2 ri (ijti)
(2) supp (i ())  0  ISRT ;k 1 i
9=;
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Finally: ISRT := T
k0
ISRT ;k
ISR consists of an iterated deletion procedure: for each type ti, reduced strategy
si survives the k-th round of deletion if and only if si is sequentially rational for type
ti, with respect to conjectures i that, at the beginning of the game, are concentrated
on pairs (t i; s i) consistent with the previous rounds of deletion. If history h is given
zero probability by the conditional conjectures held the preceding node, is conjectures
at h may be concentrated anywhere in 0T iS i (h). The lack of restrictions on
the conjectures held at unexpected histories rules out elements of forward induction
reasoning (see example 3.1).16 Notice also that ISR considers playersconjectures
that allow for correlation in the opponentsstrategies and 0 in the Bayesian game.17
Amore thorough discussion of the solution concept and its relation with the literature
is postponed to section 3.7.
Example 3.5: Example 3.1 illustrated the basic logic of ISR. We repeat the
argument here to familiarize with the procedure and the notation: a3 is dominated
by a1, hence it is deleted at the rst round. Given this, ISR restricts 2s initial
conjectures to put zero probability on a3, that is 2 () [a3] = 0. No further restric-
tions are imposed: In particular, conjectures ^2 can be such that ^2 () [a1] = 1 and
^2 (In) [a3] = 1, which makes b2 the unique sequential best response to ^2. Given
that neither b1 nor b2 is deleted at the second round, also a1 cannot be deleted, and
the procedure stops at ISR = fa1; a2g  fb1; b2g. 
16An epistemic characterization for ISR in nite models is provided in Penta (2009b). The epis-
temic conditions are sequential rationalityand initial common certainty of sequential rationality.
17Similarly to the distinction between interim independent and correlated rationalizability (Dekel
et al., 2007), one could think of rening ISR so that playersconjectures on the opponentsbehavior
are measurable with respect to their types. Given the results in section 3.5, such renement would
not be robust.
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3.4.1 Example: Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
In games with complete information, it can be shown that ISR can be computed
applying Dekel and Fudenbergs (1990) S1W -procedure to the normal form of the
game: That is, one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, followed by iter-
ated strict dominance.18 As in Dekel and Fudenberg (1990, Section 5), it is instructive
to discuss how the procedure applies to the nitely repeated prisoners dilemma: Let
stage payo¤s be as in the following table, and the game be repeated a nite number
T of times (players sum payo¤s over periods, with no discounting):
C S
C 10; 10 0; 11
S 11; 0 1; 1
For any T <1, all the strategies that prescribe C at the last stage are deleted at
the rst round, because they are not sequentially rational: for any conditional beliefs
held at any history of length T , action C is dominated, hence all strategies prescribing
that behavior at some of these node are not sequentially rational. (In terms of the
normal form, these are weakly dominated strategies.) If T = 2, after the rst round
of deletion, only two strategies survive for each player:
ISR1i = fhS;SSSSi ; hC;SSSSig
It is immediate to see that at this point strategy hC;SSSSi cannot be a sequential
best response to any conjecture i such that i () 2   ISR1 i. (In terms of the
normal form, strategies hC;SSSSi are strictly dominated in ISR1.) Hence, at the
second round, hCSSSSi is deleted, and ISRi = fhS;SSSSig: In the unique ISR-
outcome both players always Shirk.
18Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.3 shows that in private-values environments with payo¤s in
generic position, ISR can be computed applying the S1W -procedure to the interim (reduced)
normal form of the game.
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Things change if T  3: In this case, the deletion procedure stops before delivering
the subgame perfect solution. Suppose that T = 3. Let


a1i jaCCi aCSi aSCi aSSi ja3i

denote
player is strategy that plays a1i 2 fC; Sg in the rst period, aa
1
1a
1
2
i 2 fC; Sg in the
second round if (a11a
1
2) was played in the rst period, and action a
3
i 2 fC; Sg in the last
period, irrespective of the history. As argued above, after the rst round of deletion
only strategies such that a3i = S survive. Hence, after the rst round, we have
ISR1i =


a1i jaCCi aCSi aSCi aSSi jS

:
 
a1i ; a
CC
i ; a
CS
i ; a
SC
i ; a
SS
i
 2 fC; Sg5	
Applying the S1W -procedure, at the second round strategies that in the second pe-
riod cooperate no-matter-what(i.e. strategies


a1i jCCCCCSCSCCSSjS

) are deleted,
because they are strictly dominated by the strategy that only replaces the second pe-
riods behavior with shirk no-matter-what (i.e.


a1i jSCCSCSSSCSSSjS

). Hence,
the reduced strategies that survive the second round of deletion are:
ISR21 =

s11 =


C1jCCCSCS   jS ; s21 = 
C1jSCCCCS   jS ;
s31 =


C1jSCCSCS   jS ; s41 = 
S1j    CSCSSSjS ;
s51 =


S1j    SSCCSSjS ; s61 = 
S1j    SSCSSSjS	
ISR22 =

s12 =


C1jCCC   SSC   jS ; s22 = 
C1jSCC   CSC   jS ;
s32 =


C1jSCC   SSC   jS ; s42 = 
S1j   CCS   SSSjS ;
s52 =


S1j   SCS   CSSjS ; s62 = 
S1j   SCS   SSSjS	
The submatrix of the reduced normal form at this point of the procedure is the
following 6 6 matrix (payo¤s in bold corresponds to best responses):
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s12 s
2
2 s
3
2 s
4
2 s
5
2 s
6
2
s11 21; 21 11; 22 11; 22 12; 12 2; 13 2; 13
s21 22; 11 12; 12 12; 12 11; 22 1; 23 1; 23
s31 22; 11 12; 12 12; 12 12; 12 2; 13 2; 13
s41 12; 12 22; 11 12; 12 3; 3 13; 2 3; 3
s51 13; 2 23; 1 13; 2 2; 13 12; 12 2; 13
s61 13; 2 23; 1 13; 2 3; 3 13; 2 3; 3
It is easy to see that no further strategies are deleted at this point, because
none of them is strictly dominated. Hence, ISRi = fs1i ; s2i ; s3i ; s4i ; s5i ; s6i g. Notice
that that if s4i were deleted at this round, iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies would delete, in order, strategies s1i , then s
2
i and s
3
i , and nally s
5
i , uniquely
selecting the subgame perfect outcome (s61; s
6
2). But s
4
i is not deleted, because it is
only weakly dominated, not strictly. To see how s4i can be a sequential best response
to conjectures consistent with initial certainty of ISR2, consider 1s conjectures 1
such that 1 () [s62] = 1. Clearly, s
4
1 is a best response to 
1 (h) at histories h = ; SS
and at any h in the last stage: In particular, since SS is consistent with s62, and 1s
initial beliefs are concentrated on s62, also at SS player 1 is certain of s
6
2. Now, to
see how s41 is a best response at history SC too (we dont need to check history CS
because CS =2 H (s41)), notice that SC =2 H (s62), so receives zero probability under
i (). Hence, ISR imposes no restrictions on i (SC) (in particular, i (SC) need
not be concentrated on ISR22). So, set i (SC) [s2] = 1 where s2 is a strategy that
prescribes that 2 plays C in the last stage if and only if 1 plays C in the second:
Given these conditional beliefs at h = SC, action C at the second period followed
by S in the last period is indeed a best response at h = SC for player 1. Notice
though that s2 is a dominated strategy, that had been deleted in the rst round of
the procedure. But, as discussed above, once players are surprised (i.e. at unexpected
histories), ISR allows them to believe that the opponents may play anything, even
104
dominated strategies.
3.5 Robustness(-es)
This section gathers properties of ISR that can be interpreted as robustness prop-
erties (see section 3.2). These are, respectively: upper hemicontinuity, type space-
invariance and model-invariance. The rst two hold for any information structure

; (ui)i2N

, while the latter holds in PV-environments, but not in NI-environments
(see example 4).
3.5.1 Upper Hemicontinuity
As discussed in section 3.2, the upper hemicontinuity of ISR on the universal type
space addresses a specic robustness question: the fact that ISR is u.h.c. means
that any behavior that ISR rules out for a given -hierarchy is also ruled out for all
nearby hierarchies. Specically, in the product topology, suppose that as analysts we
know players hierarchies only up to a nite order k: if a solution concept is not u.h.c.
it means that we can never rule out that by rening our model of the beliefs of order
higher than k, the solution concept allows behavior that is ruled out in the original
model.19
Proposition 3.1. For each t 2 T  and sequence ftmg : tm ! t and for fsmg  S
s.t. sm ! s^ and sm 2 ISR (tm) for all m, s^ 2 ISR (t).
Proof. (See appendix A.1)
19Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) extensively discuss the interpretation of the product topology.
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3.5.2 Type Space Invariance
The problem of type space-dependence (Dekel et al., 2007) originates in the di¤erent
possibility of correlation between types and payo¤ states 0 that di¤erent type spaces,
representing the same set of hierarchies of beliefs, may allow. If a solution concept
imposes condition of conditional independence on the agentsconjectures about the
opponentsstrategies, these di¤erences in the possibility of correlation built in the type
space may a¤ect the predictions of a solution concept, and the strategies selected for
a type may not depend on the hierarchy of beliefs only.20 The intuition behind the
type space-invariance of ISR is the same as for that proved by Dekel et al. (2007) for
interim correlated rationalizability (ICR): Solution concepts, such as ICR and ISR,
that do not impose any condition of independence on playersconjectures about the
opponentsstrategies, already allow for all the possible correlation and therefore are
not a¤ected by the di¤erences across type spaces discussed above. Hence, they are
type space-invariant:
Proposition 3.2. Let T and ~T be two -based type spaces. If ti 2 Ti; ~ti 2 ~Ti are
s.t. ^ (ti) = ^
 
~ti
 2 T i; , then ISRT (ti) = ISR ~T  ~ti. Indeed, for each k, if for all
l  k, ^li (ti) = ^li
 
~ti

then ISRT ;k 1i (ti) = ISR
~T ;k 1
i
 
~ti

.
Proof. (See appendix A.1)
3.5.3 Model Invariance
The failure of model-invariance for ISR in NI-environments was shown in example 4.
The reason behind that failure is the following: The only restrictions that ISR puts
on the conjectures held at zero-probability histories come from the denition of the
20The renement of ISR mentioned in footnote 17 would not be type space-invariant.
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model (that they be concentrated on 0  T i). Once surprised, type ti may assign
positive probability to pairs (0; t i) that were initially given zero probability by the
beliefs i (ti). Moving from smaller to larger models (e.g. from a -based type space,
to a -based type space) puts less and less restrictions on such possible conjectures.
In NI-environments, larger 0 also means more freedom to specify a players beliefs
about his own payo¤s, thereby changing the set of sequential best responses. In
contrast, in PV-environments players know their own payo¤s: Even if their beliefs
are completely upset, they dont alter a types preferences over the terminal nodes.
This provides the intuition for the model-invariance result in PV-settings.
Let


; T; (u^i)i2N

be amodel. Any type ti 2 Ti;  induces a-hierarchy ^i (ti) =
(i (ti) ; ^
1
i (ti) ; :::) 2 T i; . Since  = nk=0k is such that k  k for all k, ^i (ti)
can be naturally embedded in the -based universal type space, and be seen as a
-based hierarchy. Let i : T i;  ! T i;  denote such embedding and let i  i^i .
Proposition 3.3. Assume private values: For any nite model


; T; (u^i)i2N

and
any type ti 2 Ti; , ISRTi (ti) = ISRT


i (

i (ti)).
Proof. (See appendix A.1)
3.6 The structure of ISR in the Universal Model
In Section 3.3 we informally introduced the universal model h; T i as representing
the benchmark in which all common knowledge assumptions are being relaxed: if 
is su¢ ciently rich, imposing common knowledge of h; T i entails essentially no
loss of generality. The notion of richnesstherefore qualies the common knowledge
assumptions that are being relaxed: the richer , the less restrictive the assumption
that  is common knowledge. The richness condition warrants that  is su¢ ciently
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rich that, as  varies, agentspreferences vary enough.
Denition 3.10. Strategy si is conditionally dominant at  2  if 8h 2 H (si),
8s0i 2 Si (h), 8s i 2 S i (h)
si (h) 6= s0i (h)) ui (z (si; s i) ; ) > ui (z (s0i; s i) ; )
Richness Condition (RC): 8s 2 S, 9s =  s0; si ; s i 2 : 8i 2 N , si is
conditionally dominant at s.
The main result in this section states that whenever a type prole t^ has multiple
ISR-outcomes, any of these is uniquely ISR for a sequence of playerstypes con-
verging to t^ (Proposition 3.4). An immediate implication is that any renement of
ISR (e.g. extensive form rationalizability, or sequential equilibrium) is not robust
(See example 3.2 in Section 3.2).
Remark 3.1. In the nitely repeated prisoners dilemma (Section 3.4.1), Proposi-
tion 3.4 implies that there exists a model of beliefs, arbitrarily close to the complete
information benchmark, in which players uniquely play the grim-trigger strategy s1i :
players cooperate in the rst period, and shirk in the last, but they cooperate in the
second period if and only if both players behaved cooperatively in the rst period. The
induced outcome is mutual cooperation in the rst two periods, followed by mutual
shirk in the last period.
Proposition 3.4 is analogous to Proposition 1 in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007),
who proved a similar structure for interim correlated rationalizability. Weinstein and
Yildizs analysis is based on a condition that assumes the existence of strict dominance
states for each of the playersstrategies. This condition cannot be satised by the
reduced normal form of a dynamic game, in which payo¤s are dened over the terminal
108
histories. As Weinstein and Yildiz point out, an obvious candidate to overcome the
problem is to introduce trembles in the solution concept, maintaining a normal form
approach. But introducing trembles changes the game, and it is not clear whether the
results on the structure of such modiedrationalizability may be used to address
questions of robustness for renements of rationalizability (without trembles). Besides
that, a normal form approach has the further drawback of overshadowing important
issues raised by dynamic environments, such as the implications of the modeling
assumptions on the agentsinformation discussed above. The extensive form approach
of this paper overcomes both these shortcomings.
3.6.1 Sensitivity of Multiplicity to higher order beliefs
Given the result of type space-invariance (Proposition 3.2), the reference to the type
space in the notation ISRT is omitted in the following.
Proposition 3.4. Under the richness condition, for any nite type prole t^ 2 T^
and any s 2 ISR  t^, there exists a sequence of nite type proles t^m	  T^ s.t.
t^m ! t^ as m!1 and ISR  t^m = fsg for each m.
Furthermore, for each m, t^m belongs to a nite belief-closed subset of types, Tm 
T , such that for each m and each t 2 Tm , jISR (t)j = 1.
Proposition 3.4 implies that any renement of ISR is not u.h.c.; since ISR is
u.h.c. by Proposition 3.1, the following is true:
Corollary 3.1. ISR is a strongest upper hemicontinuous solution concept.
The last part of the proposition, stating that the types in the sequence belong
to a nite, belief-closed subset of types, is of particular interest in the context of
PV-environments, in which ISR is also model-invariant, which means that such
belief-closed sets of types can be considered as models, in the sense of denition 3.6.
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The proof of proposition 3.4 requires a substantial investment in additional con-
cepts and notation. To facilitate the reader that is not interested in the technicalities,
all these are conned to the next subsection. The argument is only sketched here.
The proof exploits a renement of ISR, SSR, in which strategies that are never
strict sequential best responses are deleted at each round. The proof is articulated
in two main steps: in the rst (lemma 3.2), it is shown that if si 2 ISRi (ti) for
nite type ti, then si is also SSR for some type close to ti; in the second (lemma
3.3), it is shown that by perturbing beliefs further, any si 2 SSRi (t0i) can be made
uniquely ISR for a type close to t0i. The main points of departure from the analysis
of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) are due to the necessity of breaking the ties between
strategies at unreached information sets: this is necessary to obtain uniqueness in
the converging sequence. Although notationally involved, the idea is very simple.
Consider the sequence constructed in example 2: to obtain b2 as the unique ISR for
player 2, given that 1 would play a1, it was necessary to perturb player 2s beliefs
introducing, with arbitrarily small probability, the possibility that he is facing types
13; 33; :::, i.e. types who are certain that a3 is dominant. These dominance types
play the role of trembles, and allow to break the tie between b1 and b2; but they do
this in an indirect way, through the perturbation of the belief structure, thus avoiding
the shortcomings of the tremble-based approach discussed above.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Denition 3.11. Let SSR0i = T i;   Si. For each k = 0; 1; :::, and ti 2 T i; ;
let SSRki (ti) =

si 2 Si : (ti; si) 2 SSRki
	
, SSRk = i=1;:::;nSSRki and SSRk i =
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j 6=i;0SSRkj . Dene recursively, for k = 1; 2; :::, and ti 2 Ti
SSRki (ti) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
s^i 2 SSRki (ti) :
9i 2 i (ti) s.t.
(1). ri (ijti) = fs^ig
(2). supp (i ())  0  SSRk 1 i
(3). if t i 2 supp(margT  i; i ())
and s i 2 SSRk 1 i (t i) ,
then: s i 2 supp(margS ii ())
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
Finally: SSR = T
k0
SSRk
The following lemma states the standard xed-point property for SSR.
Lemma 3.1. Let fVjgj2N be s.t. for each i 2 N , Vi  Si  Ti and 8si 2 Vi (ti),
9i 2 i (ti) :
 (i) supp(i ())  j 6=iVj
 (ii) fsig = ri (ijti)
Then: Vi (ti)  SSRi (ti)
Exploiting the richness condition, let    be a nite set of dominance states,
s.t. 8s 2 S, 9!s 2  at which s is conditionally dominant. For each s 2 S, let
ts 2 T  be s.t. for each i, i (ts) = si and i (tsi )

s0; t
s
 i

= 1. Let T = fts : s 2 Sg,
and let Tj and T j denote the corresponding projections: T is a nite set of types
representing common belief of s, for each s 2 S. Elements of Ti will be referred to
as dominance-types, and will play the role of the ka3-types in example 3.
For each i and si 2 Si, let T i (si) be s.t. 8s i 2 S i;9!t i 2 T i (si) s.t.
t i = t
(si;s i)
 i . Notice that for each t
s
i 2 Ti, fsig = SSR1i (tsi ), because si is the
unique sequential best reply to any conjecture consistent with condition 3 for SSR
in denition 3.11.
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Lemma 3.2. Under the richness condition, for any nite type ti 2 T^i, , for any
si 2 ISRi (ti), there exists a sequence of nite types fm (ti; si)gm2N, such that:
 (i) m (ti; si)! ti as m!1
 (ii) 8m, si 2 SSRi (m (ti; si)) and m (ti; si) 2 T^i
 (iii) 8m, conjectures si;m 2  (m (ti; si)) s.t. fsig = ri (si;mjm (ti; si)) satisfy
T i (si)  supp

margT  i; 
si;m ()

:
Proof. (See Appendix A.2.1)
Lemma 3.3. Under the richness condition, for each nite type t^i 2 T^i; , for each
k, for each si 2 SSRki
 
t^i

such that the conjectures si 2   t^i: fsig = ri  sijt^i
satisfy
T i (si)  supp

margT  i; 
si ()

;
there exists ~ti 2 T^i s.t.
1. For each k0  k, ^k0  t^i = ^k0  ~ti
2. ISRk+1i
 
~ti

= fsig
3. ~ti 2 ~T ~tii for some nite belief closed set of types ~T ~ti = j2N ~T ~tij such thatISRk+1 (t) = 1 for each t 2 ~T ~ti.
Hence, for any such si 2 SSRi
 
t^i

there exists a sequence of nite types ti;m ! t^i
s.t. ISRi (ti;m) = fsig.
Proof. (See Appendix A.2.2.)
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Given the lemmata above, the proof of proposition 3.4 is immediate:
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Take any t^ 2 T^ and any s 2 ISR  t^. For each i,
from lemma 3.2 there exists a sequence ftmi g  T^i;  of nite types s.t. tmi ! t^i and
for each i, si 2 SSRi (tmi ) for each m, for conjectures si as in the thesis of lemma
3.2 and in the hypothesis of lemma 3.3. Then we can apply lemma 3.3 to the types
tmi for each m: for si 2 SSRi (tmi ), for each k, there exists a sequence
n
~tm;ki
o
k2N
s.t.
~tm;ki ! tmi for k ! 1 s.t. ISRi

~tm;ki

= fsig. Because the universal type-space is
metrizable, there exists a sequence km !1 with tm;kmi ! t^i. Set t^mi = tm;kmi , so that
t^m ! t^ as m!1 and ISR  t^m = fsg for each m.
3.6.2 Genericity of Uniqueness
In this section it is proved that uniqueness holds for an open and dense set of types
in the universal type space. The proof exploits the following known result:
Lemma 3.4 (Mertens and Zamir (1985)). The set T^ of nite types is dense in T ,
i.e.
T  = cl

T^

Proposition 3.5. Under the richness assumption, the set
U = ft 2 T  : jISR (t)j = 1g
is open and dense in T . Moreover, the unique ISR outcome is locally constant, in
the sense that 8t 2 U such that ISR(t) = fsg, there exists an open neighborhood of
types, N (t), such that ISR(t0) = fsg for all t0 2 N (t).
Proof: (U is dense) To show that U is dense, notice that by proposition 2, for
any for any t^ 2 T^ there exists a sequence t^m	  T^m s.t. t^m ! t^ and ISR  t^m = fsg
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for some s 2 ISR  t^. By denition, t^m 2 U for each m. Hence, t^ 2 cl (U), thus
T^  cl (U). But we know that cl

T^

= T , therefore cl (U)  cl

T^

= T . Hence
U is dense.
(U is open and ISR locally constant in U) Since (proposition 2) ISR is
u.h.c., for each t 2 U , there exists a neighborhood N (t) s.t. for each t0 2 N (t),
ISR (t0)  ISR (t). Since ISR(t) = fsg for some s, and ISR(t0) 6= ;, it follows
trivially that ISR (t0) = fsg, hence N (t)  U . Therefore U is open. By the same
token, we also have that ISR (t0) = fsg for all t0 2 N (t), i.e. the unique ISR
outcome is locally constant.
Corollary 3.2. Generic uniqueness of ISR implies generic uniqueness of any equi-
librium renement. In particular, of any Perfect-Bayesian Equilibrium outcome.
For each s 2 S, let U s =
n
t 2 T^ : ISR (t) = fsg
o
. From proposition 3.5 we
know that these sets are open. Let the boundary be bd (U s) = cl (U s) nU s.
Corollary 3.3. Under the richness condition, for each t 2 T^: jISR (t)j > 1 if and
only if there exist s; s0 2 ISR (t) : s 6= s0 such that t 2 bd (U s) \ bd  U s0
Summing up, the results of this section conclude that ISR is a generically unique
and locally constant solution concept, that yields multiple solutions at, and only at,
the boundaries where the concept changes its prescribed behavior. The structure of
ISR is therefore analogous to that proved by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) for ICR.
Given the results from this and the previous section, the analogues of the remaining
results in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) can be obtained in a straightforward manner
for ISR: in particular, proposition 3.4 also holds if one imposes the common prior
assumption.
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3.7 Related Literature and Concluding Remarks
On NI- and PV-settings. In NI-settings, all common knowledge-assumptions are
relaxed. In particular, the assumption that players know their own preferences. Under
an equivalent richness condition, independent work by Chen (2009) studied the struc-
ture of ICR for dynamic NI-environments, extending Weinstein and Yildizs (2007)
results. Together with the upper hemicontinuity of ISR, Chens results imply that
the two solution concepts coincide on the universal model in these settings.21 Outside
of the realm of NI-environments, ISR generally renes ICR (imposing sequential ra-
tionality restrictions). The fact that, under the richness condition, ISR coincides
with ICR in NI-environments, implies that sequential rationality has no bite in these
settings. The intuition is simple: In NI-environments players dont know their own
payo¤s, they merely have beliefs about them. Once an unexpected information set
is reached, Bayesrule does not restrict playersbeliefs, which can be set arbitrar-
ily. Under the richness conditions, there are essentially no restrictions on players
beliefs about their own preferences, so that any behavior can be justied. Hence, the
only restrictions that retain their bite are those imposed by (normal form) rationality
alone. This also provides the main intuition for ISRs failure of model invariance in
NI-settings (example 4).
To the extent that the interest in studying extensive form games comes from the
notion of sequential rationality, PV-settings, in which the assumption that players
know their own payo¤s is maintained, seem most meaningful for dynamic environ-
ments. As shown by proposition 3.3, ISR is model invariant in these settings. In
appendix A.3 it is also shown that, in PV-environments, ISR is (generically) equiva-
21Im grateful to Eddie Dekel for this observation.
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lent to Dekel and Fudenbergs (1990) S1W procedure applied to the interim normal
form.22
On the Related Solution Concepts. ISR generalizes to games with incomplete
and imperfect information the solution concept developed by Ben-Porath (1997) to
characterize the behavioral implications of (initial) common certainty of rationality.
Ben-Porath (1997) also proves that for games with complete and perfect information
with payo¤s in generic position, his solution concept is equivalent to Dekel and Fu-
denbergs (1990) S1W -procedure. The results in Penta (2009c) and appendix A.3
generalize Ben-Poraths (1997) to incomplete and imperfect information.
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007) notion of weak -rationalizability is also closely
related to ISR: their solution concept is not dened for Bayesian games, but for
games with payo¤ uncertainty. For Bayesian games with information types ISR can
be shown to be equivalent to weak -rationalizability, where the -restrictions on
rst order beliefs are those derived from the type space.23
On the Robustness(-es). A closely related paper is Dekel and Fudenberg (1990):
In that paper, solution concept S1W is shown to be robust to the possibility
that players entertain small doubts about their opponents payo¤ functions. The
robustness result for ISR is in the same spirit. Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) maintain
the assumption that players know their own payo¤s: This corresponds to the PV-case
in this paper, for which it is shown (appendix A.3) that ISR coincides with S1W
applied to the interim normal form.
22The S1W -procedure consists of one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies followed
by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies.
23An analogous result in Battigalli et al. (2009) relates -rationalizability and interim correlated
rationalizability in games with information types.
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Type space invariance, in the context of normal form games, has been addressed
by the literature: Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel et al. (2007) pointed out the
type space-dependence of Interim Independent Rationalizability (IIR). Based on this
observation, Ely and Peski (2006) showed that the relevant measurability condition
for IIR is not in terms of the -hierarchies, but in terms of ()-hierarchies. Dekel
et al. (2007) instead introduced the concept of Interim Correlated Rationalizability
(ICR) and showed that it is type space invariant. To the best of my knowledge, the
problem of model invariance was not addressed by the literature.
On the Impact of higher order beliefs on multiplicity. The result of proposi-
tion 3.5 implies that, generically, initial common certainty of sequential rationality is
su¢ cient to achieve coordination of expectations. Generically, multiplicity is driven
by the common knowledge-assumptions of our models. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, this parallels what is known from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and the literature
on static global games. A growing literature is exploring to what extent the main
insights from the theory of global games can be extended to dynamic environments.
These contributions are mainly from an applied perspective, and do not pursue a
systematic analysis of these problems. Consequently, the conclusions are variegated:
for instance, Chamley (1999) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000) obtain the familiar
uniqueness result in di¤erent setups, under di¤erent sets of assumptions. On the
other hand, few recent papers seem to question the general validity of these results:
For instance, Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2007) and Angeletos and Werning (2006)
apply the global gamesinformation structure to dynamic environments, and obtain
non-uniqueness results that contrast with the familiar ones in static settings. The
origin of such multiplicity lies in a tension between the global games information
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structure and the dynamic structure: by relaxing common knowledge-assumptions,
the former favors uniqueness; in dynamic games, some information endogenously be-
comes common knowledge (e.g. public histories), thus mitigating the impact of the
information structure.
Many aspects of the papers mentioned above make the comparison with the
present framework di¢ cult, and a careful analysis and understanding of the rela-
tions between the two approaches is an interesting open question for future research.
One important di¤erence underlying the contrasting results in term of uniqueness is
certainly the fact that, in those papers, not all common knowledge assumptions are
relaxed.24 For instance, in the paper by Angeletos et al. (2007), the assumption of
common knowledge that the stage game does not depend on the previous history is
maintained throughout. Important work for future research is to investigate the ro-
bustness and uniqueness questions when only some common knowledge assumptions
are relaxed.25 This line of research may help shed some light on the relations between
the present work and the literature on dynamic global games.
24Another important di¤erence is that the game in Angeletos et al. (2007) has innite horizon.
Extending the analysis of this paper to multistage games with innite horizon is an important
question, left to future research.
25Chapter 2 explored these questions in the context of static games.
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Chapter 4
Robust Dynamic Mechanism
Design
Abstract: In situations in which the social planner has to make several
decisions over time, before agents have observed all the relevant informa-
tion, static mechanisms may not su¢ ce to induce agents to reveal their
information truthfully. This paper focuses on questions of partial and
full implementation in dynamic mechanisms, when agentsbeliefs are un-
known to the designer (hence the term robust). It is shown that a social
choice function (SCF) is (partially) implementable for all models of beliefs
if and only if it is ex-post incentive compatible. Furthermore, in environ-
ments with single crossing preferences, strict ex-post incentive compati-
bility and a contraction propertyare su¢ cient to guarantee full robust
implementation. This property limits the interdependence in agentsval-
uations, the limit being tighter the stronger the intertemporal e¤ects.
Full robust implementation requires that, for all models of agents be-
liefs, all the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a mechanism induce outcomes
consistent with the SCF. This paper shows that, for a weaker notion of
equilibrium and for a general class of dynamic games, the set of all such
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equilibria can be computed by means of a backwards procedurewhich
combines the logic of rationalizability and backward induction reasoning.
It thus provides foundation to a tractable approach to the implementation
question, allowing at the same time stronger implementation results.
Keywords: backwards induction dynamic mechanism implementa-
tion  social choice function  rationalizability robust implementation.
JEL Codes: C72; C73; D82.
4.1 Introduction
Several situations of economic interest present problems of mechanism design that are
inherently dynamic. Consider the problem of a public authority (or social planner)
who wants to assign yearly licenses for the provision of a public good to the most
productive rm in each period. Firmsproductivity is private information and may
change over time; it may be correlated over time, and later productivity may depend
on earlier allocative choices (for example, if there is learning-by-doing). Hence, the
planners choice depends on private information of the rms, and the design problem is
to provide rms with the incentives to reveal their information truthfully. But rms
realize that the information revealed in earlier stages can be used by the planner
in the future, a¤ecting the allocative choices of later periods. Thus, in designing
the mechanism (e.g. a sequence of auctions), the planner has to take into account
intertemporal e¤ectsthat may alter rmsstatic incentives.
A rapidly growing literature has recently addressed similar problems of dynamic
mechanism design, in which the planner has to make several decisions over di¤erent
periods, with the agentsinformation changing over time. In the standard approach,
some commonly known distribution over the stochastic process generates payo¤s and
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signals.1 Hence, it is implicitly assumed that the designer knows the agents be-
liefs about their opponentsprivate information and their beliefs, conditional on all
possible realizations of agentsprivate information. In that approach, classical im-
plementation questions can be addressed: For any given model of beliefs, we can
ask under what conditions there exists a mechanism in which agents reveal their
information truthfully in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game (par-
tial implementation), or whether there exists a mechanism in which, all the PBE of
the induced game induce outcomes consistent with the social choice function (full
implementation).
It is commonly accepted that the assumption that the designer knows the agents
entire hierarchies of beliefs is too strong. In dynamic settings in particular, the
assumption of a commonly known prior entails the planners knowledge of signicantly
more complex objects, such as agentshierarchies of conditional beliefs: For instance,
in the example above, it means that the designer knows the rmsconditional beliefs
(conditional on all possible realizations of private signals) over own future productivity
and the other rmscurrent and future productivities and their beliefs, conditional
on all realization of their signals. Not only are these assumptions strong, but the
sensitivity of game theoretic results to the ne details of agentshigher order beliefs is
also well documented. Weakening the reliance of game theoretic analysis on common
knowledge assumptions seems thus crucial to enable us to conduct useful analysis of
practical problems(Wilson, 1987, p.34).2
1Among others, see Bergemann and Valimaki (2008), Athey and Segal (2007), Pavan, Segal and
Toikka (2009). Gershov and Moldovanu (2009a,b) depart from the standardapproach described
above in that the designer does not know the truedistribution, combining implementation prob-
lems with learning.
2In the context of mechanism design, this research agenda (sometimes referred to as Wilsons
doctrine) has been put forward in a series of papers by Bergemann and Morris, who developed a
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This paper focuses on the question of whether partial and full implementation
can be achieved, in dynamic environments, when agentsbeliefs are unknown to the
designer (hence the term robust). For the partial implementation question, building
on the existing literature on static robust mechanism design (particularly, Bergemann
and Morris, 2005) it is not di¢ cult to show that a Social Choice Function (SCF)
is PBE-implementable for all models of beliefs if and only if it is ex-post incentive
compatible. The analysis of the full implementation question instead raises novel
problems: in order to achieve robust full implementation we need a mechanism such
that, for any model of beliefs, all the PBE induce outcomes consistent with the
SCF. The direct approach to the question is to compute the set of PBE for each
model of beliefs; but the obvious di¢ culties that this task presents have been a major
impediment to the development of a robust approach to dynamic mechanism design.
This paper introduces and provides foundations to a methodology that avoids
the di¢ culties of the direct approach. The key ingredient is the notion of interim
perfect equilibrium (IPE). IPE weakens Fudenberg and Tiroles (1991) PBE allowing
a larger set of beliefs o¤-the-equilibrium path. The advantage of weakening PBE in
this context is twofold: on the one hand, full implementation results are stronger if
obtained under a weaker solution concept (if all the IPE induce outcomes consistent
with the SCF, then so do all the PBE, or any other renement of IPE); on the other
hand, the weakness of IPE is crucial to making the problem tractable. In particular,
it is shown that the set of IPE-strategies across models of beliefs can be computed
by means of a backwards procedurethat combines the logic of rationalizability and
backward induction reasoning: For each history, compute the set of rationalizable
continuation-strategies, treating private histories as types, and proceed backwards
belief-free approach to classical implementation questions, known as robustmechanism design.
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from almost-terminal histories to the beginning of the game. (Renements of IPE
would either lack such a recursive structure, or require more complicated backwards
procedures.)
The results are applied to study conditions for full implementation in environ-
ments with monotone aggregators of information: In these environments information
is revealed dynamically, and while agentspreferences may depend on their oppo-
nentsinformation (interdependent values) or on the signals received in any period,
in each period all the available information (across agents and current and previ-
ous periods) can be summarized by one-dimensional statistics. In environments with
single-crossing preferences, su¢ cient conditions for full implementation in direct mech-
anisms are studied: these conditions bound the amount of interdependence in agents
valuations, such bounds being more stringent the stronger the intertemporal e¤ects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses an introductory
example to illustrate the main concepts and insights. Section 4.3 introduces the notion
of environments, which dene agentspreferences and information structure (allowing
for information to be obtained over time). Section 4.4 introducesmechanisms. Models
of beliefs, used to represent agentshigher order uncertainty, are presented in Section
4.5. Section 4.6 is the core of the paper, and contains the main solution concepts and
results for the proposed methodology. Section 4.7 focuses on the problem of partial
implementation, while Section 4.8 analyzes the problem of full implementation in
direct mechanisms. Proofs are in the Appendices.
4.2 A Dynamic Public Goods Problem
I discuss here an example introducing main ideas and results, abstracting from some
technicalities. The section ends with a brief discussion of the suitable generalizations
123
of the examples key features.
Consider an environment with two agents (n = 2) and two periods (T = 2). In
each period t = 1; 2, agents privately observe a signal i;t 2 [0; 1], i = 1; 2, and
the planner chooses some quantity qt of public good. The cost function for the
production of the public good is c (qt) = 12q
2
t in each period, and for each realization
 = (i;1; i;2; j;1; j;2), i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, agent is valuation for the public goods
q1 and q2 are, respectively,
i;1 (1) = i;1 + j;1
and
i;2 (1; 2) = ' (i;1; i;2) + ' (j;1; j;2)
where   0 and ' : [0; 1]2 ! R is assumed continuously di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing in both arguments. Notice that if  = 0, we are in a private-values setting;
for any  > 0, agents have interdependent values. Also, since ' is strictly increasing
in both arguments, there are intertemporal e¤ects: the rst period signal a¤ects
the agentsvaluation in the second period.
The notation i;t is mnemonic for aggregator: functions i;1 and i;2 aggregate
all the information available up to period t = 1; 2 into real numbers ai;1, ai;2, which
uniquely determine agent is preferences. Agent is utility function is
ui (q1; q2; i;1; i;2; ) = i;1 (1)  q1 + i;1 (4.1)
+ [i;2 (1; 2)  q2 + j;2] ,
where i;1 and i;2 represent the quantity of private good in period t = 1; 2. The
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optimal provision of public good in each period is therefore
q1 (1) = i;1 (1) + j;1 (1) and (4.2)
q2 () = i;2 (1; 2) + j;2 (1; 2) . (4.3)
Consider now the following direct mechanism: agents publicly report messages
mi;t 2 [0; 1] in each period, and for each prole of reports m = (mi;1;mj;1;mi;2;mj;2),
agent i receives generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfers
i;1 (mi;1;mj;1) =   (1 + )

 mi;1 mj;1 + 1
2
m2j;1

and (4.4)
i;2 (mi;1;mj;1) =   (1 + )

  ' (mi;1mi;2)  ' (mj;1mj;2) + 1
2
' (mj;1mj;2)
2

, (4.5)
and the allocation is chosen according to the optimal rule, (q1 (m1) ; q

2 (m1;m2)).
If we complete the description of the environment with a model of agentsbeliefs,
then the mechanism above induces a dynamic game with incomplete information. The
solution concept that will be used for this kind of environments is interim perfect
equilibrium(IPE), a weaker version of Perfect Equilibrium in which agentsbeliefs
at histories immediately following a deviation are unrestricted (they are otherwise
obtained via Bayesian updating).
Robustimplementation though is concerned with the possibility of implement-
ing a social choice function (SCF) irrespective of the model of beliefs. So, consider
the SCF f =
 
qt ; 

i;t; 

j;t

t=1;2
that we have just described: We say that f is partially
robustly implemented by the direct mechanism if, for any model of beliefs, truthfully
reporting the private signal in each period is an interim perfect equilibrium(IPE)
of the induced game.
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For each  = (i;1; i;2; j;1; j;2) and m = (mi;1;mi;2;mj;1;mj;2), dene
i (;m) = ' (mi;1;mi;2)  ' (i;1; i;2)
    [' (j;1; j;2)  ' (mj;1;mj;2)]
= i;2 (m)  i;2 () .
In words: given payo¤ state  and reports m (for all agents and periods), i (;m)
is the di¤erence between the value of the aggregator i;2 under the reports prole m,
and its truevalue if payo¤-state is .
For given rst period (public) reports m^1 = (m^i;1; m^j;1) and private signals

^i;1; ^i;2;

,
and for point beliefs (j;1; j;2;mj;2) about the opponents private information and re-
port in the second period, if we ignore problems with corner solutions, then the best
response mi;2 of agent i at the second period in the mechanism above satises:
3
i

^i;1; ^i;2; j;1; j;2; m^1;m

i;2;mj;2

= 0. (4.6)
Also, given private signal ^i;1, and point beliefs about (i;2; j;1; j;2;mj;1;mi;2;mj;2)  
n(i;1);mn(i;1)

, the rst period best-response satises:
mi;1   ^i;1 =  (j;1  mj;1)
+
@'
 
mi;1;mi;2

@mi;1


^i;1; n(i;1);mi;1;mn(i;1)

(4.7)
This mechanism satises ex-post incentive compatibility: For each possible realization
of  2 [0; 1]4, conditional on the opponents reporting truthfully, if agent i has reported
truthfully in the past (i.e. mi;1 = i;1), then equation (4.6) is satised if and only
if mi;2 = i;2. Similarly, given that (;m) = 0 in the second period, the right-
hand side of (4.7) is zero if the opponents report truthfully in the rst period, and
3We ignore here the possibility of corner solutions, which do not a¤ect the fundamental insights.
Corner solutions will be discussed in Section 4.8.
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so it is optimal to report mi;1 = i;1 (independent of the realization of ). Notice
that this is the case for any   0. Since such incentive compatibility is realized
ex-post, conditioning to all information being revealed, incentive compatibility will
also be realized with respect to any model of beliefs. Thus, for any such model of
beliefs, there always exist an IPE that induces truthful revelation, that is, f is robustly
partially implementable if   0.
Even with ex-post incentive compatibility, it is still possible that, for some model
of beliefs, there exists an IPE which does not induce truthful revelation: To achieve
full robust implementation in this mechanism we must guarantee that all the IPE for
all models of beliefs induce truthful revelation. We approach this problem indirectly,
applying a backwards procedure to the belief-free dynamic game that will be
shown to characterize the set of IPE-strategies across models of beliefs. In the proce-
dure, for each public history m^1 (prole of rst-period reports), apply rationalizability
in the continuation game, treating the private histories of signals as types; then,
apply rationalizability at the rst stage, maintaining that continuation strategies are
rationalizable in the corresponding continuations.
Before illustrating the procedure, notice that equation (4.6) implies that, condi-
tional on having reported truthfully in the rst period (mi;1 = i;1), truthful revelation
in the second period is a best-response to truthful revelation of the opponent irrespec-
tive of the realization of . Now, maintain that the opponent is revealing truthfully
(mj;t = j;t for t = 1; 2); if mi;1 6= i;1, i.e. if i has misreported in the rst period, the
optimal report in the second period is a further misreport (mi;2 6= i;2), such that the
implied value of the aggregator i;2 is equal to its true value (i.e.: (; m^1;m2) = 0.)
This is the notion of self-correcting strategy, sci : a strategy that reports truthfully at
the beginning of the game and at every truthful history, but in which earlier mis-
127
reports (which do not arise if sci is played) are followed by further misreports, to
correctthe impact of the previous misreports on the value of the aggregator i;2. It
will be shown next that, if  < 1, then the self-correcting strategy prole is the only
prole surviving the backward proceduredescribed above. Hence, given the results
of Section 4.6, the self-correcting strategy is the only strategy played in all IPE for all
models of beliefs. Since sc induces truthful revelation, this implies that, if  < 1,
SCF f is fully robustly implemented.
For given m^1 and i = (i;1; i;2), let xi (i) = [' (m^i;1;mi;2)  ' (i;1; i;2)] de-
note type is implied over-reportof the value of '. Then equation (4.6) can be
interpreted as saying that the optimal over-report of ' is equal to   times the
(expected) opponents under-report of '. Let x
¯
0
j and x
0
j denote the minimum and
maximum possible values of xj. Then, if i is rational, his over-reports are bounded by
xi (i)  x1i  x¯
0
j and xi (i)  x¯
1
i     x0j . Recursively, dene xki =  x¯
k 1
j and
x
¯
k
i =  
P
j 6=i x
k 1
j . Also, for each k and i, let y
k
i 

xki   x¯
k
j

denote the distance
between the maximum and lowest possible over-report at step k. Then, substituting,
we obtain the following system of di¤erence equations:
yk=    yk 1
where
yk=

yki
ykj

and   =

0 
 0
 (4.8)
Notice that the continuation game from m^1 is dominance solvable if and only if yk ! 0
as k ! 1. In that case, for each i, xi (i) ! 0, and so truthtelling is the unique
rationalizable strategy. Thus, it su¢ ces to study conditions for the dynamic system
above to converge to the steady state 0. In this example, 0 is an asymptotically stable
steady state if and only if  < 1. Hence, if  < 1, the only rationalizable outcome
in the continuation from m^1 guarantees that  = 0. Given this, the rst period best
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response simplies to
mi;1   ^i;1 =  (j;1  mj;1) :
The same argument can be applied to show that truthful revelation is the only ra-
tionalizable strategy in the rst period if and only if  < 1 (cf. Bergemann and
Morris, 2009). Then, if  < 1, the self-correcting strategy is the only backward
rationalizablestrategy, hence the only strategy played as part of IPE for all models
of beliefs.
Key Properties and their Generalizations. The analysis in Section 4.8 gener-
alizes several features of this example: The notions of aggregator functions and of
self-correcting strategy have a fairly straightforward generalization. An important
feature is that, in each period, the marginal rate of substitutions between qt and the
other goods is increasing in i;t for each i. This property implies that, for given be-
liefs about the space of uncertainty and the opponentsmessages, higher types report
higher messages: such monotonicity, allowing us to construct the recursive system
(4.8). Several versions of single-crossing conditions generalize this aspect in Section
4.8. Finally, the generalization of the idea that  < 1 takes the form of a contraction
property.4 Consider the rst period: for any 1 and m1,
i;1 (mi;1;mj;1)  i;1 (i;1; j;1) = (mi;1   i;1) +  (mj;1   j;1) :
Thus, if  < 1, for any set of possible deceptionsD there exists at least one agent
i 2 f1; 2g which can unilaterally sign i;1  m0i;1;mj;1  i;1 (i;1; j;1) by reporting
some message m0i;1 6= j;1, irrespective of j;1 and mj;1. That is, for all j;1 and mj;1 in
4The name, borrowed from Bergemann and Morris (2009), is evocative of the logic behind equa-
tion 4.8.
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D:
sign

i;1
 
m0i;1;mj;1
  i;1 (i;1; j;1) = sign m0i;1   i;1 :
Similarly, for public history m^1 in the second period,  < 1 guarantees that there
exists at least one agent that can unilaterally sign

i;2
 
m^1;m
0
i;2;mj;2
  i;2 (i; j),
(uniformly over j and mj;2), by reporting some message m0j;2 other than the one
implied by the self-correcting strategy, sci;2:
sign

m0i;2   sci;2

= sign

i;2
 
m^1;m
0
i;2;mj;2
  i;2 (i; j) :
This property will be required to hold at all histories.5
4.3 Environments
Consider an environment with n agents and T periods. In each period t = 1; :::; T ,
each agent i = 1; :::; n observes a signal i;t 2 i;t. For each t, t := 1;t  ::: n;t
denotes the set of period-t signals proles. For each i and t, the set i;t is assumed
non-empty and compact subset of a nitely dimensional Euclidean space. For each
agent i, i := Tt=1i;t is the set of is payo¤ types: a payo¤-type is a complete
sequence of agent is signals in every period. A state of nature is a prole of agents
payo¤ types, and the set of states of nature is dened as  := 1  :::n.
In each period t, the social planner chooses an allocation from a non-empty subset
of a nitely dimensional Euclidean space, t (possibly a singleton). The set  =
Tt=1t denotes the set of feasible sequences of allocations. Agents have preferences
over sequences of allocations that depend on the realization of : for each i = 1; :::; n,
preferences are represented by utility functions ui :  ! R. Thus, the states of
nature characterize everybodys preferences over the sets of feasible allocations.
5The general formulation (Section 4.8) allows to accommodate the case analogous to the possi-
bility of corner solutions in the example above.
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An environment is dened by a tuple
E = 
N;;; (ui)i2N ,
assumed common knowledge.
Notice that an environment only represents agentsknowledge and preferences: it
does not encompass agentsbeliefs. Each agents payo¤-type i 2 i represents his
knowledge of the state of nature at the end of period T . That is, his knowledge of
everyones preferences about the feasible allocations.
For each t, let Y ti := t=1i denote the set of possible histories of player is signals
up to period t. For each t and private signals yti = (i;1; :::; i;t) 2 Y ti , agent i knows
that the truestate of nature  2  belongs to the set fytig
 T=t+1i;t i.
At any point in time, agent form beliefs about the features of the environment
they dont known. These beliefs should be interpreted here as purely subjective. Since
robust mechanism design is concerned with problems of implementation as agents
model of beliefs change, we maintain the description of the agentsbeliefs separate
from the description of their information (which is part of the environment, and held
constant). Models of beliefs are presented in Section 4.5.
Social Choice Functions. The description of the primitives of the problem is
completed by the specication of a social choice function (SCF), f :  ! .
Given the constraints of the environment, a necessary condition for a SCF to be
implementable is that period t choices be measurable with respect to the information
available in that period. That is:
Remark 4.1. A necessary condition for a SCF f :  !  to be implementable is
that there exist functions ft : Y t ! t, t = 1; :::; T , such that for each  = (1; :::T ),
f () = (ft (1; :::; t))
T
t=1.
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In the following, we will only consider SCF that satisfy such necessary condition.
We thus write f = (ft)
T
t=1.
4.4 Mechanisms
A mechanism is a tuple
M =
D 
(Mi;t)i2N
T
t=1
; (gt)
T
t=1
E
where eachMi;t is a non-empty set of messages available to agent i at period t (i 2 N
and t = 1; :::; T ); gt are outcome functions, assigning allocations to each history at
each stage. As usual, for each t we dene Mt = i2NMi;t.
Formally, let H0 := fg ( denotes the empty history). For each t = 1; :::; T , the
period-t outcome function is a mapping gt : H t 1 Mt ! t, where for each t, the
set of public histories of length t is dened as:
H t =
 
ht 1;mt; t
 2 H t 1 Mt  t : t = gt  ht 1;mt	 .
The set of public histories is dened as H = [T=0H . Throughout the paper we
focus on compact mechanisms, in which the sets Mi;t are compact subsets of nitely
dimensional Euclidean spaces.
4.4.1 Games with Payo¤Uncertainty
An environment E and a mechanismM determine a dynamic game with payo¤ un-
certainty, that is a tuple
(E ;M) = 
N; (Hi;i ; ui)i2N :
Sets N , i and payo¤ functions ui are as dened in E , while sets Hi are dened
as follows: the set of player is private signals is given by Y ti = (t=1i; ); sets H t
132
(t = 0; 1; :::; T ) are dened as in M; player is set of private histories of length t
(t = 1; :::; T )is dened as H ti := H
t 1Y ti , and nally Hi := fg[
 [T=1Hi  denotes
the set of is private histories. Thus, each private history of length t is made of two
components: a public component, made of the previous messages of the agents and
the allocations chosen by the mechanism in periods 1 through t   1; and a private
component, made of agent is private signals from period 1 through t.
It is convenient to introduce notation for the partial order representing the prece-
dence relation on the setsH andHi: h  ht indicates that history h is a predecessor
of ht (similarly for private histories: (h 1; yi )  (ht 1; yti) if and only if h  ht and
yi  yti .)
Remark 4.2. The tuple (E ;M) is not a standard incomplete information game
(Harsanyi, 1967-68), because it does not encompass a specication of agents inter-
active beliefs. A standard incomplete information game is obtained by appending a
model of beliefs B, introduced in Section 4.5. Concepts and notation for structures
(E ;M;B) will be introduced in Section 4.6.1.
Strategic Forms.
Agentsstrategies in the game (E ;M) are measurable functions si : Hi ! Mi such
that si (hti) 2 Mi;t for each hti 2 Hi. The set of player is strategies is denoted by Si,
and as usual we dene the sets S = i2NSi and S i = j 6=iSj. Payo¤s are dened as
in E , as functions ui :  ! R. For any strategy prole s 2 S, each realization of
 2  induces a terminal allocation gs () 2 . Hence, we can dene strategic-form
payo¤ functions Ui : S  ! R as Ui (s; ) = ui (gs () ; ) for each s and .
As the game unfolds, agents learn about the environment observing the private
signals, but they also learn about the opponentsbehavior through the public histo-
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ries: for each public history ht and player i, let Si (ht) denote the set of player is
strategies that are consistent with history ht being observed. Clearly, since is pri-
vate histories are only informative about the opponentsbehavior through the public
history, for each i, hti = (h
t 1; yti) 2 Hi and j 6= i, Sj (hti) = Sj (ht 1).
For each ht, Sh
t
i denotes the set of strategies in the subform starting from h
t,
and for each si 2 Si, sijht 2 Shti denotes the continuation si starting from ht. The
notation gsjh
t
() refers to the terminal history induced by strategy prole s from the
public history ht if the realized state of nature is . Strategic-form payo¤ functions
can be dened for continuations from a given public history: for each ht 2 H and
each (s; ) 2 S, Ui (s; ;ht) = ui
 
gsjh
t
() ; 

. For the initial history , it will be
written Ui (s; ) instead of Ui (s; ;). Sets Hi and Si are endowed with the standard
metrics derived from the Euclidean metric on HT .6
4.4.2 Direct Mechanisms
The notion of direct mechanism is based on the observation made in remark 4.1:
Denition 4.1. A mechanism is direct, denoted by M, if for each i and for each
t = 1; :::; T , Mi;t = i;t, and gt = ft.
In a direct mechanism, agents are asked to announce their signals at every period.
Based on the reports, the mechanism chooses the period-t allocation according to the
function ft : Y t ! t, as specied by the SCF. The truthtelling strategies are those
that, conditionally on having reported truthfully in the past, report truthfully the
period-t signal, ti. Truthtelling strategies may di¤er in the behavior they prescribe
at histories following past misreports, but they all are outcome equivalent and induce
6See Appendix B.1.1 for details.
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truthful revelation in each period. The set of such strategies is denoted by Si , with
typical element si .
4.5 Models of Beliefs
A model of beliefs for an environment E is a tuple
B = 
N;; (Bi; i)i2N
such that for each i, Bi is measurable space (the set of types), and i : Bi !
( B i) is a measurable function.7
At period 0 agents have no information about the environment. Their (subjective)
priors about the payo¤ state and the opponentsbeliefs is implicitly represented
by means of types bi, with beliefs given by i (bi) 2 ( B i). In periods t =
1; :::; T , agents update their beliefs using their private information (the history of
payo¤ signals), and other information possibly disclosed by the mechanism set in
place. The main di¤erence with respect to standard (static) type spaces with payo¤
types, as in Bergemann and Morris (2005) for example, is that players here dont
know their own payo¤-types at the interim stage: payo¤-types are disclosed over
time, and known only at the end of period T . Thus, an agents type at the beginning
of the game is completely described by a priorbelief over the payo¤ states and the
opponentstypes.
In standard models of dynamic mechanism design (e.g. Bergemann and Valimaki,
2008, and Athey and Segal, 2007, Pavan et al., 2009), the history of payo¤ types
completely determines players beliefs about the payo¤ states and the opponents
7For a measurable space X, (X) denotes the set of probability measures on X, endowed with
the topology of weak convergence and the corresponding Borel sigma-algebra.
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beliefs at each point of the process.8 In the present setting this corresponds to the
case where, for each i, Bi is a singleton and supp

margi i (bi)

= i : A unique
priordescribes the beliefs (of any order) for each player, so that conditional beliefs
are uniquely determined for all possible realizations of the payo¤ types.
To summarize our terminology, in an environment with beliefs (E ;B) we distin-
guish the following stages: in period 0 (the interim stage) agents have no in-
formation, their (subjective) prior is represented by types bi, with beliefs i (bi) 2
( B i); T di¤erent period-t interim stages, for each t = 1; :::; T , when a types
beliefs after a history of signals yti would be concentrated on the set

yti
	  T=t+1i;t i B i:
The term ex-post refers to hypothetical situations in which interim proles are
revealed: period-t ex-post stage refers to a situation in which everybodys signals
up to period t are revealed. By ex-post stage we refer to the nal realization, when
payo¤-states are fully revealed (or the period-T ex-post stage).
4.6 Solution Concepts
This section is organized in two parts: the rst, introduces the main solution con-
cept for environments with a model of beliefs; the second introduces the solution
concept for environments without beliefs, which will be used in the analysis of the
full-implementation problem in Section 4.8.
8Classical mechanism design focuses almost exclusively on the case of payo¤ type spaces. Neeman
(2004) shows how relaxing this assumption may crucially a¤ect the results.
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4.6.1 Mechanisms in Environments with Beliefs: (E ;M;B)
A tuple (E ;M;B) determines a dynamic incomplete information game in the sense
of Harsanyi. Strategies are thus measurable mappings i : Bi ! Si, and the set of
strategies is denoted by i. At period 0, agents only know their own type. Hence,
the set of agent is private histories of length 0 coincides with the set of his types. It
is therefore convenient to identify types with such histories, and write h0i 2 Bi.
A system of beliefs consists of collections (pi (hti))hti2Hinfg for each agent i, such
that pi (hti) 2 ( B i): a belief system represents agents conditional beliefs
about the payo¤ state and the opponentstypes at each private history. A strategy
prole and a belief system (; p) form an assessment. For each agent i, a strategy
prole  and conditional beliefs pi induce, at each private history ht 1i , a probability
measure P ;pi
 
ht 1i

over the histories of length t.
Denition 4.2. Fix a strategy prole  2 . A beliefs system p is consistent with 
if for each i 2 N :
8h0i 2 Bi; pi
 
h0i

= i
 
h0i

(4.9)
8hti =
 
yti ; h
t 1 2 Hin fg
supp[pi
 
hti

]  yti	  T=t+1i; i B i (4.10)
and for each hti such that h
t 1
i  hti, pi (hti) is obtained from pi
 
ht 1i

and P ;pi
 
ht 1i

via Bayesian updating (whenever possible).
Condition (4.9) requires each agents beliefs conditional on observing type bi to
agree with that types beliefs as specied in the model B; condition (4.10) requires
conditional beliefs at each private history to be consistent with the information about
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the payo¤state contained in the history itself; nally, the belief system pi is consistent
with Bayesian updating whenever possible.
From the point of view of each i, for each hti 2 Hin fg and strategy prole , the
induced terminal history is a random variable that depends on the realization of the
state of nature and opponentstype prole (agent is type h0i is known to agent i at
hti, h
0
i  hti). This is denoted by gjhti (; b i). As done for games without a model of
beliefs (Section 4.4.1), we can dene strategic-form payo¤ functions as follows:
Ui
 
; ; b i;hti

= ui

gjh
t
i (; b i) ; 

.
Denition 4.3. Fix a belief system p. A strategy prole is sequentially rational with
respect to p if for every i 2 N and every hti 2 Hin fg, the following inequality is
satised for every 0i 2 i:Z
B i
Ui
 
; ; b i;hti
  dpi  hti (4.11)

Z
B i
Ui
 
0i;  i; ; b i;h
t
i
  dpi  hti .
Denition 4.4. An assessment (; p) is an Interim Perfect Equilibrium (IPE) if:9
1.  is sequentially rational with respect to p; and
2. p is consistent with .
If inequality (4.11) is only imposed at private histories of length zero, the solution
concept coincides with interim equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2005). IPE re-
nes interim equilibrium imposing two natural conditions: rst, sequential rationality;
second, consistency of the belief system.
9I avoid the adjective Bayesian(preferring the terminology interimperfect equilibrium) be-
cause the models of beliefs under consideration are not necessarily consistent with a common prior.
For the same reason, Bergemann and Morris (2005) preferred the terminology interim to that of
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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The notion of consistency adopted here imposes no restrictions on the beliefs held
at histories that receive zero probability at the preceding node.10 Hence, even if
agentsinitial beliefs admit a common prior, IPE is weaker than Fudenberg and Ti-
roles (1991) perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Also, notice that any players deviation
is a zero probability event, and treated the same way. In particular, if history hti
is precluded by i
 
ht 1i

alone, hti =2suppP ;pi
 
ht 1i

, and agent is beliefs at hti are
unrestricted the same way they would be after an unexpected move of the oppo-
nents. This feature of IPE is not standard, but it is key to the result that the set
of IPE-strategies across models of beliefs can be computed by means of a convenient
backwards procedure: Treating own deviations the same as the opponentsis key
to the possibility of considering continuation games in isolation, necessary for the
result. In Penta (2009a) I consider a minimal strengthening of IPE, in which agents
beliefs are not upset by unilateral own deviations, and I show how the analysis that
follows adapts to that case: The backwards procedureto compute the set of equi-
libria across models of beliefs must be modied, so to keep track of the restrictions
the extensive form imposes on the agentsbeliefs at unexpected nodes. Losing the
possibility of envisioning continuation games in isolation, the modied procedure
is more complicated, essentially undoing the advantages of the indirect approach.
Furthermore, for the sake of the full-implementation analysis, it can be shown that
in the framework considered in Section 4.8, the set of IPE-strategies across models of
beliefs coincides with the set of strong IPE -strategies across models of beliefs. Thus,
from the point of view of the full-implementation results of Section 4.8, this point is
10IPE is consistent with a trembling-handview of unexpected moves, in which no restrictions
on the possible correlations between trembles and other elements of uncertainty are imposed.
Unlike other notions of weak perfect Bayesian equilbrium, in IPE agentsbeliefs are consistent with
Bayesian updating also o¤-the-equilibrium path. In particular, in complete information games, IPE
coincides with subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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not critical.
4.6.2 Mechanisms in Environments without Beliefs: (E ;M)
This section introduces a solution concept for dynamic games without a model of
beliefs, backward rationalizability (BR), and shows that it characterizes the set of
IPE-strategies across models of beliefs (proposition 4.1). It is also shown that BR
can be conveniently solved by a backwards procedure that extends the logic of
backward induction to environments with incomplete information (proposition 4.2).
In environments without a model of beliefs we will not follow a classical equilib-
rium approach: no coordination of beliefs on some equilibrium strategy is imposed.
Rather, agents form conjectures about everyones behavior, which may or may not
be consistent with each other. To avoid confusion, we refer to this kind of beliefs as
conjectures, retaining the term beliefsonly for those represented in the models
of Section 4.5.
Conjectures. Agents entertain conjectures about the space   S. As the game
unfolds, and agents observe their private histories, their conjectures change. For each
private history hti = (h
t 1; yti) 2 Hi, dene the event [hti]    S as:

hti

=

yti
	  T=t+1i; i  S  ht 1 :
(Notice that, by denition, [hti] 

ht 1i

whenever ht 1i  hti.)
Denition 4.5. A conjecture for agent i is a conditional probability system (CPS
hereafter), that is a collection i = (i (hti))hti2Hi of conditional distributions 
i (hti) 2
(  S) that satisfy the following conditions:
C.1 For all hti 2 Hi, i (hti) 2 ([hti]);
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C.2 For every measurable A  [hti] 

ht 1i

, i (hti) [A]i
 
ht 1i

[hti] = 
i
 
ht 1i

[A].
The set of agent is conjectures is denoted by Hi (  S).11
Condition C.1 states that agentsare always certain of what they know; condition
C.2 states that agentsconjectures are consistent with Bayesian updating whenever
possible. Notice that in this specication agents entertain conjectures about the payo¤
state, the opponentsand their own strategies. This point is discussed in Section 4.6.3.
Sequential Rationality. A strategy si is sequentially rational with respect to con-
jectures i if, at each history hti 2 Hi, it prescribes optimal behavior with respect to
i (;hti) in the continuation of the game. Formally: Given a CPS i 2 Hi (  S)
and a history hti = (h
t 1; yti), strategy si expected payo¤ at h
t
i, given 
i, is dened as:
Ui
 
si; 
i;hti

=
Z
S i
Ui
 
si; s i; ;ht 1
  dmargS ii  hti . (4.12)
Denition 4.6. A strategy si is sequentially rational with respect to i 2 Hi (  S),
written si 2 ri (i), if and only if for each hti 2 Hi and each s0i 2 Si the following
inequality is satised:
Ui
 
si; 
i;hti
  Ui  s0i; i;hti : (4.13)
If si 2 ri (i), we say that conjectures i justifystrategy si.
Backward Rationalizability.
We introduce now the solution concept that will be shown (proposition 4.1) to char-
acterize the set of IPE-strategies across models of beliefs, Backwards Rationalizability
(BR). The name is justied by proposition 4.2, which shows that BR can be com-
puted by means of a backwards procedurethat combines the logic of rationalizabil-
ity and backwards induction.
11The general denition of a CPS is in Appendix B.1.2.
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Denition 4.7. For each i 2 N , let BR0i = Si. Dene recursively, for k = 1; 2; :::
BRki =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
s^i 2 BRk 1i :
9i 2 Hi (  S) s.t.
(1) s^i 2 ri (i)
(2) supp (i ())    fs^ig  BRk 1 i
(3) for each hti = (h
t 1; yti) 2 Hi:
s 2 supp (margSi (hti)) implies:
(3.1) sijhti = s^ijhti, and
(3.2) 9s0 i 2 BRk 1 i : s0 ijht 1 = s ijht 1
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
Finally, BR := T
k0
BRk.12
BR consists of an iterated deletion procedure. At each round, strategy si survives
if it is justied by conjectures i that satisfy two conditions: condition (2) states that
at the beginning of the game, the agent must be certain of his own strategy si and have
conjectures concentrated on opponentsstrategies that survived the previous rounds
of deletion; condition (3) restricts the agents conjectures at unexpected histories:
condition (3.1) states that agent i is always certain of his own continuation strategy;
condition (3.2) requires conjectures to be concentrated on opponentscontinuation
strategies that are consistent with the previous rounds of deletion. However, at un-
expected histories, agentsconjectures about  are essentially unrestricted. Thus,
condition (3) embeds two conceptually distinct kinds of assumptions: the rst con-
cerning agentsconjectures about ; the second concerning their conjectures about
the continuation behavior. For ease of reference, they are summarized as follows:
 Unrestricted-Inference Assumption (UIA): At unexpected histories, agents
conjectures about  are unrestricted. In particular, agents are free to infer
anything about the opponentsprivate information (or their own future signals)
from the public history.
12It goes without saying that whenever we write a condition like i (Xjhti)   and X is not
measurable, the condition is not satised.
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For example, conditional conjectures may be such that marg i
i (jhti) is concen-
trated on a type yt i for which some of the previous moves in h
t 1 are irrational.
Nonetheless, condition (3.2) implies that it is believed that yt i will behave ratio-
nally in the future. From an epistemic viewpoint, it can be shown that BR can be
interpreted as common certainty of future rationality at every history.
 Common Certainty in Future Rationality (CCFR): at every history (ex-
pected or not), agents share common certainty in future rationality.
Thus, CCFR can be interpreted as a condition of belief persistence on the contin-
uation strategies.13
4.6.3 Results
We discuss now the two main results which are useful to tackle the problem of full
implementation in Section 4.8. The rst result shows that BR characterizes the set
of IPE-strategies across models of beliefs; the second result shows that this set can
be computed by means of a convenient backwards procedure.
Characterization of the set of IPE. As emphasized above, in BR agents hold
conjectures about both the opponentsand their own strategies. First, notice that
conditions (2) and (3.2) in the denition of BRmaintain that agents are always certain
of their own strategy; furthermore, the denition of sequential best response (def. 4.6)
depends only on the marginals of the conditional conjectures overS i. Hence, this
particular feature of BR does not a¤ect the standard notion of rationality. The fact
13In games of complete information, an instance of the same principle is provided by subgame
perfection, where agents believe in the equilibrium continuation strategies both on- and o¤-the-
equilibrium path. The belief persistence hypothesis goes hand in hand with the logic of backward
induction, allowing to envision each subgame in isolation. (cf. Perea, 2010, and discussion below,
Section 4.9.)
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that conjectures are elements ofHi (  S) rather thanHi (  S i) corresponds
to the assumption, discussed in Section 4.6.1, that IPE treats all deviations the same;
its implication is that both histories arising from unexpected moves of the opponents
and from ones own deviations represent zero-probability events, allowing the same
set of conditional beliefs about S i, with essentially the same freedom that IPE
allows after anyones deviation. This is the main insight behind the following result
(the proof is in Appendix B.2.1):
Proposition 4.1 (Characterization). Fix a game (E ;M). For each i: s^i 2 BRi if
and only if 9B, b^i 2 Bi and (^; p^) such that: (i) (^; p^) is an IPE of (E ;M;B) and
(ii) s^i 2supp ^i

b^i

:
An analogous result can be obtained for the more standard renement of IPE,
in which unilateral own deviations leave an agentsbeliefs unchanged, applying to a
modied version of BR: such modication entails assuming that agents only form
conjectures about   S i (that is: i 2 Hi (  S i)) and by consequently
adapting conditions (2) and (3) in the denition of BR (see Penta, 2009a.) Hence,
the assumption that IPE treats anyones deviation the same (and, correspondingly,
that in BR agents hold conjectures about their own strategy as well) is not crucial
to characterize the set of equilibrium strategies across models of beliefs. As already
discussed in Section 4.6.1, it is crucial instead for the next result, which shows that
such set can be computed applying a procedure that extends the logic of backward
induction to environments with incomplete information (proposition 4.2 below).
The Backwards Procedure. The backwards procedure is described as follows:
Fix a public history hT 1 of length T  1. For each payo¤-type yTi 2 i of each agent,
the continuation game is a static game, to which we can apply the standard notion of
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-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003). For each hT 1, let RhT 1i denote
the set of pairs
 
yTi ; sijhT 1

such that continuation strategy sijhT 1 is rationalizable
in the continuation game from hT 1 for type yTi . We now proceed backwards: for
each public history hT 2 of length T   2, we apply again -rationalizability to the
continuation game from hT 2 (in normal form), restricting continuation strategies
sijhT 2 2 ShT 2i to be -rationalizable in the continuation games from histories of
length hT 1. RhT 2i denotes the set of pairs
 
yT 1i ; sijhT 2

such that continuation
strategy sijhT 2 is rationalizable in the continuation game from hT 2 for typeyT 1i .
Inductively, this is done for each ht 1, until the initial node  is reached, for which
the set Ri is computed. We can now introduce the backwards procedure result
(the proof and the formal denition of R are in appendix B.2.2):
Proposition 4.2 (Computation). BRi = Ri for each i.
Properties UIA and CCFR provide the basic insight behind this result. First,
notice that under UIA, the set of beliefs agents are allowed to entertain about the
opponentspayo¤ types (i.e. the support of their marginal beliefs over  i) is the
same at every history (equal to  i). Hence, in this respect, their information about
the opponentstypes in the subform starting from (public) history ht 1 is the same as
if the game started from ht 1. Also, CCFR implies that agentsepistemic assumptions
about everyones behavior in the continuation is also the same at every history. Thus,
UIA and CCFR combined imply that, from the point of view of BR, a continuation
from history ht 1 is equivalent to a game with the same space of uncertainty and
strategy spaces equal to the continuation strategies, which justies the possibility of
analyzing continuation games in isolation.14
14Hence, BR satises a property that generalizes the notion of subgame consistency, according
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4.7 Partial Implementation
Under our assumption that the designer can commit to the mechanism, it is easy to
show that a revelation principle holds for dynamic environments, so that restricting
attention to direct mechanisms (denition 4.1) entails no loss of generality for the
analysis of the partial implementation problem.
The notion of implementation adopted by the classical literature on static mech-
anism design is that of interim incentive compatibility:
Denition 4.8. A SCF is interim implementable (or interim incentive compati-
ble) on B = 
N;; (Bi; i)i2N if truthful revelation is an interim equilibrium of
(E ;M;B). That is, 9 2  such that for each i 2 N and bi 2 Bi, for all i 2 i,Z
B i
Ui (
; ; b i; bi)  d (bi)

Z
B i
Ui
 
i; 

 i; ; b i; bi
  d (bi) :
(Recall that  denotes the set of truthtelling strategies.) Bergemann and Morris
(2005) showed that a SCF is interim incentive compatible on all type spaces, if and
only if it is ex-post incentive compatible, that is:
Denition 4.9. A SCF f is ex post implementable (or ex post incentive compatible)
if for each i, for each  2  and s0i 2 Si
Ui (s
; )  Ui
 
s0i; s

 i; 

:
We say that a SCF is Strictly Ex-Post Incentive Compatible if for any s0i =2 Si , the
inequality holds strictly:
to which the behavior prescribed on a subgame is nothing else than the solution of the subgame
itself(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, p.90).
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Interim incentive compatibility imposes no requirement of perfection: If players
cannot commit to their strategies, more stringent incentive compatibility requirements
must be introduced, to account for the dynamic structure of the problem. We thus
apply the solution concept introduced in Section 4.6.1, IPE: A mechanism is interim
perfect implementable if the truthtelling strategy is an IPE of the direct mechanism.
Denition 4.10. A SCF is interim perfect implementable (or interim perfect incen-
tive compatible) on B = 
N;; (Bi; i)i2N if there exist beliefs (pi)i2N and  2 
such that, (; p) is an IPE of (E ;M;B).
For a given model of beliefs, interim perfect incentive compatibility is clearly more
demanding than interim incentive compatibility. But, as the next result shows, the
requirement of perfectionis no more demanding than the ex-anteincentive com-
patibility if it is required for all models of beliefs:
Proposition 4.3 (Partial Implementation). A SCF is perfect implementable on all
models of beliefs if and only if it is ex post implementable.
Hence, as far as robust partial implementation is concerned, assuming that
agents can commit to their strategies is without loss of generality: The dynamic
mechanism can be analyzed in its normal form.
On the other hand, in environments with dynamic revelation of information,
agentssignals are intrinsically multidimensional. Hence, given proposition 4.3, the
negative result on ex-post implementation by Jehiel et al. (2006) can be interpreted
as setting tight limits for theWilsons doctrine applied to dynamic mechanism design
problems. However, the literature provides examples of environments of economic
interest where ex-post implementation with multidimensional signals is possible (e.g.
Picketty, 1999; Bikhchandani, 2006; Eso and Maskin, 2002).
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4.8 Full Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
We begin by focusing on direct mechanisms. Unlike the static case of Bergemann and
Morris (2009), in environments with dynamic revelation of information direct mech-
anisms may not su¢ ce to achieve full robust implementation: Section 4.8.4 shows
how simple enlargedmechanisms, can improve on the direct ones, yet avoiding the
intricacies of the augmented mechanismsrequired for classical Bayesian Implemen-
tation.15
Denition 4.11. SCF f is fully perfectly implementable in the direct mechanism if
for every B, the set of IPE-strategies of (E ;M;B) is included in P.
The following proposition follows immediately from proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.4. SCF f is (fully) robustly perfect-implementable in the direct
mechanism if and only if BR  S.
4.8.1 Environments with Monotone Aggregators of Informa-
tion
In this Section it is maintained that each set i;t = [li;t; 
h
i;t]  R, so that, for each
t = 1; :::; T , Y t  Rnt. Environments with monotone aggregators are characterized by
the property that for each agent, in each period, all the available information (across
time and agents) can be summarized by a one-dimensional statistic. Furthermore,
such T statistics uniquely determine an agents preferences. (This notion generalizes
properties of preferences discussed in the example in Section 4.2).
15Classical references are Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1988), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and
Jackson (1991).
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Denition 4.12. An Environment admits monotone aggregators (EMA) if, for each
i, and for each t = 1; :::; T , there exists an aggregator function ti : Y
t ! R and a
valuation function vi :  RT! R such that ti and vi are continuous, ti is strictly
increasing in i;t and for each (; ) 2  ;
ui (
; ) = vi

; (i (y
 ()))T=1

:
Assuming the existence of the aggregators and the valuation functions, per se,
entails no loss of generality: the bite of the representation derives from the continuity
assumptions and the further restrictions on the aggregator functions that will be
imposed in the following.
The self-correcting strategy. The analysis is based on the notion of self-correcting
strategy, sc, which generalizes what we have already described in the leading example
of Section 4.2: at each period-t history, sci reports a message such that the implied
period-t valuation is as correct as it can be, given the previous reports. That is:
conditional on past truthful revelation, sci truthfully reports is period-t signal; at his-
tories that come after previous misreports of agent i, sci entails a further misreport, to
o¤set the impact on the period-t aggregator of the previous misresports.16 Formally:
Denition 4.13. The self-correcting strategy, sci 2 Si, is such that for each t =
1; :::; T and public history ht 1 = (~yt 1; xt 1), and for each private history hti =
(ht 1; yti ; ),
sci
 
hti

= arg min
mi;t2i;t
(
max
yt i2Y t i
ti  yti ; yt i  ti  ~yt 1i ;mi;t; yt i
)
: (4.14)
16An earlier formulation of the idea of self-correcting strategy can be found in Pavan (2007). I
thank Alessandro Pavan for pointing this out.
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Clearly, sc induces truthful reporting (that is: sc 2 S): if ht 1 = (~yt 1; xt 1) and
yti =
 
~yt 1i ; i;t

, then sci (h
t 1; yti) = i;t. Also, notice that s
c
i (h
t
i) only depends on the
component of the public history made of is own reports, ~yt 1i . Let ~y
t
 i be such that:
~yt i 2 arg max
yt i2Y t i
ti  yti ; yt i  ti  ~yt 1i ; sci  hti ; yt i .
Then, by denition of sci and the fact that 
t
i is strictly increasing in i;t, we may have
three cases:
ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i

= ti
 
~yt 1i ; s
c
i
 
hti

; yt i

for all yt i 2 Y t i; (4.15)
ti
 
yti ; ~y
t
 i

> ti
 
~yt 1i ; s
c
i
 
hti

; ~yt i

and sci
 
hti

= +i;t, (4.16)
ti
 
yti ; ~y
t
 i

< ti
 
~yt 1i ; s
c
i
 
hti

; ~yt i

and sci
 
hti

=  i;t. (4.17)
Equation (4.15) corresponds to the case in which strategy sci can completely o¤set
the previous misreports. But there may exist histories at which no current report
can o¤set the previous misreports. In the example of Section 4.2, suppose that the
rst period under- (resp. over-) report is so low (resp. high), that even reporting
the highest (lowest) possible message in the second period is not enough to correct
the implied value of '. This was the case corresponding to the possibility of corner
solutions, and corresponds cases to (4.16) and (4.17) respectively.
The Contraction Property. The results on full implementation are based on a
contraction property that limits the dependence of agentsaggregator functions on the
private signals of the opponents. Before formally introducing the contraction property,
some extra notation is needed: for each set of strategy proles D = j2IDj  S and
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for each private history hti, let
Di
 
hti

:=

mi;t : 9si 2 Di; s.t. si
 
hti

= mi;t
	
and
Di
 
ht 1

:=
[
yti2Y ti
Di
 
ht 1; yti

.
Dene also:
si

Di
 
ht 1

:=
 
mi;t; y
t
i
 2Mi;t  Y ti : mi;t 2 Di  ht 1; yti	
and
sci

ht 1

:=
 
mi;t; y
t
i
 2Mi;t  Y ti : mi;t = sci  ht 1; yti	
Denition 4.14 (Contraction Property). An environment with monotone aggregators
of information satises the Contraction Property if, for each D  S such that D 6=
fscg and for each ht 1 = (~yt 1; xt 1) such that s [D (ht 1)] 6= sc [ht 1], there exists yti
and m0i;t 2 Di (ht 1; yti), m0i;t 6= sci (ht 1; yti), such that:
sign

sci
 
ht 1; yti
  0i;t = sign ti  yti ; yt i  ti  ~yt 1; 0i;t; 0 i;t (4.18)
for all yt i =
 
yt 1 i ;  i;t
 2 Y t i and m0 i;t 2 D i  ht 1; yt i.
To interpret the condition, rewrite the argument of the right-hand side of (4.18)
as follows:
ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i
  ti  ~yt 1;m0i;t;m0 i;t
=

ti
 
~yT 1; sci
 
hT 1; yTi

; sc i
 
hT 1; yT i
  ti  ~yt 1;m0i;t;m0 i;t
+ 
 
ht 1; yti ; y
t
 i

(4.19)
where

 
ht 1; yti ; y
t
 i

= ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i
  ti  ~yt 1; sc  ht 1; yti ; yt i (4.20)
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The term in the rst square bracket in (4.19) represents the impact, on the period-t
aggregator, of a deviation (in the setD) from the self-correcting prole at history ht 1;
the term 
 
ht 1; yti ; y
t
 i

represents the extent by which the self-correcting prole is
incapable of o¤setting the previous misreports. Suppose that 
 
ht 1; yti ; y
t
 i

= 0, i.e.
strategy prole sc fully o¤sets the previous misreports (in particular, this is the case
if ht 1 is a truthful history: ~yt 1 = yt 1), then, the contraction property boils down
to the following:
(Simple CP) For each public history at which the behavior allowed
by the set of deviations D is di¤erent from sc, there exists at least one
players typeyti of some agent i, for which for some m
0
i;t 2 Di (ht 1; yti),
ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i
 ti  ~yt 1;m0i;t;m0 i;t is unilaterally signed by sci (ht 1; yti) m0i;t,
uniformly over the opponents private information and current reports.
From equations (4.15)-(4.17) it is easy to see that 
 
ht 1; yti ; y
t
 i

= 0 whenever
sci (h
t
i) 2
 
 i;t; 
+
i;t

. Hence, this corresponds precisely to the case considered in the
example of Section 4.2. For histories such that the self-correcting strategy is not
su¢ cient to o¤set the previous misreports, then the simple CP must be strength-
ened so that the sign of the impact of deviations from sc at ht 1 on the aggregator
ti is not upset by the previous misreports, . So, in principle, the bound on the
interdependence in agentsvaluations may depend on the histories of payo¤ signals.
Section 4.8.4 though will show how simple enlargedmechanisms, in which agents
sets of messages are extended at every period so that any possible past misreport can
be corrected, eliminate this problem, inducing 
 
ht 1; yti ; y
t
 i

= 0 at all histories.
Given the simplicity of their structure, such mechanisms will be called quasi-direct.
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4.8.2 Aggregator-Based SCF
Consider the SCF in the example of Section 4.2 (equations 4.2-4.5): the allocation
chosen by the SCF in period t, is only a function of the values of the aggregators in
period t. The notion of aggregator-based SCF generalizes this idea:
Denition 4.15. The SCF f = (ft)
T
t=1 is aggregator-based if for each t, 
t
i (y
t) =
ti (~y
t) for all i implies ft (yt) = ft (~yt).
The next proposition shows that, if the contraction property is satised, an
aggregator-based SCF is fully implementable in environments that satisfy a single-
crossing condition:
Denition 4.16 (SCC-1). An environment with monotone aggregators of information
satises SCC-1 if, for each i, valuation function vi, is such that: for each t, and ; 0 2
 :  = 0 for all  6= t, then for each ai; t 2 RT 1 and for each i;t < 0i;t < 00i;t,
vi
 
; i;t; a

i; t

> vi
 
0; i;t; ai; t

and vi
 
; 0i;t; a

i; t

= vi
 
0; 0i;t; a

i; t

implies:vi
 
; 00i;t; a

i; t

< vti
 
0; 00i;t; a

i; t

In words: For any two allocations  and 0 that only di¤er in their period-t
component, for any ai; t 2 RT 1, the di¤erence i;t (; 0; i;t) = vi
 
; i;t; a

i; t
  
vi
 
0; i;t; ai; t

as a function of i;t crosses zero (at most) once (see gure 4.1.a, p.
156). We are now in the position to present the rst full-implementation result:
Proposition 4.5. In an environment with monotone aggregators (def. 4.12) satis-
fying SCC-1 (def. 4.16) and the contraction property (def. 4.14), if an aggregator-
based social choice function satises Strict EPIC (denition 4.9), then BR = fscg.
The argument of the proof is analogous to the argument presented in Section 4.2:
For each history of length T  1, it is proved that the contraction property and SCC-1
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imply that agents play according to sc in the last stage; then the argument proceeds
by induction: given that in periods t+1; :::; T agents follow sc, a misreport at period t
only a¤ects the period-t aggregator (because the SCF is aggregator-based). Then,
SCC-1 and the contraction property imply that the self-correcting strategy is followed
at stage t.
AnAppraisal of the aggregator-basedassumption. Consider the important
special case of time-separable preferences: Suppose that, for each i and t = 1; :::; T ,
there exist an aggregator function ti : Y
t ! R and a valuation function vti :
t  R! R such that for each (; ) 2  ,
ui (
; ) =
TX
t=1
vti
 
t ; 
t
i
 
yt ()

:
In this case, the condition that the SCF is aggregator-based (def. 4.15) can be inter-
preted as saying that the SCF only responds to changes in preferences: If two distinct
payo¤ states  and 0 induce the same preferences over the period-t allocations, then
the SCF chooses the same allocation under  and 0 in period t. This is the case of the
example in Section 4.2.17 These preferences though cannot accommodate phenomena
of path-dependence such as learning-by-doing. For instance, in the context of
the example of Section 4.2, suppose that agentspreferences are the following:
ui (q1; q2; i;1; i;2; ) = i;1 (1)  q1 + i;1 (4.21)
+ [i;2 (1; 2)  F (q1)  q2 + j;2] .
17In that example the set of allocations includes the transfers, hence for each t the social choice
function is: ft () =
 
qt () ; 

i;t () ; 

j;t ()

. The rst component is clearly aggregator-based (see
equations 4.2 and 4.3); Furthermore, if  2 [0; 1), the values of the aggregators uniquely determine
the size of the transfers (equations 4.4 and 4.5). The social choice function is thus aggregator-
based.
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The marginal utility of q2 now also depends on the amount of public good pro-
vided in the rst period. Then, the optimal policy for the second period is to set
q2 () = [i;2 () + j;2 ()]  F (q1). This rule is not aggregator-based, as the period-2
allocation choice depends on both the period-2 aggregators and the previous period
allocation. Thus, to allow the SCF to respond to possible path-dependencies in
agentspreferences (such as learning-by-doinge¤ects) it is necessary to relax the
aggregator-basedassumption.
In environments with transferable utility (such as the example above) our notion of
SCF includes the specication of the transfers scheme: ft () = (qt () ; i;t () ; j;t ())
for each t. Since the requirement that the SCF is aggregator-based applies to all
its components, it also applies to transfers. In general, it is desirable to allow for
arbitrary transfers, not necessarily aggregator-based. The general results of the next
section can be easily adapted to accommodate the possibility of arbitrary transfers
in environments with transferable utility (Section 4.8.3).
4.8.3 Relaxing Aggregator-Based
In the proof of proposition 4.5, the problem with relaxing the assumption that the
SCF is aggregator-basedis that a one-shot deviation from sc at period-t may induce
di¤erent allocations in period-t and in subsequent periods. Hence, the within period
single-crossing condition (SCC-1) may not su¢ ce to conclude the inductive step,
and guarantee that strategy sc is played at period-t: Some bound is needed on the
impact that a one-shot deviation has on the outcome of the SCF. The next condition
guarantees that the impact of a one-shot deviation is not too strong.
Denition 4.17 (SCC-2). An environment with monotone aggregators of information
satises SCC-2 if, for each i: for each ; 0 2  such that 9t 2 f1; :::; Tg : y () =
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y (0) for all  < t and for all j, j () = 

j (
0) for all  > t, then for each
ai; t 2 RT 1 and for each i;t < 0i;t < 00i;t,
if vi
 
f () ; i;t; a

i; t

> vi
 
f (0) ; i;t; ai; t

and vi
 
f () ; 0i;t; a

i; t

= vi
 
f (0) ; 0i;t; a

i; t

,
then vi
 
f (0) ; 00i;t; a

i; t

< vti
 
f (0) ; 00i;t; a

i; t

SCC-2 compares the allocations chosen for any two similar states of nature:
states  and 0 are similarin the sense that they are identical up to period t   1,
and imply the same value of the aggregators at all periods other than t. Since agents
preferences are uniquely determined by the values of the aggregators (denition 4.12),
the preferences induced by states  and 0 only di¤er along the dimension of the period-
t aggregator. The condition requires a single-crossing condition for the corresponding
outcomes to hold along this direction. The condition is easily interpretable from a
graphical viewpoint: suppose that  and 0 are as in denition 4.17. Then, if the
SCF is aggregator-based and the environment satises SCC-1 (denition 4.16),
the di¤erence in payo¤s for f () and f (0) as a function of the period-t aggregator
crosses zero (at most) once. (Figure 1.a). If f is not aggregator based, allocations
at periods  > t may di¤er under f () and f (0), shifting (or changing the shape) of
the curve i;t (f () ; f (0) ; i;t). SCC-2 guarantees that such shifting maintains the
single-crossing property (gure 4.1.b).
(The path-dependentpreferences in equation (4.21) satisfy SCC-2 for any choice
of F : R! R.)
Proposition 4.6 (Full Implementation). In an environment with monotone aggrega-
tors (def. 4.12) satisfying the contraction property (def. 4.14), if a SCF f is Strictly
EPIC (denition 4.9) and satises SCC-2 (def. 4.17), then BR = fscg :
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Figure 4.1: Single Crossing Conditions
Corollary 4.1. Since sc 2 S, if the assumptions of propositions 4.5 or 4.6, then f
is fully robustly implementable.
Transferable Utility.
A special case of interest is that of additively separable preferences with transferable
utility: For each t = 1; :::; T , the space of allocations is t = Qt  (ni=1i;t), where
Qt is the set of common componentsof the allocation and i;t  R is the set of
transfers to agent i (is private component). Maintaining the restriction that the
environment admits monotone aggregators, agent is preferences are as follows: For
each  = (qt; 1;t; :::; n;t)
T
t=1 2  and  2 ;
ui (
; ) =
TX
t=1
vti
 
(q )
t
=1 ; 
t
i
 
yt ()

+ i;t,
where for each t = 1; :::; T , vti : (t=1Q )  R! R is the period-t valuation of the
common component. Notice that functions vti : (t=1Q )  R! R are dened over
the entire history (q1; :::; qt): this allows period-t valuation of the current allocation
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(qt) to depend on the previous allocative decisions (q1; :::; qt 1). This allows us to
accommodate the path dependenciesin preferences discussed above.18
In environments with transferable utility, it is common to dene a social choice
function only for the common component, t : Y t ! Qt (t = 1; :::; T ), while transfer
schemes i;t : Y t ! R (i = 1; :::; n and t = 1; :::; T ) are specied as part of the mech-
anism. Not assuming transferable utility, social choice functions above were dened
over the entire allocation space (ft : Y t ! t), they thus include transfers in the case
of transferable utility. The transition from one approach to the other is straightfor-
ward. Any given pair of choice function and transfer scheme
 
t; (i;t)
n
i=1
T
t=1
trivially
induces a social choice function f;t : Y
t ! t (t = 1; :::; T ) in the setup above: for
each t and yt 2 Y t, f;t (yt) =
 
t (y
t) ; (i;t (y
t))
n
i=1

.
It is easy to check that, in environments with transferable utility, if agentspref-
erences over the common component Q = Tt=1Qt satisfy (SCC-1), and  :  ! Q
is aggregator-based, then for any transfer scheme (i;t (yt))
n
i=1, the fullsocial choice
function f; satises (SCC-2). More generally, if  and agentspreferences over Q
satisfy (SCC-2), then f; satises (SCC-2) for any transfer scheme (i;t (yt))
n
i=1.
Given this, the following corollary of proposition 4.6 is immediate:
Corollary 4.2. In environments with monotone aggregators of information and trans-
ferable utility, if agentspreferences over Q and  :  ! Q satisfy: (i) the contrac-
tion property; (ii) the single crossing condition (SCC-2); and (iii) there exist transfers
 that make  strictly ex-post incentive compatible; then f; is fully robustly imple-
mented.
18The special case of path-independentpreferences corresponding to the example in section 4.2
is such that period-t valuation are functions vti : Qt  R! R.
158
4.8.4 Quasi-directMechanisms
This section shows how simple enlargedmechanisms may avoid incurring into corner
solutions, which allows us to relax the bite of the contraction property (denition 4.14)
by guaranteeing that the sign condition holds with  (ht 1; yt) = 0 at every history
(equation 4.20), thus weakening the su¢ cient condition for full implementation.
Let ^i;t : Rnt ! R be a continuous extension of i;t : Y t ! R from Y t to R,
strictly increasing in the component that extends i;t and constant in all the others
on RnY t (from denition 4.12 i;t is only assumed strictly increasing in i;t on Y ti :)
Set m i;1 = 
 
i;1 and m
+
i;1 = 
+
i;1, and for each t = 1; :::; T , let ^i;t =

m i;t;m
+
i;t

, and
Y^ ti = t=1^i; where m i;t and m+i;t are recursively dened so to satisfy:
m+i;t = max
(
mi 2 R : max
(yti ;yt i)2Y t
^i;t  yti ; yt i  miny^t 12Y^ t 1i ^i;t  y^t 1;mi; yt i
 = 0
)
m i;t = min
(
mi 2 R : max
(yti ;yt i)2Y t
^i;t  yti ; yt i  maxy^t 12Y^ t 1i ^i;t  y^t 1;mi; yt i
 = 0
)
Set the message spaces in the mechanism such that Mi;t = ^i;t for each i and
t. By construction, for any private history hti = (h
t 1; yti), the self-correcting report
sci (h
t
i) satises equation (4.15), that is s
c is capable of fully o¤set previous misreports:
messages in ^i;tni;t are used whenever equations (4.16) or (4.17) would be the case in
the direct mechanism. (Clearly, such messages never arise if sc is played.) To complete
the mechanism, we need to extend the domain of the outcome function to account for
these extramessages. Such extension consists of treating these reports in terms of
the implied value of the aggregator: For given sequence of reports y^t 2 Y^ t such that
some message in ^i;tni;t has been reported at some period   t, let gt (y^t) = ft ()
for some  such that i; () = i; (y^ ) for all i and   t, ft () = ft (0).
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4.9 Further Remarks on the Solution Concepts
Backwards procedure, Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium and IPE. In games
with complete and perfect information, the backwards procedureR coincides with
the backward induction solution, hence with subgame perfection.19 The next example
(borrowed from Perea, 2010) shows that if the game has complete but imperfect
information, strategies played in Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) may be a strict
subset of R:
Example 4.1.
Consider the game in the following gure:
Backwards Procedure, SPE and IPE
R1 = fbc; bd; acg and R2 = ff; gg. The game though has only one SPE, in which
player 1 chooses b: in the proper subgame, the only Nash equilibrium entails the
mixed (continuation) strategies 1
2
c + 1
2
d and 3
4
f + 1
4
g, yielding a continuation payo¤
of 11
4
for player 1. Hence, player 1 chooses b at the rst node.
19For the special case of games with complete information, Perea (2010) independently introduced
a procedure that is equivalent to R, and showed that R coincides with the backward induction
solution if the game has perfect information.
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In games with complete information, IPE coincides with SPE, but R in general
is weaker than subgame perfection. At rst glance, this may appear in contradiction
with propositions 4.1 and 4.2, which imply that R characterizes the set of strategies
played in IPE across models of beliefs. The reason is that even if the environment
has no payo¤ uncertainty ( is a singleton), the complete information model in
which Bi is a singleton for every i is not the only possible: models with redundant
types may exist, for which IPE strategies di¤er from the SPE-strategies played in
the complete information model. The source of the discrepancy is analogous to the
one between Nash equilibrium and subjective correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974).
We illustrate the point constructing a model of beliefs and an IPE in which strategy
(ac) is played with positive probability by some type of player 1.20 Let payo¤s be the
same as in example 4.1, and consider the model B such that B1 =

bbc1 ; b
bd
1 ; b
ac
1
	
and
B2 =
n
bf2 ; b
g
2
o
, with the following beliefs:
1 (b1)
h
bf2
i
=

1 if b1 = bbc1 ; b
ac
1
0 otherwise
and
2 (b
g
2)

bad1

= 1, 2

bf2
 
bbc1

= 1
The equilibrium strategy prole  is such that 8i;8bi, i (bsii ) = si. The system of
beliefs agrees with the models beliefs at the initial history, hence the beliefs of types
bg2 and b
ac
1 are uniquely determined by Bayesian updating. For types b
si
i 6= bg2; bac1 ,
it is su¢ cient to set pi (b
si
i ; ai) = i (b
si
i ) (i.e. maintain whatever the beliefs at the
beginning of the game were) Then, it is easy to verify that (; p) is an IPE.
On the other hand, if jj = 1 and the game has perfect information (no stage
20It is easy to see that such di¤erence is not merely due to the possibility of zero-probability types.
Also the relaxation of the common prior assumption is not crucial.
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with simultaneous moves), then R coincides with the set of SPE-strategies. Hence,
in environments with no payo¤ uncertainty and with perfect information, only SPE-
strategies are played in IPE for any model of beliefs.
4.10 Concluding Remarks
On the Solution Concepts. Proposition 4.1 can be seen as the dynamic counter-
part of Brandenburger and Dekels (1987) characterization of correlated equilibrium.
As discussed above, the adoption of IPE in this paper is motivated by the result in
proposition 4.2, which makes the full implementation problem of Section 4.8 tractable.
The weakness of IPE (relative to other notions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium) is key
to that result: the heart of proposition 4.2 is BRs property of subgame consistency
(cf. footnote 14), which allows us to analyze continuation games in isolation, in
analogy with the logic of backward induction. The CCFR and UIA assumptions
(p. 143) provide the epistemic underpinnings of the argument. To understand this
point, it is instructive to compare BR with Battigalli and Sinicalschis (2007) weak
and strong versions of extensive form rationalizability (EFR), which correspond re-
spectively to the epistemic assumptions of (initial) common certainty of rationality
(CCR) and common strong belief in rationality (CSBR): BR is stronger than the
rst, and weaker than the latter. The strong version of EFR fails the property of
subgame consistencybecause it is based on a forward induction logic, which inher-
ently precludes the possibility of envisioning continuations in isolation: by taking
into account the possibility of counterfactual moves, agents may draw inferences from
their opponentspast moves and rene their conjectures on the behavior in the con-
tinuation. The weak version of EFR fails subgame consistencyfor opposite reasons:
an agent can make weaker predictions on the opponentsbehavior in the continuation
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than he would make if he envisioned the continuation game in isolation, because
no restrictions on the agentsbeliefs about their opponentsrationality are imposed
after an unexpected history. Thus, the form of backward induction reasoningim-
plicit in IPE (which generalizes the idea of subgame perfection) is based on stronger
(respectively, weaker) epistemic assumptions than CCR (respectively, CSBR).
Dynamic Mechanisms in Static Environments. Consider an environment in
which agents obtain all the relevant information before the planner has to make a
decision. The designer may still have reasons to adopt a dynamic mechanism (e.g.
an ascending auction).21 In the context of an environment with complete informa-
tion, Bergemann and Morris (2007) recently argued that dynamic mechanisms may
improve on static ones by reducing agentsstrategic uncertainty: They showed how
the backward induction outcome of a second-price clock-auction guarantees full ro-
bust implementation of the e¢ cient allocation for a larger set of parameters than the
rationalizable outcomes of a second price sealed-bid auction. The approach of this
paper allows us to extend the analysis to incomplete information settings: It can be
shown that, with incomplete information, the ascending clock-auction does not im-
prove on the static one. The reason is that the logic of backward induction loses its bite
when the assumption of complete information is relaxed.22 In incomplete informa-
tion environments, the case for the role of dynamic mechanisms in reducing strategic
uncertainty must rely on stronger solution concepts (e.g. based on forward induction
reasoning), that allow agents to draw stronger inferences on their opponentsprivate
information from their past moves (see Mueller, 2009).
21In the formal setup of the paper, this amounts to a situation in which jtj = 1 for all t > 1 and
jtj = 1 for all t < T .
22See Kunamoto and Tercieux (2009) for a related negative result.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Proofs of results from Section 3.5
A.1.1 Proof of proposition 3.1
The proof is by induction. The initial step is trivial, for ISR0 is vacuously u.h.c..
For the inductive step, suppose that ISRk 1 is u.h.c., and let ftmi g be s.t. tmi ! ti,
fsmi g s.t. smi ! s^i and smi 2 ISRki (tmi ) for all m. Then, for each m, there exists
i;m 2 H  0  T  i;   S i s.t.
(1) smi 2 ri (i;mjtmi )
(2)  tmi = marg0T  i; 
i;m (j)
(3) supp(i;m (j))  0  ISRk 1 i
We want to show that s^i 2 ISRki (ti), i.e. that 9^i 2 H
 
T  i  S i

s.t.
(1) s^i 2 ri
 
^ijt^i

(2)  ti = marg0T  i^
i (j)
(3) supp(^i (j))  0  ISRk 1 i
Consider the sequence fi;mg  H  0  T  i;   S i. Since fi;mg is in a com-
pact, there exists a subsequential limit ^i. By continuity of  , ^i satises condition
(2), since (2) holds for each i;m and tmi ! ti. Furthermore, since the best-response
correspondence ri () is u.h.c. and smi 2 ri (i;mjtmi ) for each m, also condition (1)
is satised. Given that i;m ! ^i, the upper hemicontinuity of ISRk 1 i (from the
inductive hypothesis) su¢ ces for (3).
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A.1.2 Proof of proposition 3.2
We prove that, for each k,
 
^l (ti)
k
l=0
=
 
^l
 
~ti
k
l=0
implies ISRT ;ki (ti) = ISR
~T ;k
i (t
0
i).
This is proven by induction: suppose that it holds for (k   1) steps, that ^k (ti) =
^k
 
~ti

and that s^i 2 ISR ~T ;ki (ti). Then:
9i 2 H (0  T i  S i) s.t.
(1). s^i 2 ri (ijti)
(2). ti = mrg0T i
i ()
(3).
R
0ISRT ;k 1 i 
i () = 1
We want to show that s^i 2 ISR ~T ;ki
 
~ti

. That is, we will show that:
9~i 2 H

0  ~T i  S i

s.t.
(1). s^i 2 ri
 
~ij~ti

(2). i
 
~ti

= mrg0 ~T i ~
i ()
(3).
R
0ISR ~T ;k 1 i
~i () = 1
Let Dk 1 i =
n 
^l i (t i)
k 1
l=0
: t i 2 T  i
o
, and % i;k 1 :supp(i (ti)) ! 0  Dk 1 i
the map (0; t i) 7!

0;
 
^l i (t i)
k 1
l=0

. Similarly dene ~% i;k 1 :supp
 
i
 
~ti
 !
0  Dk 1 i . For each h 2 H, let 'k 1i (h) 2 
 
0 Dk 1 i

be the pushforward of
marg0T i
i (h) under % i;k 1. Under the inductive hypothesis, for every measurable
B  0 Dk 1 i , i
 
~ti
 
~% 1 i;0 (B)

= 'k 1i () [B].
Dene k 1i : 0 Dk 1 i  S i ! [0; 1] be such that such that for every s i 2 S i
and measurable B  0 Dk 1 i ,Z
(0;dk 1 i )2B
k 1i
 
0; d
k 1
 i ; s i

=
(
i()[fs ig% 1 i;k 1(B)]
'k 1i ()[B]
if 'k 1i () [B] > 0
0 otherwise
Let ~i 2 H

0  ~T i  S i

be s.t. for each measurable B  0  ~T i and
s i 2 S i (h)
~i () [B  fs ig] = i
 
~ti

[B] 
Z
(0;dk 1 i )2% i;k 1(B)
k 1i
 
0; d
k 1
 i ; s i

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By denition of CPS, ~i () pins down conditional beliefs at all histories reached with
positive probability. At all other histories, let ~i (h) be the pushforward of i (h)
under the map  :suppi (h)! 0  ~T i  S i dened as
(0; t i; s i) 7! (0;  i (t i) ; s i)
where  i (t i) 2 ~T i is such that
 
^l i (ti)
k 1
l=0
=
 
^l i ( i (t i))
k 1
l=0
(this is possible
since
 
^l (ti)
k
l=0
=
 
^l
 
~ti
k
l=0
). First, by construction, ~i 2  ~T  ~ti and (under
the inductive hypothesis) supp~i ()  0  ISR ~T ;k 1 i . Also, for all histories h
that receive zero probability under ~i (), ~i (h) induces the same distribution over
0   i  S i (the payo¤ relevant variables) as i (h). If we show that this is true
also at , it follows that s^i 2 ri (ijti) implies s^i 2 ri
 
~ij~ti

(since i (ti) = i
 
~ti

by
assumption ^0 i (ti) = ^
0
 i
 
~ti

). In fact, for each B  0 D0 i ( 0  i)
~i ()

~% 1 i;0 (B) fs ig

= i
 
~ti
 
~% 1 i;0 (B)
  Z
B
d0i (; s i)
= i
 
~ti
 
~% 1 i;0 (B)
  i () % 1 i;0 (B) fs ig
'0i () [B]
= i ()

% 1 i;0 (B) fs ig

This completes the proof. 
A.1.3 Proof of proposition 3.3
The proof is by induction: Let ti 2 T i; . Clearly, if i (ti) = ^0i (ti ), ISRT;1i (ti) =
ISRT  ;1i (ti ). As inductive hypothesis, assume that (^ni (ti))k 1n=0 = (^ni (ti ))k 1n=0 im-
plies that ISRT;ki (ti) = ISRT

 ;k
i (t

i ), and suppose that (^
n
i (ti))
k
n=0 = (^
n
i (t

i ))
k
n=0.
It will be shown that (^ni (ti))
k
n=0 = (^
n
i (t

i ))
k
n=0 implies that
ISRT;k+1i (ti) = ISRT

 ;k+1
i (t

i ) :
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Under the inductive hypothesis, s i 2 ISRT;ki (t i) for some t i 2 supp i (ti) if
and only if s i 2 ISRT

 ;k
 i
 
t i

for some t i 2 supp i (ti ). In PV-environments
only the conjectures about S i are payo¤ relevant for player i ( is dont a¤ect is
payo¤s, and 0 is a singleton.). Thus, under the inductive hypothesis, 9i 2 i (ti)
s.t. supp(margT i;S i
i)  ISRT;k+1 i and si 2 ri (ijti) if and only if 9^i 2 i (ti)
s.t. supp(margT  i;S i^
i)  ISRT  ;k+1 i and si 2 ri (^ijti ). (Remember the only
restrictions on the conjectures over S i imposed by ISR are at the beginning of the
game). Hence ISRT;k+1i (ti) = ISRT

 ;k+1
i (t

i ).
A.2 Proofs of results from Section 3.6
A.2.1 Proof of lemma 3.2
(Part I:) Fix ti 2 T^i, . For each k 6= i, let 0k be the nite set of payo¤ states
that receive positive probability by ti 2 Tj, j 6= k, and let i = 0i [ i. (i is nite
because ti is a nite type and i is nite). 8si 2 ISR (ti), 9si 2 i (ti) s.t. (1)
si 2 ri (sijti) and (2) supp(si ())  0 ISR i. Given a probability space (
;B)
and a set A 2 B, denote by [A] the uniform probability distribution concentrated on
A. For each " 2 [0; 1], consider the set of types proles i2NT "i  T  s.t. each T "i
consists of all the types ti 2 Ti and of types i (ti; si; ") s.t.:
i (i (ti; si; ")) = "
s
i + (1  ") i (ti)
and
 "i (i (ti; si; ")) = "[fs0g T i(si)] + (1  ")

si ()  ^ 1 i;"

where T i  T " i is the subset of dominance-types proles dened above, and
^ i;" : 0  T i  S i ! 0  T " i is s.t.
^ i;" (0; s i; t i; ) = (0;  i (t i; s i; "))
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By construction, with probability ", type i (ti; si; ") is certain that si is condition-
ally dominant, and puts positive probability to all of the opponentsdominance types
in T i. Dene  : 0  T " i ! 0  T " i  S i s.t.:
8 i (t i; s i; ") 2 T " i :
 (0;  i (t i; s i; ")) = (0;  i (t i; s i; ") ; s i)
and for every ts i 2 T i  T " i;

 
0; t
s
 i

=
 
0; t
s
 i; s i

Consider the conjectures ^i 2 H  0  T " i  S i dened by:
^i () =
 
 "i (i (ti; si; "))   1
 2   0  T " i  S i
For any " > 0, the conjectures ^i are such that T i  supp

margT " i^
i ()

.
From the denition of , it follows that supp
 
margS i^
i ()

= S i, so that the
entire CPS (^i (h))h2H can be obtained via BayesRule. This also implies that ^
i
satises condition (3) in the denition of SSR. Furthermore, by construction, ^i 2
i (i (ti; si; ")), and 8" > 0, 8h 2 H, 9";h 2 (0; 1) s.t. ";h ! 0 as "! 0 and
marg0T  iS i^
i (h) = ";h[fs0g Th i(si)S i(h)]
+
 
1  ":hmarg0S isi (h)
where T h i (si) =
n
t
(si;s i)
 i : s i 2 S i (h)
o
. Hence, the conditional conjectures ^i (h)
of type  i (t i; s i; ") are a mixture: with probability
 
1  ";h they agree with
i (), which made si sequential best response; with probability ";h they are con-
centrated on payo¤ states fsi0 g

 i (t i) : t i 2 T h i (si)
	
, which together with the
fact that i (i (ti; si; ")) = "
si
i + (1  ") i (ti) breaks the all ties in favor of si so that
169
ri (^
iji (ti; si; ")) = fsig. Thus, si 2 SSRi (i (ti; si; ")), so that (ii) and (iii) in the
lemma are satised for all " > 0.
The remainder of the proof guarantees that also part (i) in the lemma holds, and
it is identical to WYs counterpart.
(Part II:) it will be shown that ^i (i (ti; si; "))! ^i (ti) as "! 0. By construc-
tion, i (i (ti; si; ")) are continuous in ", hence ^i (i (ti; si; ")) ! ^i (i (ti; si; 0)) as
" ! 0 (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993). It su¢ ces to show that ^i (i (ti; si; 0)) =
^i (ti) for each ti and i. This is proved by induction. The payo¤ types and the rst
order beliefs are the same. For the inductive step, assume that
 
^li (i (ti; si; 0))
k 1
l=0
= 
^li (ti)
k 1
l=0
. We will show that ^ki (i (ti; si:0)) = ^
k
i (ti). Dene
Dk 1 i =
n 
^l i (t i)
k 1
l=0
: t i 2 T i
o
:
Under the inductive hypothesis, it can be shown (see WY) that
marg0Dk 1 i

i ()  ^ 1 i

= marg0Dk 1 i 
i () (})
Therefore:
^ki (i (ti; si; 0)) = [^k 1 i (i(ti;si;0))]
marg0Dk 1 i

si ()  ^ 1 i

= [^k 1 i (i(ti;si;0))]
marg0Dk 1 i 
si ()
= [^k 1 i (t i)]
marg0Dk 1 i 
si ()
= [^k 1 i (t i)]
marg0Dk 1 i i (ti)
= ^ki (ti)
where the rst equality is the denition of k-th level belief; the second from (}); the
third from the inductive hypothesis; the fourth from the fact that si 2  (ti); the
last one again by denition.
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A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
The proof is by induction: For k = 0, let ~ti be s.t. i
 
~ti

= i
 
t^i

and i
 
~ti

=
[fsg T i(si)]. Clearly, ISR1i
 
~ti

= fsig and condition (1) is satised. Fix k > 0,
write each t i = (; ) where  =

^k
0
 i (t i)
	k 1
k0=1 and  =

^k
0
 i (t i)
	1
k0=k. Let
Lk 1 i =

 : 9 s.t. (; ) 2 T  i
	
. As inductive hypothesis, assume that: for each
nite t i = (; ) and s i 2 SSRk 1 i (t i) s.t. T i (si) supp

marg T^ i
si ()

, there
exists nite ts i i =
 
; s i;

s.t. ISRki (tsii ) = fsig. Take any si 2 SSRki
 
t^i

s.t.
T i (si) supp

marg T^ i
si ()

: we will construct a type ~ti s.t. for each k0  k,
^k
0
i
 
t^i

= ^k
0
i
 
~ti

, ISRk+1i
 
~ti

= fsig: By denition, if si 2 SSRki
 
t^i

, 9si 2
H
 
0  T  i  S i

s.t.
(1) i
 
t^i

= margT i
si ()
(2). supp (si ())  0  SSRk 1 i
(3) fsig = ri
 
sijt^i

Using the inductive hypothesis, dene the mapping
' :
S
h2H
h
supp

marg0Lk 1 i S i
si (h)
i
! 0  T  i
such that: ' (; ; s i) =
 
;
 
; s i;

Dene type ~ti as
i
 
~ti

= marg0Lk 1 i S i
si (j)  ' 1
= si ()  proj 1
0Lk 1 i S i
 ' 1
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By construction (for the inductive hypothesis), the rst k orders of beliefs are the
same for ti and ~ti (which is point 1 in the lemma)
~ki
 
~ti

= margLk 1 i ~ti
= si ()  proj 1
Lk 1 i S i
 ' 1  proj 1
Lk 1 i
= si ()  proj 1
Lk 1 i
=

si ()  proj 1T  i

 proj 1
Lk 1 i
= margLk 1 i ti
= ~ki (ti)
Where the rst equality is by denition, the second is from construction of i
 
~ti

above; the third is from the denition of ', for which
proj 1
0Lk 1 i S i
 ' 1  proj 1
0Lk 1 i
= proj 1
0Lk 1 i
The fourth and fth are simply notational, and the last one by denition. We need to
show that ISRk+1i
 
~ti

= fsig. To this end, notice that each (0; t i) 2supp
 
i
 
~ti

is of the form (0; t i) =
 
0;
 
; s i;

, and it is s.t. ISRk i
  
; s i;

= fs ig.
Hence, the array of conditional conjectures (i.e. CPS) that are consistent with ~ti and
with the restrictions ISRk i are ~i s.t.:
i
 
t^i

= marg0T  i ~
i ()
and
~i ()

0 

(t i; s i) : ISRk i (t i) = fs ig
	
= 1
hence, the conditional conjectures are uniquely determined for all h 2 H (s i) for some
s i : fs ig = ISRk i (t i) and t i 2supp
 
margT ii
 
t^i

. But since, from hypothesis,
T i (si) supp
 
margT i
si

, and that by denition of T i (si) we trivially have that
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S
t i2 T i(si)
ISRk i (t i) = S i, the conditional conjectures are uniquely determined for
all h 2 H. These conjectures are given by ~i () = i
 
t^i
  { 1, with { dened as
{
 
0;
 
; s i;

=
 
0;
 
; s i;

; s i

Furthermore, for each h:
margS i ~
i (h) = margS i
si (h)
To see this, given the observation that si () is completely mixed (i.e. all histories
are reachable with positive probability), it su¢ ces to show that
margS i ~
i () = margS i
si () :
But this is immediate, given that from the denition of { and ', we have:
proj 1
0Lk 1 i S i
 {  ' = I.
(I is the identity map). Hence, ~i is uniquely determined for all h, and it is equal to
si, to which si is the unique best response. Hence ISRk+1i
 
~ti

= fsig.
The proof of statement (3) in the lemma is identical to WYs: Dene
~T
~ti
i =

~ti
	 [
0B@ [
(;t
s i
 i )2supp(i(t^i))
T
t
s i
 i
i
1CA ;
~T
~ti
j =
[
(;t
s i
 i )2supp(i(t^i))
T
t
s i
 i
 i (for j 6= i)

A.3 ISR in the Interim Normal Form
The analysis in this section applies to nite models in PV-environments, we thus
focus on Bayesian games  T =


N;H;Z;(Ti; i; u^i)i2N

s.t. j T j < 1 and
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u^i : Ti Z ! R for each i 2 N .1
Dene the ex-ante payo¤s as: For each (ti; si) 2 Ti  Si and  i 2 (T i  S i),
Ui (si;  i; ti) =
Z
T iS i
ui (z (si; s i) ; i (ti)) d i (t i; s i)
Denition A.1. A strategy si 2 Si is weakly dominated for ti, if for all  i 2
(T i  S i) s.t. margT i i = i (ti) and s.t.  i [s i] > 0 for each s i 2 S i
si =2 argmax
s0i2Si
Ui (s
0
i;  i; ti)
Say that  T is in generic position if for every ti 2 Ti, z 6= z0 implies that
ui (z; i (ti)) 6= ui (z0; i (ti)). Notice that in PV-environments, tis beliefs i (ti) 2
(T i) are payo¤ irrelevant. The following is thus a well-known fact (e.g., lemma 1.2
in Ben-Porath, 1997).
Lemma A.1. If  T is in generic position, si is not weakly dominated for ti if and
only if si is sequentially rational for ti.2
The next denition introduces Dekel and Fudenbergs (1990) S1W -procedure for
the interim normal form of  T .
Denition A.2. For each ti 2 Ti, let S0W Ti (ti)  ri (ti).For each k = 0; 1; 2; :::, and
ti 2 Ti, let SkW Ti (ti) =

si 2 Si : (ti; si) 2 SkW Ti
	
, SkW T = i=1;:::;nSkW Ti and
SkW T i = j 6=i;0SkW Tj . Recursively, for k = 1; 2; :::, and ti 2 Ti
SkW Ti (ti) =
8<:s^i 2 Sk 1W Ti (ti) :
9 i 2 
 
Sk 1W T i

s.t.
(1). i (ti) = margT i i
(2). s^i 2 argmaxs0i2Si Ui (s0i;  i; ti)
9=;
Finally: S1W Ti (ti) =
T
k0
SkW Ti (ti)
1As in section 3.3 u^i (z; ti) = ui (z; i (ti)) :
2Sequentially rational strategies were dened in denition 3.8.
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Proposition A.1. If  T is in generic position, for each i 2 N , ti 2 Ti and k 
1,ISRT ;ki (ti) = Sk 1W T i (ti). Hence ISRT = S1W T .
Proof: From Lemma A.1, ISRT ;1i (ti) = S0Wi (ti). In the following it will
be shown that for each k  1 and ti 2 Ti, ISRT ;ki (ti) = Sk 1W Ti (ti) implies
ISRT ;k+1i (ti) = SkW Ti (ti).
Step 1(): Let s^i 2 ISRT ;k+1i (ti) and i 2 i (ti) be s.t. supp(margS ii (j)) 
ISRT ;k i and s^i 2 ri (ijti). Set  i = i (j). Under the inductive hypothesis,
 i 2 
 
Sk 1W T i

and trivially by construction: i (ti) =margT i i and s^i 2
arg max
si2Sk 1WTi (ti)
Ui (si;  i; ti). Hence, s^i 2 SkW Ti (ti).
Step 2(): Let s^i 2 SkW Ti (ti) and ^ i 2 
 
Sk 1W T i

s.t. i (ti) =margT i^ i
and s^i 2 arg max
si2Sk 1WTi (ti)
Ui (si; ^ i; ti). From the inductive hypothesis, s^i 2 SkW Ti (ti) 
Sk 1W Ti (ti) = ISRT ;ki (ti), hence 9i 2 i (ti) s.t. supp(margS ii (j))  ISRT ;k 1 i
and s^i 2 ri (ijti). Let ^i such that ^i (j) = ^ i, and for each h at which ^i (jh)
is not specied by BayesRule, set ^i (jh) = i (jh). Since supp(^ i)  Sk 1W T i =
ISRT ;k i (ti) under the inductive hypothesis, ^i 2 i (ti) and is concentrated on
ISRT ;k i . That also s^i 2 ri (ijti) holds is immediate, as ^i (j) agree with ^ i,
and the conditional conjectures at unexpected histories agree with i.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Topological structures and Conditional Prob-
ability Systems
B.1.1 Topological structures
Sets i;t  Rni;t, t  RltandMi;t  Ri;t are non-empty and compact, for each i and
t (Sections 4.3 and 4.4). Let nt =
P
i2N ni;t and t =
P
i2N i;t. For each h
t
i =,  < t,
let  (hti) denote the triple (i; ;m ;  ) consisting of is private signal at period  ,
the message prole and allocation chosen at stage  along history hti. For each k 2 N,
let d(k) denote the Euclidean metric on Rk. We endow the sets Hi with the following
metrics, di(i 2 N), dened as: For each hti; hi 2 Hi (w.l.o.g.: let   t)
di
 
hti; h

i

=
t 1X
k=1
d(ni;k+k+lk)
 
k
 
hti

; k (h

i )

+ dni;t
 
i;t; 
0
i;t

+
X
k=t+1
1:
It can be checked that (Hi; di) are complete, separable metric spaces.
Sets of strategies are endowed with the supmetrics dSi dened as:
dSi (si; s
0
i) =
TX
t=1
 
sup
hti2Ht 1Y ti
di;t
 
si
 
hti

; s0i
 
hti
!
Under these topological structures, the following lemma implies that CPSs intro-
duced in Section B.1.2 are well-dened.
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Lemma B.1. For all public histories h 2 H, Si (h) is closed.
Proof. See lemma 2.1 in Battigalli (2003).
B.1.2 Conditional Probability Systems
Let 
 be a metric space and A its Borel sigma-algebra. Fix a non-empty collection of
subsets C  An;, to be interpreted as relevant hypothesis. A conditional probability
system (CPS hereafter) on (
;A; C) is a mapping  : A C ! [0; 1] such that:
For all B 2 C,  (B) [B] = 1
For all B 2 C,  (B) is a probability measure on (
;A).
For all A 2 A, B;C 2 C, if A  B  C then  (B) [A]   (C) [B] =  (C) [A].
The set of CPS on (
;A; C), denoted byC (
), can be seen as a subset of [ (
)]C
(i.e. mappings from C to probability measures over (
;A)). CPSs will be written
as  = ( (B))B2C 2 C (
). The subsets of 
 in C are the conditioning events, each
inducing beliefs over 
; (
) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence of
measures and [ (
)]C is endowed with the product topology. Below, for each player i,
we will set 
 = S in games with payo¤uncertainty (or 
 =  if the game is
appended with a model of beliefs). The set of conditioning events is naturally provided
by the set of private histories Hi: for each private history hti = (ht 1; yti) 2 Hi, the
corresponding event [hti] is dened as:

hti

=

yti
	  T=t+1i; i  S  ht 1 :
Under the maintained assumptions and topological structures, sets [hti] are com-
pact for each hti, thus 
Hi (
) is a well-dened space of conditional probability sys-
tems. With a slight abuse of notation, we will write i (hti) instead of 
i ([hti]) :
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B.2 Proofs of results from Section 4.6
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof:
Step 1: ((). Fix B, (^; p^) and b^i. For each hti, let P (^;p^)i (hti) 2 ( B i  S i)
denote the probability measure on   B i  S i induced by p^i (hti) and ^ i. For
each j, let
Sj = fsj 2 Sj : 9bj 2 Bj s.t. sj 2 supp (^j (bj))g :
We will prove that Sj  BRMj for every j. For each hti = (yti ; ht 1) 2 Hi, let
'
hti
j :
Sj ! Sj (hti) be a measurable function such that
'
hti
j (sj)
 
hj

=

sj
 
hj

if   t
mj otherwise
where mj is the message (action) played by j at period  < t in the public history
ht 1. Thus, 'h
t
i
j transforms any strategy in Sj into one that has the same continuation
from hti, and that agrees with h
t
i for the previous periods. Dene the mapping Lhti :
 B i  S i !  B  S such that
Lhti (; b i; s i) =

; b^i; b i; '
hti
i

^i

b^i

; '
hti
 i (s i)

:
(In particular, L (; b i; s i) =

; b^i; b i; ^i

b^i

; s i

.).
Dene the CPS i 2 Hi ( B  S) such that, for any measurable E   
B  S,
i () [E] = P
(^;p^)
i

b^i
 
L 1 (E)

and for all hti 2 Hi s.t. i
 
ht 1i

[hti] = 0, let
i
 
hti

[E] = P
(^;p^)
i

b^i
 h
L 1
hti
(E)
i
:
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(conditional beliefs i (hti) at histories h
t
i s.t. i
 
ht 1i

[hti] > 0 are determined via
Bayesian updating, from the denition of CPS, appendix B.1.2)
Dene the CPS i 2 Hi (  S) s.t. 8hti 2 Hi, i (hti) =margSi (hti). By
construction, s^i 2 ri (i). We only need to show that conditions (2) and (3) in the
denition of BR are satised by i. This part proceeds by induction: The initial
step, for k = 1, is trivial. Hence, Sj  BR1j for every j. To complete the proof, let
(as inductive hypothesis) Sj  BRkj for every j. Then i constructed above satises
i ()    fs^ig  BRk i and
supp
 
margSjht 1
i ()

= supp
 
margSjht 1
i
 
hti

 Sjht 1:
thus s^i 2 BRk+1i . This concludes the rst part of the proof.
Step 2: ()). Let B be such that for each i, Bi = BRi and let strategy ^i : Bi !
Si be the identity map. Dene the map Mi; :   S !  B i s.t.
Mi; (; si; s i) =
 
; ^ 1 i (s i)

Notice that, for each i and si 2 BRi, 9si 2 Hi (  S) s.t.
1. s^i 2 ri
 
s^i

2. for all hti 2 Hi: sj 2 supp

margSj
s^i (hti)

) 9s0j 2 BRj : sjjht 1 = s0jjht 1:
Hence, for each hti 6= , we can dene the map s^i;hti :supp
 
margS i
s^i (hti)
! BR i
that satises s^i;hti (s i) jht 1 = s ijht 1. Let ms^i;hti  ^ 1 i  s^i;hti . Dene maps
Ms^i;hti : 
  supp  s^i (hti)!  B i
Ms^i;hti (; si; s i) =
 
;mhti (s i)

:
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Let beliefs i : Bi ! ( B i) be s.t. for every measurable E   B i
i (bi) [E] = 
^i(bi) ()

M 1i; (E)

Let beliefs p^i be derived from ^ and the initial beliefs via Bayesian updating
whenever possible. At all other histories hti 2 Hi, for every measurable E   B,
set
p^i
 
hti

[E] = ^i(bi)
 
hti
 h
M 1
^i(bi);hti
(E)
i
:
By construction, (^; p^) is an IPE of (E ;M;B).
B.2.2 The backwards procedure
Fix a public history of length T   1, hT 1. For each k = 0; 1; :::, let Rk;hT 1i  ShT 1i
be such that

yTi ; s
hTi
i

2 Rk;hT 1i if and only if sh
T
i
i 2 Rk;h
T 1
i
 
yTi

, Rk;hT 1 =
i2NRk;hT 1i and Rk;h
T 1
 i = j 6=iRk;h
T 1
j . For each h
T
i =
 
hT 1; yTi
 2 Y Ti , let
R0;hT 1i
 
yTi

= S
hTi
i and for k = 1; 2; :::, for each ~y
T
i 2 Y Ti let
Rk;hT 1i
 
~yTi

=
n
si 2 Rk 1;hT 1i
 
~yTi

: 9hTi 2 

  ShT 1 i

1. h
T
i

~yTi
	 i Rk 1;hT 1 i  = 1
2. for all s0 2 ShT 1i :Z
(;s i)2ShT 1 i
Ui
 
si; s i; ;hT 1
  dhTi

Z
(;s i)2ShT 1 i
Ui
 
s0i; s i; ;h
T 1  dhTi )
and RhT 1i (~yti) =
1T
k=1
Rk;hT 1i (~yti).
Notice that RhT 1i consists of pairs of types yTi and continuation strategies si 2
S
(hT 1;yTi )
i . Hence, each RhT 1i can be seen as a subset of ShT 1i .
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For each t = 1; :::; T   1, for each hti = (ht 1; yti) let:
R0;ht 1i
 
yti

=
n
si 2 Sh
t
i
i : 8ht s.t. ht 1  ht,
8yt+1i s.t.  yti  yt+1i , sij
 
ht; yt+1i
 2 Rhti  yt+1i o
and for each k,

yti ; s
hti
i

2 Rk;ht 1i if and only if sh
t
i
i 2 Rk;h
t 1
i (y
t
i). For each k =
1; 2; :::and for each k = 1; 2; :::
Rk;ht 1i
 
~yti

=
n
si 2 Rk 1;ht 1i
 
~yti

: 9hti 2 

  Sht 1 i

1. 

~yti
	  T=t+1 i Rk 1;hT 1 i  = 1
2. for all s0 2 Shtii :Z
(;s i)2Sht 1 i
Ui
 
si; s i; ;ht 1
  dhti

Z
(;s i)2Sht 1 i
Ui
 
s0i; s i; ;h
t 1  dhti)
and Rht 1i
 
~yti

=
1\
k=1
Rk;ht 1i
 
~yti

:
Finally: Ri =
n
si 2 Si : sijy1i 2 Ri (y1i ) for each y1i 2 Y 1i
o
.
Proposition 4.2. BRi = Ri for each i.
Proof:
Step 1

Ri  BRi:

: let s^i 2 Ri . Then, for each hti = (ht 1; yti), sijhti 2
Rht 1i (yti) (equivalently: sht 1i 2 Rht 1). Notice that for each ht 1 and sht 1i 2 Rht 1i ,
there exists si 2 Ri such that sijht 1 = sht 1i . Thus, for each j and ht 1, we can
dene measurable functions h
t 1
j : Rht 1j ! Rj such that: 8 sht 1j 2 Rht 1j
h
t 1
j

sh
t 1
j

jht 1 = sht 1j .
(Functions h
t 1
j assign to strategies in Rht 1j , strategies in Rj with the same contin-
uation from ht 1.) As usual, denote by 
ht 1 i
 i the product j 6=i
ht 1j
j .
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For each ht 1, let 'h
t 1
j : Sj ! Sj (ht 1) be a measurable function such that
'h
t 1
j (sj)
 
hj

=

sj
 
hj

if  > t
mj otherwise
where mj is the message (action) played by j at period  < t in the public history
ht 1. (As usual, denote by '
ht 1 i
 i the product j 6=i'
ht 1j
j .)
For each ht 1, dene the measurable mapping %h
t 1
 i : Rht 1 i ! S i (ht 1) such that
8sht 1 i 2 Rht 1 i ,
%h
t 1
 i

sh
t 1
 i

= 'h
t 1
 i  h
t 1
 i

sh
t 1
 i

:
It will be shown that: for each k = 0; 1; :::, s^i 2 R;ki implies s^i 2 BRki .
The initial step is trivially satised (BR0i = Si = R;0i ).
For the inductive step, suppose that the statement is true for n = 0; :::; k 1: Since
s^i 2 R;ki , for each hti = (ht 1; yti) there exists hti 2 

  Sht 1 i

that satisfy
s^ijhti 2 arg max
s0i2S
ht
i
i
Z
Sht 1 i
Ui
 
s0i; s i; ;h
t 1  dhti ,
and such that 

 R;k 1 i

= 1 and for all hti 6= ,
h
t
i

yti
	  T=t+1i; i Rht 1 i  = 1:
Now, consider the CPS i 2 Hi (  S) such that, for all measurable E 
  S i,
i () [fs^ig  E] =  (E) .
By denition of CPS, i () denes  (hti) for all h
t
i s.t. 
i () [hti] > 0. Let h
t
i
be such that i ()

ht 1i

> 0 and i () [hti] = 0. Dene the measurable mapping
Mhti : 
 Rht 1 i !   S (ht 1) such that for all

; sh
t 1
 i

2   S (ht 1),
Mhti

; sh
t 1
 i

=

; 'h
t 1
i (s^i) ; %
ht 1
 i

sh
t 1
 i

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and set i (hti) equal to the pushforward of 
hti under Mhti , i.e. such that for every
measurable E    S
i
 
hti

[E] = h
t
i
h
M 1
hti
(E)
i
.
Again, by denition of CPS, i (hti) denes  (h

i ) for all h

i  hti that receive
positive probability under i (hti). For other histories, proceeds as above, setting
i (hi ) equal to the pushforward of 
hi under Mhi , and so on.
By construction, s^i 2 ri (i) (condition 1 in the denition of BRki ). Since by
construction i

  fs^ig R;k 1 i ;

= 1, under the inductive hypothesis
i
 
  fs^ig  BRk 1 i ;

= 1
(condition 2 in the denition of BRki ). From the denition of 'ht 1i (s^i), CPS i
satises condition (3.1) at each hti. From the denition of %
ht
 i, under the inductive
hypothesis, i satises condition (3.2).
Step 2 (BRi  Ri ): let s^i 2 Ri and i 2 Hi (  S) be such that s^i 2 ri (i).
For each hti = (h
t 1; yti), dene the mapping  hti : S i ! Sh
t 1
 i s.t.  hti (s i) jht 1 =
s ijht 1 for each s i 2 S i. (Function  hti transforms each strategy prole of the
opponents into its continuation from ht 1.) Dene also 	hti : 
  S !   Sht 1 i
such that
	hti (; si; s i) =
 
;  hti (s i)

For each hti 2 Hi, let hti 2 

  Sht 1 i

be such that for every measurable
E    Sht 1 i
h
t
i [E] = i
 
hti
 h
	 1
hti
(E)
i
.
so that the implied joint distribution over payo¤ states and continuation strategies
s ijht 1 is the same under i (;hti) and hti . We will show that s^ijhti 2 Rht 1i (yti) for
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each hti = (h
t 1; yti). Notice that, by construction,
s^ijhti 2 arg max
si2S
ht
i
i
Z
Ui
 
si; s i;hti
  dhti .
The argument proceeds by induction on the length of histories.
Initial Step (T   1). Fix history hTi =
 
hT 1; yTi

: for each k, if s^i 2 BRki , then
s^ijhTi 2 Rh
T 1;k
i
 
yTi

. For k = 0, it is trivial. For the inductive step, let h
T
i be dened
as above: under the inductive hypothesis, h
T
i

i Rh
T 1;k 1
 i

= 1 (condition 1),
while s^i 2 ri (i) implies that condition (2) is satised.
Inductive Step: suppose that for each  = t + 1; :::; T , s^i 2 BRi, implies
s^ijhi 2 Rh 1i (y ) for each hi = (h 1; yi ). We will show that for each k, hti =
(ht 1; yti), s^ijhti 2 Rk;h
t 1
i (y
t). We proceed by induction on k: under the inductive
hypothesis on  , s^ijhti 2 R0;h
t 1
i (y
t). For the inductive step on k, suppose that
s^i 2 BRi, implies s^ijhti 2 Rn;h
t 1
i (y
t) for n = 0; :::; k   1, and suppose (as contra-
positive) that s^ijhti =2 Rk;h
t 1
i (y
t). Then, for h
t
i dened as above, it must be that
supp
 
h
t
i

* Rk 1;ht 1 i , which, under the inductive hypothesis on n, implies that
9s i 2supp
 
margS i
i (hti)

s.t. @s0 i 2 BR i : s0 ijht 1 = s ijht 1, which contradicts
that i justies s^i in BRi.
B.3 Proofs of results from Sections 4.7 and 4.8
B.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Step 1 (If):For the if part, x an arbitrary type space B, and consider a direct
mechanism M. Let (pi)i2N be any beliefs system such that, 8i 2 N , 8 (; b i) 2
B i, pi (h0i ) = i (h0i ) and for each hti 2 Hi such that P ;p
 
ht 1i

[hti] > 0, p
i (hti)
is obtained via Bayesian updating. If instead hti is such that P
;p
 
ht 1i

[hti] = 0, and
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hti = (h
t 1; yti) s.t. h
t 1 =
 
~yti ; ~y
t
 i

, then let beliefs be such that
supp

marg ip
i
 
hti
  ~yt i	  T=t+1 i; (B.1)
That is, at unexpected histories, each i believes that the opponents have not deviated
from the truthtelling strategy: If unexpected reportswere observed, player i rather
revises his beliefs about the opponentstypes, not their behavior.
Notice that if Ui (s; )  Ui
 
s0i; s

 i; 

for all , then for any pi () 2 ( B i),Z
B i
ui
 
gs

() ; 
  dpi ()

Z
B i
ui

g(s
0
i;s

 i)jhti () ; 

 dpi () :
Hence, the incentive compatibility constraints are satised at the beginning of the
game, and so at all histories reached with positive probability according to the ini-
tial conjectures and strategy prole. Being  2 , only truthful histories receive
positive probability. At zero probability histories, we maintain that the belief sys-
tem satises (B.1). With these beliefs, the only payo¤-relevant component of the
opponentsstrategies at history hti is the truthful report: from the point of view
of player i, what  i species at non-truthful histories is irrelevant. Let 

i (h
t
i) be
a best response to such beliefs and  i in the continuation game: Notice that under
these beliefs, any  i 2  determines the same i (hti). Hence, for any i we can chose
i 2  so that the strategy prole thus constructed is an IPE of the Bayesian game.
Step 2 (only if): Since perfect implementability implies interim implementabil-
ity, the only if immediately follows the results by Bergemann and Morris (2005),
who showed that if a SCF is interim implementable on all type spaces, then it is
ex-post implementable.
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B.3.2 Proof of Proposition 4.5
By contradiction, suppose BR = B 6= fscg. By continuity of ui and compactness of
, B (ht) is compact for each ht. (Because if B = BR, strategies in B must be best
responses to conjectures concentrated on B, see denition of BR).
It will be shown that for each t and for each public history ht 1, s [B (ht 1)] =
sc [ht 1], contradicting the absurd hypothesis. The proof proceeds by induction on the
length of the history, proceeding backwards from public histories hT 1 to the empty
history h0.
Initial Step: [s

B
 
hT 1

= sc

hT 1

for each hT 1].
Suppose, by contradiction, that 9hT 1 =  ~yT 1; xT 1 : s B  hT 1 6= sc  hT 1.
Then, by the contraction property,
9yTi and 0i;T 2 Bi
 
hT 1; yTi

: 0i;T 6= sci
 
hT 1; yTi

such that:
sign

sci
 
hT 1; yTi
  0i;T  = sign Ti  yTi ; yT i  Ti  ~yT 1; 0i;t; 0 i;t
for all yT i =
 
yT 1 i ;  i;T

and 0 i;T 2 B i
 
hT 1; yT i

:
Fix such yTi and 
0
i;T 6= sci
 
hT 1; yTi

, and suppose (w.l.o.g.) that sci
 
hT 1; yTi

>
0i;T . Dene:

 
hT 1; yTi

:= min
yT i2Y T i and
0 i;T2B i(hT 1;yT i)

Ti
 
yTi ; y
T
 i
  Ti  ~yT 1; 0i;t; 0 i;t (B.2)
(by compactness of Y T and B
 
hT

, 
 
hT ; yTi

is well-dened). Also, from 0i;T 6=
sci
 
hT 1; yTi

and the Contraction Property, 
 
hT 1; yTi

> 0.
For any " > 0, let
 
 
hT 1; yTi ; 
0
i;T ; "

= max
 i;T2 i;T

Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T
  Ti  ~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T 	
(B.3)
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(again, compactness of  i;T guarantees that  
 
hT ; "

is well-dened). Since Ti is
strictly increasing in i;T ,  
 
hT 1; yTi ; 
0
i;T ; "

is increasing in " and  
 
hT 1; yTi ; 
0
i;T ; "
!
0 as "! 0.
Let (ft (~yt))
T 1
t=1 = x
T 1. From strict EPIC, we have that for each ",
vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

; Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

;  T
 
~yT 1

> vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

; Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

;  T
 
~yT 1

and
vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

; Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

;  T
 
~yT 1

< vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

; Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

;  T
 
~yT 1

Thus, by continuity, there exists aT (") such that
Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

< aT (") < Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

(B.4)
such that
vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

; aT (") ;  T
 
~yT 1

= vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

; aT (") ;  T
 
~yT 1

From the within-period SCC(def. 4.16),
vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

; a;  T
 
~yT 1

> vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

; a;  T
 
~yT 1

whenever a > aT (")
Thus, to reach the contradiction, it su¢ ces to show that for any yT i 2 Y T i, Ti
 
yTi ; y
T
 i

> aT ("): If this is the case, reporting 0i;T is (conditionally) strictly dominated by
reporting 0i;T + " at h
T
i =
 
hT 1; yTi

, hence it cannot be that Bi = BRi and 0i;T 2
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Bi
 
hT 1; yTi

. To this end, it su¢ ces to choose " su¢ ciently small that
 
 
hT 1; yTi ; 
0
i;T ; "

<  (B.5)
and operate the substitutions as follows
Ti
 
yTi ; y
T
 i
  Ti  ~yT 1; 0i;T ; 0 i;T +   hT 1; yTi 
 Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + "; 
0
 i;T

+ 
 
hT 1; yTi
    hT 1; yTi ; 0i;T ; "
> Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + "; 
0
 i;T

> aT (")
Thus: Ti
 
yTi ; y
T
 i

> aT (") for any yT i. This concludes the initial step.
Inductive Step: [for t = 1; :::; T  1: if s [B (h )] = sc [h ] for all h and all  > t
then s [B (ht)] = sc [ht] for all ht]
Suppose, by contradiction, that 9ht 1 = (~yt 1; xt 1) : s [B (ht 1)] 6= sc (ht 1).
Then, by the contraction property,
9yti and 0i;t 2 Bi
 
ht 1; yti

: 0i;t 6= sci
 
ht 1; yti

such that:
sign

sci
 
ht 1; yti
  0i;t = sign ti  yti ; yt i  ti  ~yt 1; 0i;t; 0 i;t
for all yt i =
 
yt 1 i ;  i;t

and 0 i;t 2 B i
 
ht 1; yt i

:
Fix such yti and 
0
i;t 6= sci (ht 1; yti), and suppose (w.l.o.g.) that sci (ht 1; yti) > 0i;t.
Similar to the initial step, it will be shown that there exists "i;t = 
0
i;t + " for some
" > 0 such that for any conjecture consistent with B i, playing "i;t is strictly better
than playing 0i;t at history (h
t 1; yti), contradicting the hypothesis that BR = B.
For any " > 0, set "i;t = 
0
i;t + "; for each realization of signals ~i =

~i;k
T
k=1
and
opponentsreports ~m i = ( ~m i;k)
T
k=t, for each  > t, denote by s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

the
action taken at period  if "i;t is played at t, s
c
i is followed in the following stages,
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and the realized payo¤ type and opponentsmessages are ~i and ~m i, respectively.
(By continuity of the aggregators functions, sci;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

is continuous in ", and
converges to sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

as "! 0.)
For each realization ~i =

~i;k
T
k=1
and reports ~m i = ( ~m i;k)
T
k=t and for each
 > t , sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

may be one of ve cases:
1. sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

2   i;T ; +i;T , then
i
 
yi ; y

 i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i, and we can choose " su¢ ciently small that s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

2 
 i;T ; 
+
i;T

, i.e.
i
 
yi ; y

 i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i
2. sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

= +i;T and
i
 
yi ; y

 i

> i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

at the argmax over y i, then we can choose " su¢ ciently small that s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

= +i;T as well.
3. sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

= +i;T and
i
 
yi ; y

 i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i. Then, either s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

= +i;T as well, or s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

2 
 i;T ; 
+
i;T

, i.e.
i
 
yi ; y

 i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

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for all y i. In either case,
i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i
4. sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

=  i;T and
i
 
yi ; y

 i

< i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

at the argmax over y i, Then we can choose " su¢ ciently small that s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

=  i;T as well.
5. sci;

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

=  i;T and
i
 
yi ; y

 i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i. Then, either s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

=  i;T as well, or s
c
i;

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

2 
 i;T ; 
+
i;T

, i.e.
i
 
yi ; y

 i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i. In either case,
i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i
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That is, for each  > t, and for each

~i; ~m i

, in all ve cases there exists
"

~i; ~m i; 

> 0 such that:
for all " 2

0; "

~i; ~m i; 

, for all y i
i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

:
Let " = min
~i; ~m i;
"

~i; ~m i; 

(by compactness, this is well-dened and such that
" > 0). Hence, if the continuation strategies are self-correcting, if f is aggregator-
based, for any " 2 (0; "), reporting "i;t or 0i;t at period t does not a¤ect the allocation
chosen at periods  > t (the opponentsself-correcting report cannot be a¤ected by
i-th components of the public history). Hence, for " 2 (0; "), for each  i 2  i, the
allocations induced following sci at periods  > t and playing 
0
i;t or 
"
i;t at history h
t
i,
respectively 0 and ", are such that 0 = 
"
 for all  6= t.
Consider types of player i, 0i,
"
i 2 i such that for each  < t, 0i; = "i; = ^i;
(the one actually reported on the path), for all  > tand i; = sci; as above, while
at t respectively equal to "i;t and 
0
i;t. Thus, the induced allocations are 
" and 0
discussed above, and for each  6= t, i (") = i (0)  a^i .
From strict EPIC, we have that for any  i
vi

"; t (") ; fa^i g 6=t

> vi

0; t (") ; fa^i g 6=t

and
vi

"; t (0) ; fa^i g 6=t

< vi

0; t (0) ; fa^i g 6=t

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Thus, by continuity, there exists at (")
ti
 
~yt 1; 0i;t;  i;t

< at (") < ti
 
~yt 1; "i;t;  i;t

(B.6)
such that
vi

"; at (") ; fa^i g 6=t

= vi

0; at (") ; fa^i g 6=t

From the Single Crossing Condition,
vi

"; a; fa^i g 6=t

> vi

0; a; fa^i g 6=t

whenever a > at (") :
Thus, since the continuations in periods  > t are the same under both 0i;t and
"i;t, to reach the desired contradiction it su¢ ces to show that for any y
t
 i 2 Y t i,
ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i

> at ("). (This, for any realization of ~ i).
As in the initial step, dene:
 := min
yt i2Y t i and
0 i;t2B i(ht 1;yt i)

ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i
  ti  ~yt 1; 0i;t; 0 i;t (B.7)
For any " > 0, let
 (") = max
 i;t2 i;t

ti
 
~yt 1; "i;t;  i;t
  ti  ~yt 1; 0i;t;  i;t	 (B.8)
Since ti is strictly increasing in i;t,  (") is increasing in " and  (") ! 0 as
"! 0.
To obtain the desired contradiction, it su¢ ces to choose " su¢ ciently small that
 (") <  (B.9)
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and operate the substitutions as follows
ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i
  ti  ~yt 1; 0i;t; 0 i;t+ 
 ti
 
~yt 1; "i;t; 
0
 i;t

+     (")
> ti
 
~yt 1; "i;t; 
0
 i;t

> at (") :
B.3.3 Proof of Proposition 4.6
The proof is very similar to those of proposition 4.5.
Initial Step: [s

B
 
hT 1

= sc

hT 1

for each hT 1].
The initial step is the same, to conclude (in analogy with equation B.4), that there
exists aT (") such that
Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

< aT (") < Ti
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

(B.10)
such that
vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

; aT (") ;  T
 
~yT 1

= vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

; aT (") ;  T
 
~yT 1

(B.11)
From the Strengthened SCC(def. 4.17),
vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T + ";  i;T

; a;  T
 
~yT 1

> vi
 
xT 1; fT
 
~yT 1; 0i;T ;  i;T

; a;  T
 
~yT 1

whenever a > aT (")
From this point, the argument proceeds unchanged, concluding the initial step.
Inductive Step: [for t = 1; :::; T  1: if s [B (h )] = sc [h ] for all h and all  > t
then s [B (ht)] = sc [ht] for all ht]
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The argument proceeds as in proposition 4.5, to show that for each  > t,
and for each

~; ~m i

, if continuation strategies are self-correcting, there exists
"

~; ~m i; 

> 0 such that:
for all " 2

0; "

~; ~m i; 

;
i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

"i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

= i

~yt 1i ; 
0
i;t;

sci;k

0i;t; ~m i; ~i

k=t+1
; y i

for all y i:
Consider types of player i, 0i,
"
i 2 i such that for each  < t, 0i; = "i; = ^i; (the
one actually reported on the path), for all  > tand i; = sci; as above, while at t
respectively equal to "i;t and 
0
i;t. By construction, such types are such that for any
 6= t, i (") = i (0).
From strict EPIC, we have that for any  i
vi

f (") ; t (") ; fa^i g 6=t

> vi

f (0) ; t (") ; fa^i g 6=t

and
vi

f (") ; t (0) ; fa^i g 6=t

< vi

f (0) ; t (0) ; fa^i g 6=t

Thus, by continuity, there exists at (")
ti
 
~yt 1; 0i;t;  i;t

< at (") < ti
 
~yt 1; "i;t;  i;t

(B.12)
such that
vi

"; at (") ; fa^i g 6=t

= vi

0; at (") ; fa^i g 6=t

From the single crossing condition,
vi

f (") ; a; fa^i g 6=t

> vi

f (0) ; a; fa^i g 6=t

whenever a > at (")
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To reach the desired contradiction it su¢ ces to show that for any yt i 2 Y t i, ti
 
yti ; y
t
 i

>
at ("). The remaining part of the proof is identical to proposition 4.5.
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